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Abstract 
This thesis reveals the level of British engagement with, and debates over, controversial 
and lethal nerve agent weapons during the first three decades after the end of the 
Second World War. At the very heart of these secret debates were fundamental 
questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-
use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for 
either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations 
and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence 
committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery of defence policy, but featured 
prominently at the highest levels of British government and defence planning.  
From Prime Ministers to grass-roots activists, nerve agents proved a heated and 
provocative subject which drew strong interventions from across the political spectrum. 
Even behind closed doors, debates over the role and place of nerve agent weapons was 
far from harmonious, causing internal strife between government departments and 
pitting the Services against each other. Central to these long-running and evolving 
debates included often stark divisions between defence officials and politicians, 
disagreements over interpretations of chemical warfare deterrence, the delicate 
balancing of secrecy and publicity, the influence of Anglo-American relations, and 
clashes between normative values and military utility.  
From discovery to chemical weapons disarmament, this thesis will examine the 
British adaptation to, and handling of, the opportunities and threats brought by the 
nerve agent age. This thesis will place the nerve agent debate within the broader 
framework of British politics and defence policy in the Cold War, and it will shed new 
light on the extent, nature and development of British policy towards lethal nerve agent 
weapons.  
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Introduction: The British Nerve Agent Debate 
 
Since their discovery by German scientists in the 1930s and 1940s, lethal nerve agents 
have added a new and controversial dimension to the potential of chemical warfare 
(CW). Nerve agents, often odourless and colourless, are capable, in small doses, of 
killing within 1-15 minutes of exposure, either through inhalation or absorption through 
the skin or the eyes.1 Their very effectiveness and lethality give them an insidious and 
even terrifying quality.2 The legacy and impact of their discovery is still felt to this day, 
and the names of these organophosphorus compounds resonate strongly with us.3 The 
mere mention of sarin or VX triggers recollections of recent reports of assassinations, 
the stockpiling of these CW agents by nations such as North Korea, and civilians falling 
victim to this gruesome form of warfare in civil wars.4 By studying the roots and 
history of the nerve agents, we can further understand and draw valuable lessons from 
the drivers and risks of weapons proliferation, the role of deterrence, and the struggles 
and motivations involved in achieving successful and committed disarmament. 
This thesis will provide an original contribution by assessing the unique and 
controversial British experience. It will analyse the trials and tribulations of British 
politicians and defence officials when it came to considerations of lethal nerve agent 
weapons, and it will further develop our understanding and comprehension of the 
motivations, constraints and development of policy in a highly sensitive area. At the 
                                                 
1
 Frederick Sidell and Jonathan Borak, ‘Chemical Warfare Agents: II. Nerve Agents’, Annals of 
Emergency Medicine, 1992, 21:7, pp.865-871; L. Szinicz, ‘History of chemical and biological warfare 
agents’, Toxicology, 2005, 214, pp,173-174; R. Everett Langford, Introduction to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Radiological, Chemical and Biological (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2004) pp.227; 
Frederick Sidell et. al., ‘Nerve Agents’, Chap. 5 in Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (Falls Church, 
VA: Office of the Surgeon General, 2008) pp.155-161, 167. It should also be noted that there are many 
variations of nerve agents, with the section here primarily referring to tabun, sarin and soman. 
2
 For further details on the nerve agents, see: Julian Perry Robinson, The Rise of CB Weapons 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971) pp.84-85; Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Weaponry: A 
Continuing Challenge (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp.5-7. Also, see Chapter 1 and the section on 
discovery.  
3
 While having strong links to contemporary security studies and world events, chemical warfare also has 
a very long history. For further details, see the excellent and highly informative: Adrienne Mayor, Greek 
Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World 
(London: Overlook Duckworth, 2003). Also see: A. Dawson, ‘Hannibal and Chemical Warfare’, The 
Classical Journal, 1967, 63:3, pp.117-125. 
4
 For examples, see: Kareem Shaheen, ‘“Almost 1,500 killed in chemical weapons attacks” in Syria’, The 
Guardian, 11 March 2016; BBC News, ‘Kim Jong-nam: VX dose was “high and lethal”’, 26 February 
2017; Martin Evans, ‘Sergei Skripal: The “spy with the Louis Vuitton bag” allegedly poisoned during 
quiet retirement in Salisbury’, The Telegraph, 5 March 2018; Cristina Varriale, ‘North Korea's Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Arms Control Today, 2018, 48:7, pp.6-10. 
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very crux of this tumultuous British experience lay pervasive, long-running and 
discordant debates over acquisition, deterrence and disarmament; during which 
conflicted politicians and defence officials attempted to adapt to the nerve agent age. 
These same officials struggled to balance arguments over the military requirements and 
justifications for acquiring nerve agent weapons, against all the negative political, 
economic, normative and occasionally military aspects of this contentious avenue of 
weapons development. These divisive discussions and detailed deliberations raged for 
over three decades. The British nerve agent debate drew the ire, support and 
interventions of Prime Ministers, it attracted severe public and political opposition, and 
it pitted the Services and government departments against each other.  
This debate and controversy over the nerve agent weapons was triggered from 1945, 
after the uncovering of the German wartime development of nerve agents. The legacy 
of this discovery led to British CW policy repeatedly oscillating from one extreme, that 
of nerve agent acquisition, to the other, that of renunciation and abandonment.5 This 
thesis is therefore not a linear history, for nerve agent weapons did not simply slowly 
drift away after they were discovered; they lingered, remained and often resurfaced at 
the very highest levels of British politics and defence policy in the Cold War. 
Throughout the course of these nerve agent debates, and despite taking different guises 
and forms, one principal question remained a constant: did the perception of the Soviet 
threat, deterrence requirements and the military utility of nerve agent weapons warrant 
the political, economic and normative costs brought about by their acquisition and 
development?6 Throughout the controversies, clashes and shifting senior political and 
military support for nerve agent acquisition and mass-production, this balancing of the 
scales represented the pivot on which British considerations of nerve agent weapons 
rested. These long-running debates continued for over thirty years, until the scales 
finally irrevocably tipped under the weight of disarmament talks, normative values and 
political and public pressures in 1976. This was the year in which the approach of 
                                                 
5
 For details on the nerve agent discovery, see: Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare 
from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006) pp.64-102; Ulf Schmidt, Secret 
Science: A Century of Poison Warfare and Human Experiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
p.158; Charlie Hall, ‘British Exploitation of German Science and Technology from War to Post-War, 
1943-1948’, PhD diss., University of Kent, 2017, p.132. For further details also see chapter 1 and the 
section on discovery. 
6
 This thesis will take normative factors to include the ‘taboo’ nature of chemical weapons, legal 
restrictions, and the broader laws of war, in particular the 1925 Geneva Protocol. As found in: Susan 
Martin, ‘Norms, Military Utility, and the Use/Non-use of Weapons: The Case of Anti-plant and Irritant 
Agents in the Vietnam War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2016, 39:3, p.325. 
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British defence officials towards nerve agent weapons dramatically shifted and 
solidified, away from acquisition and towards disarmament.7 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine the extent of political engagement with the 
nerve agent weapons, the military rationale, motives and constraints involved in nerve 
agent acquisition, and ultimately, to assess how far Britain ventured down this 
controversial path. It will reveal the secret inner workings and debates in Britain over 
the nerve agent question, and it will seek to uncover the complex interlinking facets of 
secrecy, publicity and disarmament. Arising from this thesis will be a clear reappraisal 
of our understanding of British engagement and activities in this contentious area 
through the exploration of five key themes. These include political and military 
support; secrecy and publicity; CW deterrence; Anglo-American cooperation; and the 
clash of arguments over normative values and military utility. These themes will be 
used to shed new and revelatory light on this crucial area of British defence policy. This 
thesis will use these supporting aims and themes to argue that in Britain the nerve agent 
question formed an important component of the development of Cold War defence 
policy, that CW policy was often confusing, divisive and contradictory, and that in the 
end, despite strong arguments and perceived military necessity, normative, economic 
and political barriers proved too high to overcome for the advocates of acquisition and 
production.  
 
The scope of the thesis 
In terms of the focus and range of this thesis, emphasis has been placed on the nerve 
agents as the bedrock of CW deterrence, the focal point of fears regarding the Soviet 
CW threat, the centre of the CW arms race, and the topic of sustained discussion of 
their actual use as a weapon of war. While the scope could have been broadened out to 
include CW policy as a whole, involving incapacitating agents and defensive measures, 
this would have diluted the level of analysis and the depth of argumentation. Such 
dilution would detract from the unique nature of the British nerve agent experience and 
                                                 
7
 For details on this end point, and its importance, see: The UK National Archives [herein abbreviated to 
TNA], DEFE 4/282, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 2 March 1976, Confidential Annex; 
TNA, DEFE 13/1056, ‘Draft Chemical Weapons Convention’, A. P. Hockaday to PS/Secretary of State, 
3 August 1976; TNA, DEFE 13/1056, ‘Draft Chemical Warfare Convention’, Chief of the Defence Staff 
to the Secretary of State for Defence, 5 August 1976; TNA, DEFE 4/282, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 5 August 1976. In addition, further detailed evidence for this end point has been 
provided in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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diminish the benefits of an in-depth study. While incapacitating agents are a 
particularly important area of research, considerations of nerve agent acquisition often 
took place in isolation from incapacitating agents, with the two following very different 
paths and with both areas holding distinct experiences and lessons.8 This is not to say 
this thesis will neglect these significant areas, as at times, as with biological warfare 
(BW), other aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) policy profoundly 
impacts the nerve agent debate; it is simply to say that the main focus of this thesis will 
be on the nerve agents.  
In assessing the British nerve agent debate, the primary focus will be on senior actors 
and agencies in the political and defence establishment. These leading actors, including 
Prime Ministers, Cabinet Defence Committee members and Service Chiefs, allow for 
an accurate examination of the extent and role of nerve agents in British defence policy. 
It is also at this higher level of policy formulation where the major decisions were 
taken, and where the policy-changing debates occurred.9 Naturally, this thesis will also 
include and assess how various high-level defence committees and officials were 
guided and informed, which has necessitated exploring the influence and roles of mid-
level advisory committees and experts. This analysis is also not purely limited to the 
viewpoint of these government officials. In order to provide a holistic account of the 
nerve agent debate, the impacts of negative publicity, grass-roots movements and 
political opposition will be explored, as well as international influences in the form of 
tripartite cooperation, détente, NATO, and the UN. It should also be noted here that this 
thesis has focused on the political and military aspects of the nerve agent debate, rather 
than the specific accounts of human experiments that were conducted or of the 
experiences of scientists working in the British programmes.10 The thesis has 
incorporated technical developments, advancements and scientific observations as a 
                                                 
8
 Valuable accounts in these fields include, but are not limited to: Brian Balmer, Secrecy and Science: A 
Historical Sociology of Biological and Chemical Warfare (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012); Alex 
Spelling, ‘“Driven to Tears”: Britain, CS Tear Gas, and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 2016, 27:4, pp.701-725; Alex Mankoo and Brian Rappert, Chemical Bodies: The Techno-
Politics of Control (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018). 
9
 Naturally a core part of this is also the policy recommendations and guidance provided to more senior 
politicians by defence officials and Government officials. 
10
 This is not to say this avenue of research will be neglected, only that the focus will be on the political-
military aspect of nerve agent weapons.  
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significant contributory part to much broader narratives on military utility, defence 
policy and political considerations.11  
With any thesis, an appreciation of scale is also needed. To adequately address such a 
complex and multi-faceted area of defence policy a degree of depth is required, which 
is all the more critical given the necessary chronological breadth of this thesis. British 
discovery of nerve agent advancement in 1945 is a natural starting point, and the year 
of 1976 represents a decisive shift and a crucial turning point in the long-running nerve 
agent debate. Studying a narrower timeframe would reveal only a partial segment of the 
British nerve agent experience, which although useful and insightful, is not the aim or 
purpose of this thesis. This thesis is an assessment of the origins, development and 
eventual decline of British considerations of lethal nerve agent weapons, and it has 
strived to ascertain just why Britain took such an unusual approach to the nerve agent 
question.  
 
Key themes  
In addressing the core arguments of this thesis, five key themes have been identified. 
These themes are central to the British nerve agent debate, and they form the very heart 
of the thesis; they also significantly contribute to our understanding of British CBW 
policy and further emphasise the importance of researching it. These themes include the 
level of political and military support for nerve agent weapons; the divisive issue of 
publicity and secrecy; concepts and interpretations of CW deterrence; the role and 
influence of Anglo-American cooperation; and normative values clashing with 
arguments over military utility. In the nerve agent debate, these core themes are 
embodied to varying degrees throughout the entire period and in all six chapters, which 
flow chronologically from 1945 to 1976.  
The first theme, at the very centre of this thesis, is an assessment of the extent to which 
the controversial CW field, and more specifically the lethal nerve agents, featured in 
                                                 
11
 At the lower levels and when it came to the general direction and the finer details of CW policy 
scientists did exert a large influence, but in terms of the more senior political and military considerations 
this facet is but one of the many avenues and drivers involved in the entirety of policy formulation. This 
is not to say it will be excluded, but it will be encompassed into a broader causal analysis. Some 
particular exceptions come in the form of scientific advisors such as Sir Solly Zuckerman, who at times 
exerted considerable influence over policy, as well as scientific advisory committees. In addition, 
detailed considerations of scientists would not directly align with the core aims of this thesis, which is 
primarily to assess and determine the levels and nature of political and military engagement.  
13 
 
British politics and defence policy. By investigating this aspect of British defence 
policy, this thesis has sought to reveal the degree of British military support and 
political engagement with lethal and controversial nerve agent weapons. This level of 
military support for nerve agent weapons is both surprising and an overlooked facet of 
British defence policy. The military importance attached to possessing nerve agent 
weapons reveals just how strong military support was for these weapons, as well as the 
remarkable extent to which defence officials were willing to go in acquiring them, with 
issues over first-use, economic constraints and political aversion all tackled head-on. 
Acquisition, development and deterrence thus all feature prominently, and in tandem 
with political and public pressures, they rendered nerve agent policy a fraught affair. 
Political and Prime Ministerial involvement in the nerve agent debate also makes this 
thesis a fascinating case study in terms of British politics. Successive Prime Ministers, 
irrespective of party loyalties, took drastically different stances over the controversial 
nerve agent debate, with some fully embracing the mass-production of nerve agent 
weapons, and others attempting to sideline and ignore the field entirely.  
The second theme of this thesis is the nexus of publicity and secrecy. The uneasy 
relationship between the two reveals surprising contradictions, and analysing this 
dimension of British policy can provide further significant insights into their effects, 
limitations and consequences. The ramifications of secrecy and publicity, and of 
politicians and defence officials attempting to exert some form of control over the flow 
of information, holds many key insights for historians of British politics, military 
historians and even contemporary practitioners. This theme of the thesis is also highly 
complementary, as it builds upon existing literature which focuses on secrecy and 
science, such as by Brian Balmer and Ulf Schmidt.12 By specifically studying the 
British nerve agent debate, we can further our appreciation of political entanglement, 
the tactical government deployment of public information, and the often negative 
impacts resulting from strict secrecy, as well as the perceived reasons for it.  
Chemical warfare deterrence, itself an underexplored area and one which is heavily 
impacted by secrecy and publicity, is the third major theme of this thesis. In both 
contemporary and historical assessments focus has tended to be placed on the much 
                                                 
12
 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy 1935-65 
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001); Schmidt, Secret Science, pp.1-672. These sources will be further discussed 
in the literature review section.  
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larger field of nuclear deterrence, yet this fixation has led to valuable alternative 
avenues of research being overlooked. One such marginalised area is British CW 
deterrence, which provides a fascinating and at times bizarrely contradictory account; 
but it is also one which features prominently in British defence policy. It holds valuable 
lessons and insights. Investigating the long history of CW deterrence, and specifically 
CW deterrence in the Cold War, can also further contribute to our understanding of the 
evolution of British nuclear deterrence thinking and defence policy formulation. In this 
endeavour to reveal the significant impact of CW deterrence within and on British 
defence policy, this thesis will assess what the perceived purpose and rationale of CW 
deterrence was, and it will reveal exactly why it was such a controversial yet significant 
area of British defence policy.  
The fourth significant theme of this thesis is one that no study of British CW policy 
would be complete without: considerations and analysis of international cooperation, 
particularly that of Anglo-American and tripartite (Britain, the United States and 
Canada) collaboration. While the remarkable level of Anglo-American cooperation is to 
an extent recognised in the existing literature, this thesis will add more depth, colour 
and evidence to the striking levels of collaboration, and it will further reveal the 
opportunities, limits and hindrances brought about by it. As while the opportunities and 
benefits are often cited, in reality Anglo-American cooperation was not always a 
smooth ride; it was strained with tensions, frustrations, and miscommunications. 
Evidence and arguments in this thesis will therefore hold significant insights for those 
interested in British defence policy, Anglo-American historians, and those interested in 
alliance networks and cooperation in extremely sensitive areas.13 This thesis will 
analyse the influence, evolution and impact of the Anglo-American partnership, and 
determine the level of British dependence and reliance on the United States for CW 
deterrence, retaliation and research.  
Overlapping and intertwining with considerations of international cooperation, 
deterrence and secrecy is the fifth major theme of this thesis, that of the divides and 
                                                 
13
 It should also be noted here that while NATO will feature, emphasis will be placed on bilateral and 
tripartite ties, for these close relations exerted a more considerable direct influence on British nerve agent 
policy than did the NATO framework. This does not entail NATO being neglected, rather that the focus 
will be on the core drivers and influencers of nerve agent policy and considerations. Occasionally this 
was in fact through NATO, however on the whole bilateral and trilateral relations were far more 
prevalent, particularly in the early Cold War. For a useful account on CW and NATO, see: John 
Hemsley, The Soviet Biochemical Threat to NATO (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987). 
15 
 
confrontations resulting from arguments over military utility and normative values. 
These clashes were often stark and unyielding. And, defence officials, politicians and 
foreign office officials all represented different facets of the debate at different times. 
Normative based considerations and internal opposition within government formed a 
core part of the checks and balances in place when it came to considerations of the first-
use of nerve agent weapons and their acquisition. This normative-military divide over 
nerve agent weapons, and the study of it, can help us better understand the reasons for 
weapons proliferation and non-proliferation.14 The British nerve agent debate is a prime 
exemplar of this divide and a valuable avenue of research, for at its heart is a debate 
and disagreement over the legal, moral, international and political consequences vis-à-
vis military requirements, deterrence and perceptions of the Soviet threat. Reflective of 
the latter point regarding the perceived Soviet threat, a sub-section of this theme will 
also be an assessment of the value and contribution of intelligence to the formulation of 
deterrence and defence policy.  
Considerations of the importance of the nerve agents to British defence policy, the 
impact of secrecy and publicity, the role of CW deterrence, Anglo-American 
cooperation, and the normative and military utility clash will thus form the very core of 
this thesis. These five major themes, present to varying degrees throughout all chapters, 
are integral to our considerations of Britain’s nerve agent experience and the heated 
debates which occurred within British defence policy. This thesis will further our 
understanding of how far Britain’s controversial flirting with this lethal and 
controversial form of warfare went, it will hold valuable insights into British attempts 
to control publicity, and it will reveal new evidence on the dynamics of Anglo-
American relations and the unique nature of the British nerve agent experience. The 
five key themes of this thesis are also not separate or disparate themes, but overlapping 
and interlinking. As such, while they have been distinguished here, throughout the 
thesis they will be blended, as they are intrinsically linked and have a substantial 
bearing upon each other.  
Analysing the causality and developments of British nerve agent policy is a 
complicated affair, yet it is an area which existing literature does not give due credence 
                                                 
14
 Studying the divide will also partially build upon Susan Martin’s excellent work, and this thesis will 
provide further insights and historical case studies for those in International Relations who analyse and 
draw lessons from the debates between normative values and military utility. See: Martin, ‘Norms, 
Military Utility, and the Use/Non-use of Weapons’, pp.321-364.  
16 
 
to, or adequately address. The major themes of this thesis, in addition to their 
importance and value in their own right, will also address a substantial and serious gap 
in our present conceptions of British defence policy.  
 
Literature review 
In order to place this thesis within the existing literature, three broad categories of work 
have been identified. The first analyses histories of British foreign and defence policy, 
the second examines closely related nuclear weapons histories and the third places this 
thesis within the disparate yet growing CBW field. Throughout this literature review, 
the contribution of this thesis will become increasingly evident, as it addresses a 
considerable gap in our knowledge and understanding of British defence policy and 
provides a new aspect to CBW history.  
An integral part of this thesis is its placement within broader narratives of Cold War 
history, as well as those dealing with British foreign and defence policy. Overviews of 
the Cold War, such as Odd Arne Westad’s The Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis’ Cold 
War, and Gordon Barrass’ The Great Cold War, form the contextual background for 
much of the analysis in the chapters.15 These accounts form a key part in breaking 
down Britain’s Cold War experience, as only by appreciating the changing Cold War 
environment can the shifts and debates within British defence policy be fully 
comprehended. 
Accounts of British foreign and defence policy in the post-war years form an essential 
contextual background within which to situate the British nerve agent debate. 
Exemplars of this avenue of study, which both illuminate and challenge our 
understandings of British foreign and defence policy in the Cold War, come in the form 
of John Young’s Britain and the World, David Reynolds’ Britannia Overruled, John 
Baylis’ British Defence Policy and David French’s Army, Empire, and Cold War.16 
                                                 
15
 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold 
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Extensive and detailed research has also been conducted on the all-important dimension 
of Anglo-American relations, with John Dumbrell’s A Special Relationship, John 
Baylis’ Anglo-American relations and C. J. Bartlett’s 'The Special Relationship'.17 This 
thesis will further develop and contribute to these broader narratives by analysing the 
British nerve agent debate, its impact on British defence policy and Anglo-American 
relations. Addressing the significant nerve agent facet of British foreign and defence 
policy will also allow for a re-evaluation of the nature of Anglo-American cooperation 
in a highly controversial area, and facilitate a re-appreciation of British political and 
military motives, intent and activities in the Cold War. 
Studies of British foreign and defence policy of a more focused nature, either 
chronologically or by theme, are also of use for this thesis, but they are similarly 
lacking in their appreciation of the role and importance of CBW, and more precisely, 
the nerve agent development. In these accounts, the British nerve agent experience 
receives either marginal or no coverage.18 More focused histories include works on the 
outbreak of the Cold War, such as by Michael Dockrill, Julian Lewis and Charlie 
Hall.19 For the British experience during the later Cold War, insightful accounts can be 
found in Thomas Robb’s A strained partnership, as well as in Alex Spelling’s 
revisionist and extremely useful articles on Edward Heath and Harold Wilson.20 A 
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central component of these more focused accounts is also that of biographies and 
autobiographies covering British leaders and noteworthy individuals. This includes 
valuable books on the character and influence of such figures as Solly Zuckerman, 
Denis Healey, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson.21 These histories 
of the Cold War, and Britain’s course and leaders within it, will be harnessed to further 
understand the British nerve agent debate. As with broader histories of the Cold War 
and the British experience, these accounts have however tended to underscore broader 
trends and policy, which, while extremely useful for historians of British defence policy 
has come at the cost of missing valuable case studies.  
This current deficit in the published histories of British defence policy is even further 
accentuated by the fact that if these accounts refer to weapons of mass destruction at 
all, they tend to confine themselves to the dominance and role of nuclear weapons. 
Histories of British nuclear weapons, though, and more specifically those concerning 
deterrence and policy, are of considerable use to this thesis. In this closely related yet 
separate field, substantial and numerous studies have been conducted. Amongst the 
most notable contributions are works by John Baylis who, in addition to writing on 
broader British defence policy, focuses on nuclear weapons history in Ambiguity and 
Deterrence.22 Other valuable accounts of British nuclear weapons history can be found 
with Margaret Gowing’s two volumes on British nuclear history, Peter Hennessy’s 
Cabinets and the Bomb, Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler’s The British Origins of 
Nuclear Strategy, and Matthew Jones’ official histories of the British nuclear 
deterrent.23 The latter is of particular use as it meticulously reflects internal government 
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debates over issues of deterrence, containing some parallels to the British nerve agent 
debate. Predictably in these accounts of nuclear history, while having some crossovers 
in terms of approaches, individuals and conceptualisations of deterrence within the 
framework of defence policy, their focus largely excludes other forms of weapons of 
mass destruction.24 This focus is understandable given the aims of the studies 
mentioned, but is a further sign of the marginalisation of an important area of British 
defence policy.  
Surprisingly, with only a few exceptions, there is remarkably little overlap between 
historians of British nuclear weapons history and British CBW history.25 This nuclear 
fixation has led to the neglect and underappreciation of the importance of the British 
nerve agent debate, as well as the ramifications it holds for Britain in the Cold War. 
Exploration of the British nerve agent experience contains many insights for experts in 
nuclear weapons history, and just as nuclear histories have aided this thesis, so to can 
this thesis aid nuclear historians in further understanding government policy and 
approaches towards controversial weapons and alternative forms of deterrence.  
Branching out from both British nuclear history and British foreign and defence policy 
history is also growing literature on the history of British intelligence.26 This 
burgeoning field provides useful ancillary material for this thesis, particularly when it 
comes to framing the Soviet threat and when assessing British perceptions of Soviet 
aggression and intent. One key text in this regard is Michael Goodman’s official history 
of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which provides a useful account of British 
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perceptions of the Soviet threat in the early Cold War.27 Another intelligence history of 
direct use can be found with Mark Wilkinson’s Before Intelligence Failed, which 
explores British CBW intelligence from the mid-to-late 1970s up until the 2003 Iraq 
War.28 Although useful in conceptualising the connections between intelligence and 
foreign policy, the focus on the end of the Cold War and the build-up to the Iraq War 
leads to the exclusion of important history. As such, crucial coverage of the formative 
years of British nerve agent policy in the 1950s and 1960s is absent, which this thesis 
will address. When it comes to policy-making and policy formulation, intelligence 
studies as a whole, while aiding in scrutinising British perceptions of the Soviet threat, 
is also but one part of a much larger process. Intelligence and perceptions of the Soviet 
threat will therefore be used as a contributory and essential thread in a much broader 
analysis of the British nerve agent debate.  
Dedicated intelligence histories are not the only sources to address perceptions of the 
Soviet CBW threat and extremely informative accounts in this regard can also be found 
in CBW histories. Included in these CBW histories is coverage of specific themes, such 
as the history of human experimentation, the impact of secrecy and science, 
disarmament, and arms control measures. These areas of research include major works 
by Brian Balmer, Edward Spiers, Ulf Schmidt, Susan Martin, and John Walker.29 Due 
to there being multiple approaches to CBW history, this section of the literature review 
will first consider those works most closely aligned to this thesis, then analyse 
international accounts of CBW, and end with considerations of alternative approaches 
and themes in CBW history.  
                                                 
27
 Michael S. Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Volume I: From the 
Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (London: Routledge, 2014). Another very 
informative and illuminating account is also: Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-
American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
28
 Mark Wilkinson, Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological 
Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2018). A thorough and 
detailed account of the Soviet BW programme can also be found with: Milton Leitenberg and Raymond 
Zilinskas, with Jens Kuhn, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012). 
Unfortunately, as of yet it seems that an equivalent has not been written for CW in English. In addition, 
other accounts also focus on Soviet BW, see: Anthony Rimmington, Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The 
Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare (London: Hurst & Company, 2018). 
29
 Full accounts, further emphasis and references will be provided as the literature review progresses 
(listing all their major works here in one footnote would be impractical). In addition, consideration will 
also be given to other substantial contributors to the CBW field, such as Jeanne Guillemin, Matthew 
Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson.  
21 
 
In the CBW field, Brian Balmer has written several revealing and extensively 
researched accounts of the British experience.30 His contribution to CBW history is 
exemplified by Britain and Biological Warfare, which traces the origins, development 
and decline of British BW policy between 1930 and 1965.31 By revealing the parallel 
yet separate history of British BW policy, Balmer provides valuable interpretations and 
insights relevant to British CW policy, particularly in relation to policy formulation, 
scientific policy and the impact of secrecy. While CW and BW histories do at times 
overlap, as will be seen in the thesis, in Britain the two followed two very distinct 
paths. The two fields both hold important, but separate lessons. Of more direct 
relevance to this thesis, Balmer has also published an insightful article on British CW 
policy in the 1960s, ‘Keeping Nothing Secret’.32 This thesis will seek to build upon this 
article, and benefitting from recently released archival sources, it will deepen and 
broaden the analysis of British CW policy from 1945, until the crucial year of 1976. 
This expanded chronological range will complement Balmer’s work in the CW field, 
and facilitate a more thorough understanding of the evolution and development of the 
British nerve agent debate.  
Other accounts exploring the history of British CW policy can be found in Gradon 
Carter’s histories of Porton Down, Kim Coleman’s A History of Chemical Warfare, and 
Robert Harris’ and Jeremy Paxman’s A Higher Form of Killing.33 These accounts have 
contributed to our awareness of what British CW policy was and where it was 
conducted. Ultimately, though, they fail to explain why British CW policy followed a 
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particular path, and limited sources available at the time of writing somewhat hinders 
their attempts to do so. As with accounts of British foreign and defence policy, the 
breadth of these studies has also come at a cost, and they focus more on what policy 
was, rather than why particular decisions were taken. While extremely useful for 
contextual and background information, these more descriptive histories leave 
unanswered the questions over why British policy followed the path it did and what 
caused it to do so. 
Of substantial use for this thesis are the numerous books and articles on CBW history 
by Edward Spiers, which explore international trends in CBW proliferation, CBW 
policy and other major themes in the CBW field. Significant works by Spiers include 
Chemical Warfare, Chemical Weaponry and A History of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons.34 In A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Spiers provides an 
informative and analytical study of the main trends in CBW, ranging from the First 
World War to recent terrorist-related incidents.35 In Chemical Warfare and Chemical 
Weaponry, assessments of the prevalent trends in the CW field are of significant use in 
identifying the key themes and their importance in the British experience. This includes 
Spiers’ writings on CW deterrence, the role of chemical weapons and the emergence of 
chemical weapons disarmament.36 Without this framework and these revealing 
histories, an accurate and informed study of the unique British nerve agent debate 
would have been immensely difficult. This thesis will therefore further fill in the 
picture when it comes to these essential domestic and international trends and themes, 
and it will place the British experience within the broader international framework. In 
addition, new insights into British nerve agent deterrence, disarmament and policy will 
provide a rich source of material and expand and enhance our awareness of the critical 
debates and motivations involved in the evolution of CW policy.  
While other significant works in the CBW field reveal central trends and key themes, 
they do not directly account for or analyse in detail the unique British nerve agent 
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experience. A core component of this aspect of the literature, which this thesis will 
further develop, is our understanding of tripartite cooperation and the nature of relations 
between Britain, the United States and Canada. Valuable accounts along these lines can 
be found with John Bryden’s Deadly Allies, Gradon Carter and Graham Pearson’s 
article on tripartite CBW collaboration and, most importantly for this thesis, Jonathan 
Tucker’s War of Nerves.37 Bryden traces the development of tripartite cooperation and 
the role of Canada from 1937-1947; however this focus necessarily omits coverage on 
the crucial years of the nerve agent debates in defence policy thinking, and the 
remarkable process of trilateral collaboration that was to emerge in the 1950s.38 
Similarly, Carter and Pearson’s article is predominantly a summary of tripartite 
meetings, which while useful, does not assess in detail why close relations developed or 
the consequences of them.39 Of these sources, Tucker’s War of Nerves is of the most 
direct relevance in regards to the British nerve agent debate, as it considerably 
improves our comprehension and appreciation of both CW history and tripartite 
cooperation in the Cold War.40 Tucker’s broad historical assessment of the United 
States CW programme, despite spanning almost a century, contains impressive details 
and causal analysis and it recognises the broader trends in, and domestic and 
international pressures on, CW policy formulation. While his approaches and 
interpretations are of significant value in framing this thesis, Tucker mostly leaves the 
history of the British nerve agent experience untapped; one-half of Anglo-American 
cooperation and policy is thus left unaccounted for.41  
Alongside Tucker’s history are other extremely valuable accounts on CW policy, which 
focus on specific themes and aspects of CBW history. Valuable works in this regard 
include Susan Martin’s ‘Norms, Military Utility, and the Use/Non-use of Weapons’ and 
analytical and illuminating assessments by Jeanne Guillemin, Matthew Meselson and 
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Julian Perry Robinson.42 Martin’s assessment of the constraints, divergent rationales 
and clashes between normative values and military utility from an IR perspective is a 
particularly refreshing and perceptive article which spans disciplinary divides.43 In 
breaking down the normative and military utility arguments over the use of anti-plant 
and irritant agents by United States forces in Vietnam, Martin reveals the internal 
struggles and motivations for military and political engagement in the CBW field.44 
Similar debates are present in the British nerve agent experience, and as such this thesis 
will provide analysis that can further inform our appreciation and comprehension of 
this crucial aspect of policy formulation. This thesis will benefit from the plethora of 
views in the CBW field, while adding its contribution to our understanding of the 
causal factors, drivers and restraints involved in CW policy formulation and weapons 
proliferation.  
Additional accounts which explore essential themes in British CBW history include 
those focused more exclusively on disarmament, those addressing controversial 
avenues such as human experimentation, and those exploring alternative forms of use, 
such as riot-control and incapacitating agents. In chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament, John Walker’s Britain and Disarmament explores British activities in the 
field between 1956 and 1975.45 This thesis will place chemical weapons disarmament 
within the much longer narrative of the British nerve agent debate, and it will also 
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expand upon the Foreign Office focus of Walker’s work to explore and account for the 
military and political rationale for accepting emergent chemical weapons disarmament 
talks in the 1970s. Other valuable sources contributing to our appreciation of the British 
CW experience are Ulf Schmidt’s Secret Science, Rob Evans’ Gassed, and Alex 
Mankoo’s, Brian Rappert’s and Alex Spelling’s works on CS gas.46 These sources 
increase our awareness of British CW policy, and they notably include the political 
angle as well as that of public perceptions. Given their alternative focus and emphases, 
none of these accounts directly address in detail the senior levels of British nerve agent 
policy formulation, nor fully account for the senior political and military debates over 
nerve agent acquisition, deterrence and disarmament.  
Taking the above works into consideration, a significant gap is therefore present in our 
understanding of how nerve agent weapons figured in British defence policy, and a 
surprising scarcity of material addresses senior British activities in this area. Historians 
of British defence and foreign policy have overlooked a substantial and valuable 
subject, and this has left unanswered important questions over the British nerve agent 
experience. And, histories of nuclear weapons have largely ignored the important 
lessons which the CW field can offer, with the nerve agent debate holding considerable 
importance and ramifications. While some influential accounts in the CBW field have 
attempted to remedy this deficiency, thus far very few complete, coherent, or dedicated 
studies of the origins and development of British nerve agent policy exist. Current 
CBW literature is to a degree a disparate field spread across the multiple dimensions of 
CBW history, such as on international trends, proliferation, disarmament, human 
experimentation and incapacitating agents. As such, while ancillary and useful, these 
histories do not in themselves explain or reveal the full development of the British 
nerve agent debate during the Cold War; it is this significant aperture in the literature 
which this thesis will attempt to fill.  
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Methodology and structure  
In seeking to examine British involvement with nerve agent weapons, the role of CW 
deterrence, the controversy and consequences of secrecy, the role of international 
cooperation, and the clashes between normative and military arguments, this thesis will 
utilise many previously untapped archival sources. Analysis informed by these sources 
will provide the core of the thesis, with British military, diplomatic and political 
motivations and drivers all examined in depth. From the UK National Archives, an 
abundance of archival sources has facilitated a new assessment of the involvement of 
Prime Ministers and defence officials in CW policy. This exploration of the 
engagement and role of Prime Ministers has been greatly aided by the release of files 
from the PREM 11 series.47 Alongside valuable PREM files, this thesis has also made 
extensive use of sources from the CAB and DEFE file series, which will fuel a 
recasting of our understanding of the senior levels and dynamics of political and 
military engagement with the nerve agent question.48 Importantly, this thesis also 
includes recently released archival material from the 1970s, which has allowed for a 
full appreciation of the decisive turning point of 1976.49  
The main accusation levied against a focus on government sources is that factors 
outside of the traditional scope of political and defence debates, or those simply that 
went unrecorded, could be overlooked. To mitigate against the necessary prevalence of 
government sources, a wide net has been cast in gathering alternative insights and 
material. When assessing normative factors and influences which were not always 
categorically stated or acknowledged, this thesis has sought to read beyond these 
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sources, and to not take them purely at face value. In addition to the UK National 
Archives, documents from the United States National Archives, the Harvard-Sussex 
Programme Archive, the George Washington University National Security Archive, the 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives and the Zuckerman Archive have all been 
incorporated to further enhance and deepen the analysis.50 Moreover, to take stock of 
the influence of public and political opinion, significant attention has also been paid to 
press coverage, political memoirs, parliamentary debates and grass-roots activism; all 
of which will enrich and broaden the analysis in the thesis.51 
In breaking down the complicated and convoluted debates over British nerve agent 
acquisition, deterrence and disarmament, the chapters will follow a chronological 
structure spanning from 1945 through to 1976. The central themes will be incorporated 
and appear to varying degrees throughout the chapters, as will broader events in British 
policy and politics, for these often had a direct impact and influence on CW policy 
formulation. Each chapter will also start with a brief and broad overview of the Cold 
War climate, helping to frame the perspectives of senior politicians and defence 
officials, as well as the currents of public opinion.  
In this thesis, the first chapter will explore the dramatic starting point of nerve agent 
discovery in 1945, and it will trace and analyse how defence officials attempted to 
grapple with the problematic nerve agent question. Chapter one is therefore more of a 
foundational chapter, which will account for military views of nerve agent weapons, 
and internal military competition for primacy in the nerve agent field. Following from 
this, chapter two will assess one of the landmarks of British post-war CW policy, with 
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the build-up to the all-important 1952 Global Strategy Paper, as well as its short-term 
effects which garnered an about turn in the fortunes of CW policy. This chapter will 
also bring to the fore debates and clashes over normative values, military utility and 
prospects for the first-use of chemical weapons. The third chapter, spanning 1954-57, 
will investigate the longer-term effects and legacy of the about turn in CW policy. A 
core part of this chapter will also be an examination of the influence of Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden on British CW policy.  
Chapter four covers 1958-63, during which time British CW policy was characterised 
by growing support for greater interdependence with the United States, a spate of 
negative publicity, and, arguably most significantly, the Zuckerman effect. With Sir 
Solly Zuckerman, as Chief Scientific Advisor at the MoD after 1960, exerting 
considerable sway over the direction of CW policy and the revival of nerve agent 
weapons in British defence policy. Chapter five traces and scrutinises the consequences 
of renewed and reinvigorated support for nerve agent weapons, and it addresses how 
government officials handled a tide of negative publicity, as well as fears of chemical 
weapons proliferation in the Third World. Spanning the period from 1964-69, this 
chapter brings to the fore controversial debates over CW deterrence, publicity and 
secrecy. The sixth and final chapter of this thesis begins with the growing influence of 
détente from 1970 onwards, and it culminates with the rise of disarmament talks and 
the decisive year for CW policy of 1976. When, military perspectives decisively 
shifted, and the British nerve agent debate was all but settled, with the oscillating and 
tempestuous course taken since 1945 finally coming to an end. 
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1. ‘A tragic state of affairs’: The Nerve Agent Discovery and British Defence 
Policy, 1945-1950  
 
[A] statement he made that frightened me was that we cannot afford to 
lag behind in bacteriological and chemical warfare preparations. It is a 
tragic state of affairs that a British Socialist statesman should say that at 
this time of day.1 
Rhys Davies MP, House of Commons, 26 July 1950. 
Moving from wartime cooperation to outright hostility, relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union witnessed a rapid and steady deterioration from the end of 
the Second World War in 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. This post-
war climate would see the clash of two great behemoths, bringing to the fore an 
ideological confrontation which would span decades, and at times bring the world to 
the very brink of catastrophe.2 While the origins of the Cold War have been long 
debated, for British defence officials it was clear from an early stage that the Soviet 
Union would be the principal threat to national security. In March 1946, as if to mark a 
crucial watershed, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated during his famous 
speech in Fulton, Missouri, that an iron curtain had fallen across Europe. Later that 
year, members of the Foreign Office also sagely warned that the Soviets were 
practising ‘the most vicious power politics’ in pursuit of their goals.3 In this early post-
war period, British foreign and defence policy was being formulated under the 
perceived threat of a large, ominous and seemingly growing menace from the East, and 
with the United States demobilizing it seemed like Soviet power would have to be 
countered without Washington’s active support.4  
From early 1947, however, there was an evident shift as the United States increasingly 
committed itself to the defence and reconstruction of Western Europe. Signs of this 
greater engagement in the emerging Cold War were seen in January 1947 when Britain 
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and the United States combined their zones of occupation in Germany, and in March 
the Truman administration pledged substantial aid to Greece and Turkey.5 The bipolar 
stand-off solidified by mid-1948, as the United States began to supply vital Marshall 
Plan economic aid to Western Europe, and when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin tested 
President Truman's resolve in the Berlin Blockade crisis.6 In isolation, Britain had little 
chance of holding the Soviet Union at bay, but, with this more committed United 
States, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoS) could begin basing British war plans on 
keeping ‘the Russians in Europe as far to the east as possible’.7 Coinciding with this 
escalating and tense Cold War stand-off in Europe, the situation was also growing 
increasingly unpredictable and uncertain in East Asia.8 Where, after the defeat of 
Nationalist forces in China, Mao Zedong proclaimed the formation of the People’s 
Republic of China in October 1949, bolstering the international Communist 
movement.9 Animated by the fallout over the so-called ‘loss’ of China, US fears grew 
over the world-wide expansion of Communism. The sense of crisis was increased by 
the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in August 1949 and was conveyed in the 
national security document NSC-68, which, produced in April 1950, called for a 
wholesale programme of US rearmament.10 A culminating point was reached with the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, an action widely perceived as instigated by 
the Kremlin.11 Britain, as a close ally of the United States and as a key regional actor in 
Asia, became heavily embroiled in the war, sending thousands of soldiers to fight.12  
For British defence officials, this tumultuous post-war period was therefore bracketed 
by the ending of one war and the beginning of another.13 It is in this emerging Cold 
War, and in this extremely uncertain global environment, that the origins and 
foundations of British CW policy were established. This chapter will first analyse the 
discovery of nerve agents, and then it will then go on to explore the evolving place of 
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nerve agent weapons in British defence policy, which culminated in crucial Cabinet 
Defence Committee decisions in 1950.  
 
Discovery  
It is often easy, when considering WMDs in the immediate post-war period, to focus 
almost exclusively on the impact of the atomic bomb. Yet similarly to advances in 
nuclear weapons, CW was also shaken by seismic developments in the field. In April 
1945, just weeks before the German surrender, British troops made a startling 
discovery.14 When advancing through North-West Germany, they stumbled upon 
strangely-marked German shells outside Lübbecke.15 These shells, alongside the 
uncovering of advanced German CW research at Raubkammer, revealed a remarkable 
development in the CW field: nerve agents.16 While CW agents deployed in the First 
World War would typically choke or blister and their use could be readily detected, 
nerve agents were ten to fifty times more lethal than these previous chemical weapons; 
CW experts also possessed no effective way to warn soldiers of their use on the 
battlefield.17 Nerve agents are often odourless, colourless, and lethal within 1-15 
minutes of exposure.18 As their name suggests, they affect the nervous system by 
disrupting the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which inhibits the breakdown of the 
neurotransmitter acetylcholine.19 This leads to a loss of control of muscles, including 
respiratory, and causes death by asphyxiation.20 The nerve agents kill by entering the 
body, not just through the eyes or respiratory tract, but also through the skin.21 Soldiers, 
who had traditionally relied on gas masks for their protection, were now potentially 
vulnerable to this colossal upgrade in the CW threat. 
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Anglo-American experts soon appreciated that this nerve agent discovery heralded a 
new age in the CW field, and this realisation triggered a further rush for German CW 
spoils.22 In the closing stages of the European war, this dramatic unveiling of the next 
generation of chemical weapons highlighted not an end, but a new beginning for a 
revitalised CW field. German researchers had uncovered three main nerve agents: 
tabun, sarin and soman.23 While German scientists had discovered sarin and soman too 
late in the war for large-scale stockpiling, this was not the case for tabun.24 As the 
Allies soon discovered, by the end of the war Germany had produced over 10,500 tons 
of tabun, nearly all of which had ended up in the British and United States zones of 
occupation. 25  
Exactly why Germany did not use its significant advantage in CW capabilities is a 
difficult and debated question. Whether it was down to inflated perceptions of Allied 
CW capabilities, Allied aerial superiority, CW not fitting into German military doctrine 
or memories of the First World War, Germany ultimately did not make operational use 
of its nerve agent weapons.26 During the war, discouraging German use of CW was also 
an active policy for Britain.27 This dissuading and deterring was a difficult endeavour 
for both British defence officials and the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. On the 
one hand, if Britain did not publicly deter Germany through its posture and with public 
threats of retaliation, then it could have invited CW attack through silence and the 
absence of a deterrent.28 However, on the other hand, if too many public 
announcements and threats of retaliation were made, German officials might have taken 
the view that Britain was either frightened of CW, or releasing public statements as a 
precursor for its imminent use.29 As Churchill was advised, deterring CW during the 
war entailed navigating this fine line, which by the end of the war appeared to have 
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worked.30 Crucially, many defence officials and politicians believed wartime CW 
deterrence to have been a success story, with CW preparedness and the occasional 
public warning seemingly successfully playing a part in deterring the German first-use 
of chemical weapons.31  
In the early Cold War, this perceived success of CW deterrence in the Second World 
War had a lasting impact on how senior British officials viewed CW deterrence, when 
deterring German CW use shifted to deterring Soviet CW use. An early indicator of this 
legacy of the Second World War in defence planning was seen in the Tizard Report of 
June 1945. Sir Henry Tizard, as scientific advisor to Churchill’s wartime Coalition 
Government, was tasked with chairing a committee to report on the future 
developments in weapons and methods of war.32 In his report, which was produced 
before the nerve agent discovery was made, Tizard argued that CW research ‘must 
continue as an insurance’.33 In supporting this claim, the Tizard Report emphasised that 
it was German fears of reprisals which had mitigated against their desire to use 
chemical weapons during the war.34  
Elected in July 1945, Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee reinforced and supported 
this line of thinking.35 With wartime experiences shaping his approach to CW 
deterrence, in November 1945, Attlee informed Parliament that: ‘gas was banned 
before the war of 1914-18, but it was used; and I have no doubt that if the Nazis had 
thought it worth while they would have used gas again.’36 This was a rare intervention, 
as on the whole secrecy shrouded the CW field and political and public scrutiny and 
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discussions were extremely limited, with the public largely unaware of the substantial 
nerve agent discovery. Indeed, Attlee only referred to poison gas, rather than to nerve 
agents. Attlee also believed that the perceived military utility of chemical weapons 
needed to be countered, which was best accomplished through deterrence and the 
ability to retaliate. When meeting President Truman in Washington that same month, 
leaked reports claimed that the lesson Britain and Attlee had taken from CW and the 
Second World War was that:  
The decision not to use gas in World War II was not a moral decision but 
a military one, based on the premise that neither belligerent would 
undertake its use as long as the other refrained.37  
From Attlee’s perspective, the prevention of CW rested upon the threat of retaliation 
and the removal or reduction of the military benefit of any enemy’s potential use, rather 
than moral considerations or legal constraints.38 His views were undoubtedly shaped by 
the harshness of the Second World War and by his experience in Churchill’s War 
Cabinet, during which he had defended Britain’s CW posture in the House of 
Commons.39 Attlee might also have been influenced by the actions of Churchill. During 
the war, Churchill had taken an active interest in CW policy, and he had proactively 
sought to deter German first-use by threatening to use chemical weapons in retaliation 
and by ensuring that Britain possessed a credible CW capability.40 Both Churchill’s and 
Attlee’s interpretations of deterring CW use through military means was also reflected 
in the extremely limited parliamentary discussions over CW deterrence in the early 
post-war period, with MPs observing that ‘the atom bomb, like poison gas, may not be 
used, because of the fear of reprisals’.41 The perceived success of CW deterrence, 
through the threat of reprisals and preparedness to retaliate, was thus also seen as a 
source of hope for potential nuclear deterrence. In the CW field, this interpretation of 
CW deterrence and the resulting requirement for insurance and a retaliatory capability 
only increased in importance after the nerve agent discovery. With the game-changing 
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nerve agent development, the stakes had risen. An effective and successful CW 
retaliatory capability and deterrent now necessitated the acquisition of nerve agent 
weapons. This up-to-date retaliatory capability was all the more imperative given that 
British officials knew they were not the only ones to have benefited from the significant 
nerve agent development.42  
Sweeping in from the east, towards the end of the war, Soviet forces had also 
uncovered the startling German nerve agent development. The discovery of nerve 
agents in Germany led to something of a race between the soon to be Cold War rivals, 
as the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union all attempted to extricate from 
Germany as much information and materials as possible.43 The invading armies located 
and, where possible, seized German CW stocks, details of production methods, 
equipment and even personnel.44 In this hunt for CW gains, one of the most substantial 
prizes for the Soviet CW programme was the discovery of a full-scale operational 
German nerve agent plant at Dyhernfurth, which had produced over 10,500 tons of 
tabun during the war.45 This facility, with German technical assistance, was 
deconstructed, moved and re-built in Soviet territory.46 In addition to the facility, 
captured personnel, research findings, and CW stocks also gave the Soviet CW 
programme a substantial boost.47 For while the importance of CW research had been 
noted by Soviet officials since the Russian Civil War, when Western forces used 
chemical weapons against the Red Army, the nerve agent discovery reinvigorated 
interest and triggered a substantial Soviet nerve agent programme.48 This intense Soviet 
interest in the nerve agents, originating from their knowledge of German discoveries, 
would go on to dominate British considerations of the Soviet CW threat throughout the 
Cold War.  
Despite this new nerve agent development and the abundance of information and 
sources from Germany, accurate intelligence on the nature and form of the Soviet CW 
threat was hard to come by. While German wartime intelligence provided British 
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planners with a limited window into Soviet wartime CW training, delivery methods, 
types of stocks and defensive measures, this was to an extent outdated after the nerve 
agent discovery, which drastically moved the goalposts for intelligence officials 
attempting to analyse the Soviet threat.49 Due to the nerve agent discovery occurring 
towards the end of the war, much of the wartime intelligence gathered by Germany and 
by Britain on the Soviet CW programme was therefore now of limited use. This lack of 
accurate intelligence was also compounded by impressive levels of Soviet security and 
counterintelligence, which limited British intelligence to a ‘negligible’ amount of 
information.50 By early 1946 British officials were almost completely reliant on the 
minimal information on Soviet CW gains from Germany, rough predictions and self-
mirroring. These hesitant assessments led to the forecast that by 1951 the Soviet Union 
would be mass-producing tabun and that by 1956 the Soviet Union would be mass-
producing the more lethal and complicated nerve agents such as sarin and soman.51 
Regardless of these difficulties in attaining information on the Soviet CW programme, 
one thing was clear for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC): in the near future 
Britain would face a significant Soviet CW threat which was a direct result of the post-
war nerve agent discovery in Germany.52  
The nerve agent discovery, and perceived threat of Soviet CW capabilities, would also 
have a more immediate and short-term impact on British CW policy. In June 1945, the 
Chiefs of Staff were strongly advised by the Inter-Service Committee on Chemical 
Warfare to acquire the 10,500 tons of tabun filled bombs from Germany.53 Even though 
Soviet forces had captured the Dyhernfurth facility, the majority of the German tabun 
filled bombs had actually ended up in Allied possession. Keen British military support 
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for the acquisition of this substantial nerve agent capability was driven by three core 
factors. Firstly, as supported by British intelligence, even after German forces had 
bombed their own tabun plant at Dyhernfurth, the Soviet Union had still acquired 
detailed information on nerve agent production.54 With concerned perceptions of Soviet 
intent, British planners thought it a sound tactical decision to acquire as much material 
and munitions from occupied Germany as possible. Secondly, in addition to preparing 
for any clash with a future adversary, British officials were also wary of the ongoing 
war in the Pacific, with concerns over possible Japanese use of chemical weapons in the 
closing stages of the fighting.55 If CW was initiated in the Pacific Theatre, then German 
nerve agent stocks would provide a ‘useful and flexible’ capability with which to 
retaliate.56 United States officials also supported this stance, as they recommended, just 
weeks before the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that German 
tabun stocks should be shipped to the Far East for possible use against Japan.57  
Although British defence officials emphasised the race for resources against the Soviet 
Union and the potential use of the nerve agent stocks against Japan, the third driving 
factor for acquisition was a technical one, which tied into how and when the nerve 
agent discovery could and would be used. If British officials wanted a temporary, 
economic and short-term capability, then regardless as to whether this was for use 
against Japan or to deter the Soviet Union, it would have to come from captured 
German stocks.58 This was due to the complexity and difficulty involved in producing 
nerve agents in bulk. It was estimated that Britain would be unable to produce nerve 
agent weapons in less than 3-4 years.59 It was also recognised that tabun, while 
extremely effective, was the lesser of the nerve agents. The question that thus arose was 
whether Britain should settle for this lesser nerve agent when it had captured 
information on how to produce more advanced nerve agents such as sarin and soman. 
This observation, however, actually further boosted the argument for acquiring German 
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tabun stocks, as while more complex nerve agents like sarin and soman were desirable, 
they would take longer to produce. If one of these more advanced nerve agents were to 
become the chosen CW agent, then Britain would still need some form of temporary 
nerve agent capability to fill the interim period.60 German tabun stocks therefore not 
only represented an economical and expedient nerve agent capability for Japan and the 
nascent Cold War, but they also acted as a stop-gap in allowing British scientists to 
focus on producing and researching more advanced nerve agents like sarin.61  
Reflecting growing fears over the Soviet CW and conventional threat, and in addition 
to the tabun stocks, the Inter-Service Committee on Chemical Warfare also 
recommended in March 1946 that Britain retain a substantial quantity of wartime CW 
stocks.62 This precautionary measure further reveals the emphasis and importance 
attached to maintaining some form of stop-gap CW capability and a credible CW 
deterrent in the emerging Cold War. As despite fears that existing chemical weapons, 
such as those containing sulfur mustard or phosgene, were ‘outmoded’ by the nerve 
agent development, their retention was still recommended.63 This was no small 
endeavour, for by the end of the war Britain had stockpiled around 35,171 tons of sulfur 
mustard, 6,744 tons of phosgene, and 1,383 tons of ‘other gases’.64 If these substantial 
figures are added to the acquisition of the 10,500 tons of tabun from Germany, then at 
the end of the Second World War Britain possessed over 50,000 tons of CW agents.65 
Of this substantial amount, the CoS was advised to retain enough sulfur mustard and 
phosgene to maintain a significant ‘war reserve’, and to maintain around 30% of 
Britain’s total wartime production capacity for CW agents.66 This British war reserve 
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came to 11,700 tons of sulfur mustard, 2,900 tons of phosgene, and all 10,500 tons of 
tabun from occupied Germany.67 
In June 1946, and in light of the emerging Soviet threat, the substantial technological 
advancement which the nerve agents represented and the need for a stop-gap capability, 
both the CoS and Attlee’s Cabinet Defence Committee approved these major 
proposals.68 Britain would acquire German tabun stocks and maintain a significant war 
reserve. Attlee, as Prime Minister and Chair of the Cabinet Defence Committee, had in 
effect again reiterated his commitment to deterrence through a viable retaliatory 
capability, by approving the retention of wartime stocks and the acquisition of lethal 
nerve agent weapons from Germany.  
This approval for the acquisition of a CW capability was to prove all the more 
significant for the CoS, given that, as they put it in June 1946, ‘it is unlikely that atomic 
or biological weapons will be available for our use on a large scale for at least five 
years and we must therefore rely on our existing weapons in this period’.69 The nerve 
agent capability would therefore act as an essential stop-gap WMD capability. The 
importance of nerve agent weapons, however, also stretched beyond the confines of a 
stop-gap capability. As even after nuclear weapons and biological weapons were 
developed, the CoS and the Defence Committee both agreed that Britain should remain 
‘in a position to wage chemical warfare from the start of hostilities’.70  
Once Ministerial confirmation was given for the acquisition of German tabun stocks, 
actually acquiring and moving 10,500 tons of tabun, which if including bomb casings 
totalled around 18,000 tons, was found to be no easy feat.71 For in addition to the 
immense problem of the sheer weight involved, there was also the possibility of nerve 
agent leakage in transit, fears of press discovery, and the fact that over half the tabun 
bombs were stored in the zone of Germany occupied by the United States. Just 
monitoring and looking after the already filled bombs would require the attention of 60 
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full-time personnel and storage at a special site at an airfield in Llandwrog, Wales.72 
Due to the tabun being stored in German bombs, which were unsuitable for carriage on 
RAF aircraft, British forces also lacked an effective means of delivery. Notwithstanding 
all these drawbacks, the nerve agents were still deemed simply too valuable, with the 
CoS believing that disposing of them would be ‘imprudent’ and that their retention 
would give Britain a ‘commanding lead in the field.’73  
After negotiations with the United States, whose zone contained around 5,700 tons of 
tabun, Britain secured the vast majority of the world’s existing nerve agent stocks from 
occupied Germany.74 Surprisingly the United States willingly accepted this agreement, 
but on the condition that they be allowed a select few tabun bombs for trials.75 A key 
reason for this was that the United States Chemical Warfare Service had its eye on 
something far more substantial, the mass-production of sarin. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, sarin was emerging as the ideal CW agent for mass-production. Its perceived 
military utility and slightly easier means of production compared to soman rendered it 
the preferred option.76 For the United States, the ability to retaliate with their growing 
stockpile of atomic weapons, Britain being an ideal storage location for nerve agent 
deployment in a European war, the fact that they were able to secure sarin samples 
from Germany, and concerns over the costs of shipping and re-purposing the German 
tabun bombs all played a part in this willingness to give Britain thousands of tons of 
lethal nerve agent weapons. As a result, from October 1946, 10,500 tons of the German 
tabun filled bombs were shipped to Wales, in what was called Operation Dismal.77 
While the Defence Committee and the CoS had secretly approved the acquisition of 
German tabun bombs and the retention of wartime stocks, they also recognised that 
both of these measures were only temporary solutions. A core part of the Defence 
Committee’s 1946 policy centred not only on existing stocks, but on planning for the 
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future creation of a ‘new offensive policy’ based on nerve agents.78 As such, the CoS 
concluded that British research ‘must continue with the object of discovering…further 
major advances in chemical warfare’.79 Alongside the potentialities of mass-producing 
and weaponising sarin and soman, British officials were therefore also hopeful of 
discovering further developments in the CW field. Only once this had been 
accomplished, whether through successfully mass-producing known nerve agents such 
as sarin, or though discovering a more lethal nerve agent, would Britain begin the 
production of nerve agent weapons and completely shift its CW policy to embrace the 
new nerve agent age. After these new weapons had either been discovered or 
developed, they would provide the foundation and bedrock of Britain’s new offensive 
CW policy for the Cold War.  
In this research endeavour for new CW agents and improved production techniques, 
Britain was greatly aided by a remarkable level of trilateral cooperation with the United 
States and Canada. This level of collaboration had been significantly shaped and 
influenced by the wartime experiences of the three respective powers. During the war, 
the United States, Canada and Britain had all cooperated extensively in CW research, 
with each country having permanent representatives in the relevant research and 
intelligence committees of the other two.80 In contrast to other areas of Anglo-
American defence cooperation, all parties continued this unusual level of collaboration 
into the immediate post-war period, with their programmes operating so ‘closely in step 
as to be virtually integrated’.81 To cover as much ground as possible whilst avoiding 
overlap, Britain, the United States and Canada all agreed to the division and allocation 
of different aspects of nerve agent research. With each country taking different facets of 
CW research sharing the research findings with the other two countries.82 These 
practices greatly aided British CW policy. As in addition to nullifying wasteful 
duplication, it secured British access to cutting-edge CW research.83 In isolation, 
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British CW research, which was feeling the strain of broader post-war economic 
cutbacks in defence, would have struggled to keep pace with significant developments 
in the field.84  
Although there was an impressive and open flow of information and research findings 
between the United States, Britain and Canada, when it came to public disclosures strict 
secrecy was applied. Despite the substantial nerve agent find and its ramifications, in 
Britain, public awareness of the nerve agent discovery was minimal in the immediate 
post-war period. Perhaps to an even greater degree than the limited disclosures on post-
war nuclear weapons, CW was kept under tight censorship, with few rare exceptions 
seeping out. One surprising early revelation had come soon after the nerve agent 
discovery in June 1945, with The Times reporting that Germany had produced a ‘new 
gas in great quantity’.85 Information was however extremely limited, and little mention 
was made of the nerve agents. This shroud of secrecy surrounding the nerve agent 
discovery was again fleetingly pierced when senior Nazi scientists were prosecuted at 
Nuremberg, with horrific stories emerging of mass-killings with gas and with human 
experimentation in concentration camps.86 Emerging from this ongoing process was the 
testimony and trial of Albert Speer, who, as well as disclosing a slightly more bizarre 
story about his plan to kill Hitler by introducing poison gas into his Chancellery 
ventilation system, revealed in his trial the German discovery of ‘two new terrible 
poison gases’, that of tabun and sarin.87 Either this remarkable revelation was 
seemingly not fully picked up by the press, or adherence to secrecy prevailed, as one of 
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the first public confirmations of the nerve agent discovery garnered little traction or 
public attention. In Britain, these early post-war years were characterised by intense 
levels of secrecy, with extremely limited information on the nerve agent discovery 
making it into the public domain.88  
 
An emerging role 
Throughout 1947, demand and military support for nerve agent weapons continued to 
grow, with a clear role for them slowly emerging and consolidating. In May 1947, the 
Defence Research Policy Sub-Committee (DRPC) produced a core set of guidelines for 
CW policy, in which the committee further emphasised the role of, and strengthened 
the requirement for, British nerve agent weapons.89 In its findings, the DRPC argued 
that Britain needed chemical weapons in the Cold War, which could prove of ‘great 
tactical use’.90 With this requirement, and as a result of the complexity of nerve agent 
production, the DRPC recommended that Britain begin the domestic production of 
nerve agents. Although initially envisaged on a small scale, this was thought a 
necessary pre-cursor to mass-production.91 The DRPC also alarmingly noted that 
British forces had no effective means of detecting the nerve agents, and as such CW 
defensive measures, including methods of detection, were assigned a high priority.92  
In this formative period, and drawing from their wartime experience, British officials 
increasingly appreciated that a core part of preventing or mitigating Soviet CW use was 
through CW deterrence. This legacy of wartime CW deterrence also influenced the 
development of ideas about nuclear deterrence, when it was assumed that the Soviet 
Union would be working to develop its own atomic bomb to break the US monopoly. 
In April 1947, when the CoS had turned to debate and discuss the possible first-use of 
weapons of mass destruction in the Cold War, it was to the CW field which they looked 
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to for past examples and guidance.93 This reflected the fact that despite the nerve agent 
development, for British officials in the post-war period, chemical weapons were 
actually the most familiar of all the weapons of mass destruction.94 The CoS took the 
case of CW deterrence in the Second World War as an example which showed that if 
they were strong and prepared to retaliate on a like-for-like basis, then that form of 
warfare would be less likely to be used. The CoS thus believed that the only way to 
prevent Soviet use of weapons of mass destruction was through facing ‘her with the 
threat of large scale damage from similar weapons’ and that this threat of like-for-like 
retaliation was to ‘be a most effective deterrent to war’.95 This logic, reinforced by the 
wartime CW experience, would come to dominate deterrence considerations in the 
Cold War. In terms of CW policy, this same deterrence frame of mind was reflected in 
the retention of a substantial war reserve and the tabun stocks from Germany, which 
were both thought to have some deterrence value. For officials based at Porton Down, 
Britain’s principal centre for CBW research established in 1916, the nerve agent 
weapons were an important ‘bargaining chip’.96 And, for the CoS, they represented an 
important stop-gap deterrent to discourage any Soviet considerations of first-use.97  
The perceived Soviet CW threat and the need for a reliable, effective and long-term 
nerve agent deterrent also demanded informed policy decisions based on accurate 
intelligence assessments and further integration in trilateral cooperation. In the 
intelligence sphere, in May 1948 the JIC outlined the priorities for SIGINT (signals 
intelligence).98 Alongside atomic weapons intelligence as a priority I was CW 
intelligence.99 The JIC feared German advances in the CW field had stimulated Soviet 
research, and they observed that due to the ‘relative backwardness’ of the Soviet Union 
it might be forced to settle for the nerve agents in the short-term, before developing a 
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nuclear weapons capability.100 Even with this high importance attached to CW 
intelligence, results were poor, with the JIC accepting that it had very limited 
information on the Soviet CW threat.101 With this lack of verifiable intelligence, British 
nerve agent weapons policy was being formulated in the dark. Defence officials had 
little idea about what the actual Soviet CW threat was, the level of research and 
development it had achieved, or if Soviet planners were considering first-use.102 These 
limitations meant that the JIC could provide little direct assistance or guidance in the 
creation of post-war British CW policy, in establishing how useful a nerve agent 
capability would be against Soviet forces, or in revealing how urgent or substantial the 
Soviet CW threat actually was.  
A far more fruitful avenue for British CW policy continued to be trilateral cooperation, 
where the remarkable level of collaboration between Britain, the United States and 
Canada had continued to grow. Yearly trilateral meetings exemplified this level of 
cooperation. During these senior meetings defence officials and scientists from all three 
national research programmes discussed CBW research, the sharing of technical 
information, the division of research tasks and the pooling of resources and findings.103 
From August 1948, this level of trilateral cooperation grew yet further, when the British 
Air Ministry consulted with colleagues in the United States and Canada on the potential 
use of chemical weapons against the Soviet Union.104 The participants aimed to 
establish a standardisation procedure which would further bridge the research efforts of 
all three countries and further integrate their respective CW policies, leading to a more 
cohesive and unified common practice.  
These consultations did achieve an impressive degree of standardisation within the CW 
field. For as all three countries agreed, they would seek to ‘obtain the greatest possible 
economy in the use of our combined effort and resources’, and there would be minimal 
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obstacles to ‘full cooperation’.105 This was especially the case in assessments of the 
effectiveness of certain types of chemical weapons and with delivery methods. 
Branching out from this initial tripartite agreement, the trilateral Standardisation 
Working Party for CW built upon and developed the cohesive practices amongst the 
three countries. This working party was not just for CW research, but also for the 
standardisation of the types of weapons stockpiled, their delivery methods and even 
target selection.106 With tightening resources, this harmonisation with the United States 
and Canada was a substantial asset to British defence policy. Although these trilateral 
relations influenced the direction of British CW policy, they ensured that British CW 
research maintained its advanced level. Without sharing the load with the United States 
and Canada, and despite allocating an increase in funding and resources after the nerve 
agent discovery, Britain in isolation would have struggled to remain at the forefront of 
CW research given the technical difficulties of the nerve agent age.107 
Much of this trilateral cooperation was, as with the nerve agent discovery itself, kept 
hidden in a highly secretive environment, concealed from outside observers and the 
domestic population.108 As seen in the scarcity of direct parliamentary questions and 
newspaper reports, there continued to be no real public comprehension or awareness of 
the nerve agent discovery. After the previous fleeting mentions of new gases, in March 
1948, in a rare instance when CW was mentioned in any capacity in Parliament, cryptic 
references were made to ‘advances in the field of chemical warfare’ and to ‘new forms 
of chemical warfare’.109 These comments gave some slight indication that there had 
indeed been a development in the CW field, but the nature of it and the German nerve 
agent discovery remained under strict secrecy. This minimal information meant that the 
majority of the public remained largely unaware of the substantial nerve agent 
development. Strict adherence to secrecy was also reflective of wider Government 
defence policy in scientific research and development, with it accepted that little could 
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be said publicly about defence research and development, for much of it ‘must remain 
secret’ in the increasingly hostile and confrontational Cold War climate.110  
More senior oversight, influence and accountability did, though, manifest itself in other 
ways, particularly when it came to shaping broader defence policy. Substantial 
questions over continental defence, and whether Britain should be willing to fight a 
protracted ground war in the defence of Western Europe, had a lasting impact on 
British CW policy. The debate over continental defence had raged since the end of the 
war, with tensions mounting between the Service Chiefs.111 A flashpoint in this broader 
debate and a crucial turning point for CW policy can be seen in 1948-49, with even 
greater United States involvement in the defence of Western Europe. This growing 
commitment by the United States to Western European defence, as seen with the 
Marshall Plan, NATO and the Berlin blockade, made continental defence far more 
feasible for British defence officials.112 In turn, British defence policy shifted much 
more favourably towards continental defence, and the priority for land-based weapons 
for use against Soviet forces increased.113  
This growing British commitment to continental defence, made possible by a more 
engaged and confrontational United States, had direct ramifications for CW policy, as 
chemical weapons were in part envisaged to deter Soviet first-use of chemical weapons 
in a continental war. A nerve agent capability could also deter Soviet aerial attacks with 
chemical weapons. But, the sheer magnitude of Soviet ground forces led to emphasis 
increasingly being placed on a land-based deterrent.114 Without firm commitments to 
continental defence, British CW policy would have lost a major potential role, and it 
may have struggled to fit into the much broader framework and reorientation of defence 
policy at the time. However, as defence officials were increasingly shifting towards 
continental defence, support for chemical weapons gained momentum and strengthened 
alongside this broader transition in British defence policy.  
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This approach to CW deterrence, focusing on a ground-based continental deterrent, 
solidified during the crucial and formative years of 1948-49. During which the War 
Office would begin to take the driving seat in the formulation of British CW policy, 
with it exerting considerable influence over the direction and role of a British nerve 
agent capability and deterrent. Coinciding with the War Office’s increasing interest in 
the possibilities of chemical weapons for continental defence was the critical 
recognition that chemical weapons were not competing with nuclear or biological 
weapons, but complementing them.115 Here advocates of CW, mainly in the War 
Office, successfully separated the role of nerve agents from other weapons of mass 
destruction. As defence officials argued, while ‘CW is specifically suitable for use 
against the Russians’, this was not in a strategic role, but a tactical localised one.116  
In late 1949, after further trials and testing, it was fully recognised that the nerve agents 
were most effective against troops and against tanks, rather than in the targeting of 
Soviet cities on a strategic scale.117 Nerve agents were thought particularly potent 
against the T-series of Soviet tanks, which officials had branded ‘one of our greatest 
menaces’.118 The Soviet Union had shown during the Second World War the advanced 
nature of its tank design.119 It was feared that with massed and modern tanks the Soviet 
Union could launch an unstoppable advance across Western Europe.120 After further 
research to better understand the nerve agents, War Office officials began to fully 
recognise the benefits that they could bring in countering this form of Soviet warfare. It 
was discovered that a single nerve agent shell could remove the threat of a Soviet tank, 
by reaching the crew through any gaps in the armour and exposing them to nerve 
agents. In addition, this form of nerve agent use was thought to have a substantial 
psychological effect on ground troops and tank crews.121 Regardless of the moral or 
ethical qualms involved in their use in a continental war, from a purely military utility 
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perspective, the nerve agents were increasingly seen as a remarkably effective weapon 
for countering numerically superior Soviet troops and tanks.  
This emerging tactical role for nerve agents removed any potential overlap with atomic 
and biological weapons, which were both thought of as strategic weapons for aerial 
delivery against targets within the Soviet Union.122 This separation was all the more 
critical given that, while atomic weapons were the undisputed prime of weapons of 
mass destruction, in the post-war period biological weapons were seen as second. As 
revealed by Balmer, British BW researchers had been exploring the potentialities of 
anthrax bombs, which would have been useable on a strategic scale against Soviet 
cities.123 The overlap between atomic weapons and biological weapons meant that they 
occupied a similar position in the strategic sphere: the targeting of cities and the 
striking at the Soviet core.124 This clash would later harm BW policy, for without a 
truly unique role and with them not reciprocating on their substantial promise and 
investment, the DRPC began to increasingly turn to chemical weapons as the preferred 
option for a ‘second-scale’ weapon of mass destruction.125 Importantly, rather than 
compete with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons were seen as complementary.126 For 
defence officials, the two forms of warfare could be used in tandem in a continental 
war, nerve agent weapons against the brunt of the Soviet ground offensive in Europe 
and atomic weapons against the core of the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons and nerve 
agent weapons would also be employed by different sections of the Armed Forces - 
strategic and tactical - and they would have two very different roles. These differences 
were crucial for defining and securing the place of chemical weapons in Cold War 
British defence policy.  
Where CW did overlap with nuclear weapons, its role was often curtailed and limited. 
A good example was seen with Air Ministry requests for an aerial strategic CW 
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capability. Here CW policy did not just overlap with atomic weapons, but also even 
biological weapons – with both forms of warfare viewed as far more suitable as 
strategic weapons. In early 1950, the DRPC unsurprisingly quashed the requirement for 
strategic chemical weapons, as it would have overlapped too heavily with the perceived 
role of atomic weapons.127 Further limiting CW to a tactical role, Britain also lacked the 
correct CW agent for a strategic capability, for although Britain possessed tabun, and 
could produce nerve agents such as sarin, these CW agents were non-persistent.128 
Once released, a non-persistent nerve agent did not remain lethal for an extended 
duration of time, meaning that they were far more effective at achieving quick results, 
for example against troops or tanks, rather than for rendering cities or large-scale 
infrastructure inhospitable for an extended period of time.129  
Rejection of a strategic nerve agent capability further bolstered the dominance of the 
War Office over CW policy. In early January 1950 this was particularly apparent when 
the DRPC significantly downgraded the importance of possessing an aerial delivery 
capability, regardless as to whether it was persistent or non-persistent.130 When ranking 
research priorities in CW policy, the DRPC accorded the highest priorities to defensive 
equipment, detection methods and nerve agent weapons for the Army. This was despite 
the Air Ministry attaching ‘outstanding’ importance to its acquisition of a new aerial 
nerve agent capability.131 The direction of CW policy was thus becoming shaped by the 
growing dominance of the Army’s ideas on use, and by the perceived military utility of 
tactical non-persistent nerve agents against Soviet ground forces, and by the fact that 
nerve agent weapons were increasingly viewed as complementary to atomic weapons, 
rather than as a competitor.  
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The impact of CW policy turning more towards the Army, and away from the Air 
Force, also actively shaped how British defence officials viewed CW deterrence in 
1949 and early 1950.132 This problem of deterrence was taking on even greater urgency 
as Second World War era CW stocks were gradually deteriorating, existing delivery 
methods were ‘unsatisfactory’, and it would take a number of years until a replacement 
nerve agent capability could be domestically mass-produced.133 Both the War Office 
and Air Ministry agreed that, due to the poor state of the war reserve, Britain was 
unable to wage CW effectively from the outset of war, and it would soon be without an 
efficient CW deterrent.134 Even after detailed planning and research, Britain was failing 
to fulfil the Defence Committee’s directive of 1946 that the country should be prepared 
to wage CW at the outset of hostilities. However, addressing this issue, and deciding 
how best to deter the Soviet Union, evoked considerable disagreement between the Air 
Ministry and the War Office. Both Services had very different interpretations over how 
best to deter the Soviet Union, and how to modernise British nerve agent capabilities.135  
For the Air Ministry, the poor state of the war reserve was ‘unlikely to deter an 
aggressor if he considers that the use of CW will be to his advantage’.136 Despite this 
apparent weakness, the Air Ministry was keen to point out that deterrence should not be 
based on the immediate capacity to wage CW, as the ‘ultimate threat’ was actually the 
total potential CW development and production capacity held by Britain and her 
allies.137 This led to Air Ministry officials concluding in November 1949 that ‘the only 
real deterrent will undoubtedly be the fear of ultimate reprisals on a very large scale’.138 
They believed that emphasis should thus be placed on the total potential production 
capacity which Britain could bring to bear in the CW field throughout a prolonged war, 
instead of stressing an immediate retaliatory capability. This total potential capability 
implied a protracted war, as it would not be immediately available; yet it was deemed 
the most effective form of deterring Soviet CW use as it threatened substantial 
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reprisals. In addition, the Air Ministry proposed abandoning certain ineffective CW 
munitions held in the war reserve, such as phosgene bombs, in order to focus on the 
nerve agents and the total potential production capacity.139  
These arguments also conveniently coincided with the state of play in CW policy, as 
the Air Ministry was unlikely to possess a retaliatory nerve agent capability in the near 
future with the DRPC questioning its importance and role, and with priority assigned to 
nerve agent weapons for the Army. As such, it had little vested interest in supporting 
the acquisition of an immediate retaliatory capability for deterrence, as it would likely 
be for the Army, not the Air Force. The Air Ministry thus had little incentive to support 
interpretations of deterrence based on an immediate retaliatory capability. Its support of 
a longer-term alternative interpretation of CW deterrence, and questioning the need for 
an immediate retaliatory nerve agent capability, also reveals a growing divergence in 
approach to CW policy by the Air Ministry and the War Office. It also shows the Air 
Ministry somewhat deviating from the established interpretation of CW deterrence, 
which was that the ability and threat to retaliate immediately with chemical weapons 
had prevented its outbreak.  
For the War Office, an immediate retaliatory capability and maintaining existing stocks 
was the clear and unquestionable way of best deterring Soviet first-use, as they believed 
that the:  
Knowledge that we possess them [chemical weapons] would impose on 
any potential enemy the inconvenience of ensuring the protection of his 
own troops, and act as a deterrent to any enemy from initiating CW.140  
Even after the protestations of the Air Ministry, but in a sign of its expanding influence 
over CW policy, it was this deterrent argument championed by the War Office which 
prevailed. Stocks of CW agents were maintained, and emphasis was placed on 
acquiring an immediate nerve agent retaliatory capability for the Army.141 Existing 
stocks were also thought to possess ‘some deterrent value’, notwithstanding their 
inefficiency and being outmoded.142 Any disposal of these existing stocks would have 
left Britain with a much smaller CW capability, which was dubbed a ‘most imprudent’ 
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step.143 Nerve agent stocks acquired from the continent would therefore continue to be 
used to deter the outbreak of CW on it, as even though the existing war reserve and the 
tabun stocks could not be deployed effectively, the knowledge that Britain possessed 
them was thought to play a substantial part in deterring Soviet first-use.  
 
 ‘A tragic state of affairs’144 
In late 1949, after they had initially disagreed over what to do with existing stocks and 
how best to deter Soviet CW use, the War Office, Air Ministry, the Chemical Warfare 
Sub-Committee (CWSC) of the CoS, and the DRPC all eventually agreed that the 
domestic production of nerve agent weapons was a necessary step for British defence 
policy in the Cold War.145 In addition to the military utility of nerve agents, defence 
officials reached the consensus that if deterrence were to work then British capabilities 
needed to be credible and effective, rather than deteriorating and borderline unusable.146 
Possession of a substantial nerve agent capability was therefore dubbed ‘one of the 
most powerful deterrents to the initiation of CW by an enemy.’147 A nerve agent 
capability was envisaged to begin with the domestic production of one ton of sarin per 
week, but after the appropriate techniques and methods had been mastered, the site 
would be massively expanded to produce 50 tons of sarin per week.148 This 
considerable expansion was believed a necessary step to meet Britain’s requirement for 
a nerve agent capability, and to deter Soviet first-use of chemical weapons. By selecting 
sarin as the prime CW agent, and similarly to the findings of the United States CW 
programme, officials also took the middle path. Of the three main German nerve agent 
discoveries, tabun, as already recognised in 1945-46, was less lethal than both sarin and 
soman. Soman, however, was extremely difficult to mass-produce, leaving sarin, with 
its high lethality and comparatively easier means of mass-production, as the preferred 
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nerve agent for mass-production.149 This focus and emphasis on the nerve agent 
weapons, however, had not yet trickled down to funding for CW research, which only 
stood at around £300,000 per annum in 1949.150 This funding did not include additional 
costs such as the construction of the sarin facility at Nancekuke, which would cost an 
additional several million pounds.151 
This shift to supporting the development of a domestic nerve agent capability was given 
greater impetus with the CoS Global Strategy Paper of 1950, which firmly placed and 
consolidated the role of continental defence at the top of British defence 
requirements.152 The document confirmed the role of the Army and committed Britain 
to the defence of mainland Europe, which in turn had a substantial impact on CW 
policy. As noted by the DRPC, the emphasis on defending Western Europe was 
significant, with it having a ‘considerable effect on our research and development 
policy.’153 In confronting the Soviet numerical advantage, allied forces needed to be 
supplied with high-quality equipment for dealing with, amongst other threats, large 
numbers of troops and heavily armoured tanks.154 The number one priority was for a 
nerve agent weapon with an anti-tank role, and the second priority was already for a 
nerve agent weapon to use against troops.155 British CW policy thus directly mirrored 
and benefitted from ongoing defence debates, with the rise and confirmation of 
continental defence securing the role and funding of British nerve agent weapons 
research and development. 
Alongside these important shifts, the impressive levels of secrecy surrounding British 
CW policy during this period meant that there still remained extremely limited 
coverage, criticism and accountability. Only minor revelations dripped into the public 
sphere. One such example was seen in July 1950, when the Labour Minister for 
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Defence Manny Shinwell revealed Government interest in CW research when 
addressing defence policy.156 Shinwell, as part of a much larger statement on defence, 
included the observation that ‘we cannot afford to lag behind’ in researching CBW 
defensive measures.157 An astute Labour MP, Rhys Davies, pounced upon on this rare 
reference to CBW policy, which revealed Government activity in the CBW field. 
Davies then proclaimed that the reference to CBW had ‘frightened’ him, and he 
lambasted his fellow Labour MP by declaring that ‘it is a tragic state of affairs that a 
British Socialist statesman should say that’ CBW research was necessary.158 This was 
but an early indicator of backbench Labour MPs views, opposition and outright 
hostility towards British involvement in CBW research.  
By September 1950, behind closed doors and still adhering to stringent levels of 
secrecy, British CW policy now had a clear purpose, that of the defence of continental 
Europe, the deterring of Soviet first-use, and the countering of Soviet troops and tanks. 
As such, the DRPC passed its conclusions and the recommendations for research, 
development and production of nerve agent weapons up to the CoS, which approved 
the requests.159 The Minister of Defence, Manny Shinwell, also supported the 
immediate construction of the facility at Portreath, Nancekuke, and the production of 
sarin.160 The sarin pilot plant was to begin with 1 ton per week, which would then be 
expanded to 10 tons per week, with the aim being to eventually reach 50 tons per 
week.161 
On 4 September 1950, with the Korean War raging, the CoS updated the Cabinet 
Defence Committee. And, it clarified and reinforced the emerging interpretation of 
nerve agent weapons and CW deterrence, by stating that:  
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As proved in the last war, the ability to retaliate effectively, and 
immediately, is one of the most powerful deterrents to the initiation of 
Chemical Warfare by an enemy.162 
While again showing the legacy and impact of the Second World War on British 
conceptions of CW deterrence, CoS support was a pivotal moment for advocates of a 
nerve agent capability. Though the Korean War undoubtedly spurred on the decision to 
acquire a nerve agent capability, it is worth noting that there had already been very 
strong and mounting military support for such a policy change. In order to meet the 
deterrent requirement and in line with the suggestions of defence officials, the CoS 
informed the Defence Committee of the decision to begin the immediate construction 
of the one ton per week sarin production facility at Portreath, Nancekuke.163 The CoS 
also re-affirmed the dominance of the Army in the nerve agent field, by confirming that 
the number one priority for nerve agent weapons production was for the development 
of anti-tank nerve agent weapons for the Army.164 The second priority was for a nerve 
agent artillery shell for use against Soviet troops, and an aerial nerve agent bomb was a 
distant third.165 These nerve agent requirements, of domestic mass-production and 
delivery methods, were thought essential to British defence policy; as noted by the CoS, 
the nerve agents had ‘tremendous potentialities’.166  
On 27 September 1950, alongside the escalating Korean War and shortly after the CoS 
and Shinwell’s approval, the Defence Committee, again chaired by Attlee, agreed with 
and supported the decision to domestically produce sarin.167 Little consideration was 
given to moral or legal norms, and military necessity and the fearful Cold War climate 
dominated considerations. For the third time in the post-war period, Attlee had thus 
again revealed his tacit support of, and commitment to, CW deterrence through the 
threat of reprisals. The Defence Committee, concerned by the Soviet threat and the poor 
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state of Britain’s CW preparedness, also supported the future expansion of Nancekuke 
to a substantial 50 tons of sarin per week and the continued research and development 
of nerve agent weapons.168 In a time of war, without any public statement or 
parliamentary acknowledgement, Britain had thus again approved the domestic 
production of chemical weapons.169 With the endorsement of the Attlee Government, 
the production of sarin and the development of nerve agent weapons was accepted and 
supported at the highest level.170  
All these changes and expenditures were recommended despite the worsening state of 
the economy, as nerve agent weapons were thought of as a necessary endeavour. 
Unfortunately for defence officials though, and as recognised by the CoS and Labour 
ministers, Britain’s mass-produced sarin capability would not be ready until 1957, 
whereas the Soviet Union was thought capable of mass-producing nerve agents from 
mid-1951.171 This perceived six-year time lag was brought about by Britain relying on 
German tabun stocks and war reserves of sulfur mustard and phosgene as an interim 
capability, whilst the Soviet Union was believed to have moved straight on to the 
domestic production of nerve agents, like the United States.172 In the immediate post-
war period Britain possessed the bulk of German nerve agents, whereas in 1950 it had 
fallen seriously behind the superpowers in the CW field, with the CoS fearful of the 
‘formidable’ Soviet nerve agent threat and unable to effectively retaliate or deter Soviet 
first-use.173 This perceived Soviet advantage added a real sense of urgency to British 
CW policy. For as the CoS emphasised, a key reason for Army requirements being the 
top priority in nerve agent weapons was also the speed with which they could be 
produced.174 An effective aerial nerve agent weapon and its suitable delivery method 
would have required greater technical sophistication, and taken more time to develop; 
time which Britain did not have.175  
Another avenue to address this perceived imbalance in capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union was through Anglo-American cooperation. Unlike atomic cooperation, which 
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was undermined by the McMahon Act in 1946, CW cooperation between the two 
countries remained remarkably close and unhindered. This level of cooperation 
rendered possible the potential British acquisition of nerve agents produced in the 
United States, which would have provided Britain with one of the most advanced 
chemical weapons known at the time and have acted as a stop-gap deterrent while 
domestic production caught up.176 Ruefully, however, defence officials recognised that 
this option was not viable in the short-term. The United States would only be mass-
producing sarin from 1952, a target date which British experts thought overly 
optimistic. In light of this, British officials believed that the focus should be on 
producing ‘our own weapons’ with greater alacrity, rather than relying on the United 
States for a stop-gap nerve agent capability in the Cold War.177  
With this deficit in CW capabilities and with a lack of viable options, the Defence 
Committee even pushed the Air Ministry to explore re-purposing the tabun bombs 
captured from Germany.178 These bombs still contained useable and viable tabun, it 
was just the delivery mechanism which was inefficient. Extending the life-span of 
captured tabun stocks, and their role as a stop-gap deterrent, was therefore another 
option which British politicians and defence officials explored.179  
Fears of the Soviet threat also manifested itself in other ways, with Attlee, the CoS and 
the rest of the Defence Committee particularly concerned over the nerve agent threat to 
British civilians.180 With the Korean War raging there was great uncertainty over Soviet 
intent, and tensions were high both in East Asia and in Europe. Perceptions of the 
danger of Communist aggression in Europe directly impacted civil defence, with 
concerns raised over British vulnerability to a Soviet aerial offensive with nerve agent 
weapons. Similarly to atomic weapons, the population density of London and its 
proximity to the Soviet Union made it a prime target for an attack with nerve agents.181 
Despite having reservations over the viability of strategic aerial delivery, British CW 
experts alarmingly reported that if the Soviet Union used nerve agent weapons in an 
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attack against London, then there would be thirty times more deaths than with 
conventional bombing.182 Given this uncertainty over Soviet intent, method of use, and 
the perceived nerve agent deficit, the need for effective civilian defensive equipment 
was thought all the more important.183  
In view of this perceived British vulnerability, civil defence preparations for CW were 
significantly accelerated. A core part of this increased focus on defensive measures and 
civilian preparations was the stepping up of the mass-production of new respirators.184 
These new respirators would be far more effective in mitigating against the nerve agent 
threat, as they would be more advanced and better fitting.185 Taking shelter with a new 
gas mask was believed to give a good degree of protection, as remaining inside would 
mitigate against nerve agent exposure through skin contact and the new gas masks 
would protect against inhalation. Although the substantial increase in defensive 
equipment was approved, neither the CoS nor the Defence Committee was impressed 
by the relatively poor state of affairs and of Britain’s distinct vulnerability. The 
Defence Committee disapprovingly accused the Ministry of Supply and defence 
officials of seeking ‘too high a standard of perfection’ at the cost of valuable time, 
which had left Britain vulnerable.186 Without an effective nerve agent capability and 
with limited defensive equipment, Britain was in a poor state to deter Soviet use of 
chemical weapons and unable to properly defend against an attack. The 1950 Cabinet 
Defence Committee decision and expansion of CW policy was therefore an 
amalgamation of attempts to mitigate against this concerning imbalance vis-à-vis the 
Soviet threat, and a recognition of the perceived military value and utility of nerve 
agent weapons for both use and deterrence.  
By the end of 1950, in secret and behind closed doors, British CW policy had 
significantly changed. Even though in 1945 British CW research was spurred into 
action after the hugely significant nerve agent discovery and even with key figures like 
Clement Attlee supporting acquisition for deterrence, there was no clear role or place 
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for these new nerve agent weapons in British defence policy. Years were spent 
investigating and analysing the possible military uses of the nerve agents. These 
considerations centred on whether nerve agent weapons were to deter Soviet first-use, 
to counter Soviet numerical advantages in conventional forces or for strategic bombing. 
Towards the end of the 1940s, amid this uncertainty and despite the divergent attempts 
of the Air Ministry, it was the Army who emerged as the chief advocate of nerve agent 
weapons. Alongside this growing dominance of the Army, which was supported by 
military assessments, the continental shift in defence policy, and by the findings of the 
DRPC and the CWSC, deterring CW came to be seen as predominantly achievable 
through weapons for the Army. This focus on a tactical chemical weapon also had the 
substantial benefit of distinguishing nerve agent weapons from other weapons of mass 
destruction.  
After a clear role had emerged, it was however soon realised that even with Britain 
possessing the bulk of the world’s nerve agents after the occupation of Germany, by 
1950 it was lagging far behind the Soviet Union and the United States. British 
dependence on wartime stocks of sulfur mustard, phosgene and captured tabun from 
Germany had, in fact, placed it at a significant disadvantage in the long-run. The Soviet 
Union, which had not discovered substantial stocks in Germany, but had acquired the 
methods, techniques and equipment for mass-production, was forced to explore mass-
production immediately. This shock realisation that Britain was around 5-6 years 
behind the Soviet Union in nerve agent production, and without a truly effective 
deterrent, pushed Attlee’s Labour Government to secretly accelerate and approve the 
production of defensive equipment, the development of nerve agent weapons and the 
domestic production of sarin. The urgency attached to nerve agent production, 
alongside fears of the advanced Soviet threat, would have significant ramifications for 
British CW policy, especially when it came to the landmark 1952 Global Strategy 
Paper.  
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2. A Step Too Far: The Nerve Agents and the Global Strategy Paper, 1951-1953  
 
The United Kingdom is at present committed by the Geneva Convention 
not to use [chemical and biological weapons] except in retaliation… The 
new nerve gases can, however, be used tactically to great advantage and 
would provide the Allies with weapons of real value against an enemy 
who relies on massed formations.1  
Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy’, 9 July 1952. 
With the ongoing conflict in Korea from 1950, the attention of the United States and 
the Soviet Union had rapidly shifted from Europe to East Asia. Although the exact 
causal factors and responsibility for the outbreak of the war are still debated to this day, 
the ramifications of the conflict are clear.2 Labelled a ‘great calamity’, the Korean War 
represented the extension of the Cold War to East Asia, and it would have a legacy far 
beyond the immediate post-war period, and even the Cold War.3 The ramifications of 
this escalation were also not confined to East Asia; they were global. The war led to a 
greater commitment by the United States to combat perceived Soviet aggression 
abroad. The United States also made stronger commitments to European defence, 
pledging to provide more land forces to NATO in Western Europe in early 1951 and 
adopting the rearmament measures advocated in NSC-68.4  
While the outbreak and outcome of the Korean War marked a significant turning point 
in the Cold War, it also bore witness to an increasingly awkward and challenging role 
for Britain. Even though Prime Minister Winston Churchill was reunited with his 
former wartime leaders, President Harry Truman and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, after 
the Conservatives won the October 1951 general election, the relationships and 
dynamics between the three countries had changed entirely.5 Churchill had returned to 
the top of British politics during yet another war, but this time he had remarkably 
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different responsibilities.6 His predecessor, Clement Attlee, had launched a substantial 
re-armament programme, but this had weakened the already parlous state of Britain’s 
economy.7 As the economic strains of the Korean War combined with the mounting 
costs of the growing welfare state and of continued post-war recovery, by mid-1951 
Britain was in significant financial and political difficulty.8 Churchill, rather than being 
in a position to tackle issues and the war head-on, was instead tasked with addressing 
economic pressures, reducing inflated defence expenditure and assuaging political 
uncertainty and alarmism.  
In Britain, the outbreak of the Korean War had also triggered a period of intense 
anxiety about the future security of Europe and the reliability of the United States.9 
Confrontational United States foreign policy in this tumultuous period had led to some 
disagreement between the Anglo-American partners over the very nature of the Soviet 
threat, and on the dangers of the atomic age.10 In the United States, the ‘red menace’ 
had become an obsession for many, with pervasive fears over the Soviet threat.11 While 
British experts took the Soviet threat seriously, United States assessments of a global, 
aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union were thought exaggerated. Ultimately, the 
British CoS believed that the Soviet Union would not risk global war due to the 
overwhelming US superiority in nuclear weapons.12 In the light of the pressures on the 
defence budget generated by rearmament, and the development by the Soviet Union of 
its own nuclear capabilities (when the UK had yet to test its first atomic bomb), the 
Churchill Government sought to clarify British defence policy in a ground-breaking 
review in 1952.  
The importance of the 1952 Defence Policy and Global Strategy Paper (GSP), 
formulated by the British CoS under the instruction of the Churchill Government, is 
widely debated. For while the GSP confirmed the centrality of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear deterrence to British defence policy, it also stated that the immediate threat of 
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war was unlikely.13 The GSP outlined how British defence policy should shift from 
purely addressing and preparing for the threat of immediate war, to more of a long-term 
focus.14 Some historians, for example Baylis, Clarke and Wheeler, question the 
importance and impact of the paper, citing its economic focus and its re-iteration of 
what was in effect already existing policy.15 Certain United States officials were also 
underwhelmed by the GSP, damningly concluding that Britain was merely ‘rearranging 
their strategic estimate to fit their economic situation.’16 In contrast other 
commentators, for example Rosecrance, argue that the GSP was the most influential 
British defence paper in the post-war period, and Pierre labels it a ‘classic among 
military documents’.17 While the importance of the paper can be debated in terms of 
what it meant for nuclear strategy and the defence budget, its various nuances are often 
underappreciated and overlooked.  
For British CW policy, the 1952 GSP represents a crucial turning point. This 
importance is not just illustrated by the final text of the 1952 GSP, but also what was 
left out at the drafting stage and what the CoS actually wanted to include, for these had 
far greater ramifications. To assess the critical turning point of the 1952 GSP and its 
impact on British CW policy, this chapter will first analyse the build-up to the GSP, 
then explore the debate over the inclusion of CW, and end by assessing the significant 
impact the GSP had on British CW policy in the Cold War. 
 
A weapon for war 
After September 1950, when the Cabinet Defence Committee had approved the 
domestic production of nerve agents, the CoS moved quickly and secretly. Fears were 
growing over the Soviet CW threat, and a consensus had emerged over the perceived 
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military role and value of nerve agent weapons in British defence policy.18 Within a 
year of being granted this political approval, the location of Britain’s nerve agent 
facility was chosen and construction had begun. Portreath, Nancekuke, on the north 
coast of Cornwall, was confirmed in October 1951 as the prime location, despite 
concerns that it was vulnerable to air, coast and seaward attack – especially in the form 
of small raids or acts of sabotage.19 Even though this location was not militarily the 
soundest, the site had good railway and communications links, and it was close to vital 
chemical industries in South Wales. The coastal location would also allow for the 
discharge of ‘dangerous effluent’ into the sea.20 This aspect of CW policy, although 
extremely controversial, attracted comparatively little public attention at the time and 
appeared to raise few moral qualms. Although the plans to discharge chemical waste 
into the sea were kept secret, in the House of Commons, just months before, it was 
revealed that since 1945 Britain had dumped over 100,000 tons of chemical weapons, 
including weapons casings and some captured outmoded German stocks, into the 
Atlantic.21 British CW policy and this massive dumping of surplus chemical weapons 
triggered only minor public interest, which again reveals the stringent levels of secrecy 
and the comparative dearth of publicly available information.  
While snippets of information on British CW activities and the disposal of CW 
munitions slipped into the public sphere, the nerve agent facility, and the substantial 
scale envisaged for it, were kept highly secret. As the CoS was informed, the services 
and much of the groundwork for the full 50 ton per week nerve agent facility had 
already been installed.22 This groundwork and core infrastructure would facilitate the 
rapid expansion of the site to a level which would meet British nerve agent 
requirements for the Cold War. 23 In this effort, assistance and advice from the United 
States were also thought to be of significant value in easing technical and production 
difficulties. Producing the nerve agents in bulk was no easy feat.24 In 1951 alone the 
United States spent $3.6 million on nerve agent research, but it had almost completed a 
substantial production facility at the substantial cost of around $79 million, which could 
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produce 9,000 tons of sarin per year.25 These United States actions, and the sheer scale 
and ambition of its nerve agent programme, coincided with the growing momentum 
behind, and support for, a nerve agent capability in British military circles. British 
officials were also increasingly keen on not just owning an effective CW deterrent, but 
possessing the option of using lethal nerve agents against numerically superior Soviet 
forces in continental defence.  
From the early 1950s, key British defence committees increasingly advocated a more 
significant and prominent role for nerve agent weapons in defence planning. This rising 
tide of support for an active nerve agent weapons policy was seen in the reports of the 
newly formed sub-committee on Anti-Tank Defence Measures, which operated under 
the important DRPC, as well as the CWSC, which operated under the CoS. All of these 
committees, either directly or indirectly, were responsible for guiding and informing 
British defence policy at the highest levels. Their collective findings represented a 
mounting consensus in defence policy, which would have significant ramifications for 
both British CW policy and defence policy.  
Reflective of the grave concerns British defence officials had over Soviet tanks, and of 
the need for new weapons in the Cold War, the Anti-Tank Defence Measures Sub-
Committee was established in June 1950.26 While the committee had a broad remit, to 
discover and recommend for development new anti-tank weapons, its findings played a 
crucial part in adding to the emerging consensus that nerve agents had a significant role 
to play in any war with the Soviet Union.27 Just two months after its creation, the 
committee assigned a nerve agent anti-tank weapon a ranking of 10+, which was the 
highest possible.28 In October 1951, after further research and field trials, it was further 
appreciated that nerve agent shells would be extremely effective against Soviet tanks.29 
                                                 
25
 NARA II, RG 330, Entry 241, Box 486, ‘Funding of Chemical Corps G Agent Research and 
Development Program’, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, 25 January 1952; NARA II, RG 218, 
Central Decimal File 1951-53, Box 152, ‘Priority for Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities’, Chief 
of Staff, United States Army, 25 February 1952. 
26
 TNA, DEFE 10/30, ‘Development of Anti-Tank Weapons in the Long Term’, Sub-Committee on Anti-
Tank Defence Measures, 22 October 1951.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 TNA, DEFE 10/420, ‘Range of Army Anti-Tank Weapons for 1953/54’, Sub-Committee on Anti-Tank 
Defence Measures, 29 August 1950. Note: The ATDMC also referred to the role of LVT-1, which had an 
incendiary affect that was very much greater than napalm. 
29
 TNA, DEFE 10/30, ‘Development of Anti-Tank Weapons in the Long Term’, Sub-Committee on Anti-
Tank Defence Measures, 22 October 1951. The interim report can be found at: TNA, DEFE 10/420, 
‘Report by No. 4 Working Party on Potential Lethality of Future Anti-Tank Weapons’, Sub-Committee 
on Anti-Tank Defence Measures, 6 June 1951. 
66 
 
Experts now firmly believed that it would take only a single shell, filled with around a 
pint of nerve agent, to incapacitate a tank crew before they were even aware of the CW 
attack.30 Such a nerve agent shell, once mass-produced, could be readily deployed by 
British forces. Trials had shown that it could be delivered effectively from a pdr-25, 
which was the dominant British field gun during the Second World War, in Malaya and 
in the Korean War.31 This ease of implementation and use meant that the vast majority 
of British artillery units would have been able to use and deploy nerve agent weapons 
against Soviet tanks with relative ease.  
To a degree reinforcing earlier military assessments, nerve agent use was also 
beneficially thought to have ‘very great’ psychological effects on Soviet tank crews and 
personnel.32 Paranoid of nerve agent exposure and hindered by cumbersome defensive 
equipment, Soviet tank crews would be significantly less effective in battle. Although 
little was mentioned on the morality of resorting to nerve agents, the recognition that 
trained and experienced Soviet tank crews would be disturbed, frightened and have 
their combat ability seriously undermined by their use, does reveal some appreciation 
of the horrors of such a method of war.  
Considerations of alternative dimensions of nerve agent use were also reflected in 
assessments of British commitments under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which defence 
officials deemed a hindrance to the development of an anti-tank nerve agent weapon.33 
The Geneva Protocol prohibited the first-use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and 
other gases, as well as their liquid form, but it did not contain any punishment for non-
compliance, nor did it ban the stockpiling of chemical weapons or their use in 
retaliation.34 This limitation of retaliatory use, though, pushed British experts to 
consider other weapons which would not be limited to a purely retaliatory role. One 
such option was ‘LVT-1’, a substance that ignited on contact with oil or water.35 Due to 
defence officials believing that this potential weapon was not covered by the Geneva 
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Protocol, despite its toxic after-effects, it was placed as the top priority for research and 
development for an anti-tank weapon. However, even after recognising the limitations 
of the Geneva Protocol, for the Anti-Tank Defence Measures Sub-Committee a nerve 
agent shell had such great military utility that it remained one of the most important 
areas for research and development. The findings of the committee, including its strong 
recommendation and support for a nerve agent anti-tank weapon, were passed upwards 
to the DRPC and the CoS, who both endorsed and supported its findings.36  
The military desire to fully embrace nerve agent weapons gained further credence with 
the strong backing of the CWSC. In terms of the possibility of a nerve agent anti-tank 
weapon, the CWSC agreed with the findings of the Anti-Tank Defence Measures Sub-
Committee, and fully supported the acquisition of a nerve agent anti-tank weapon. In 
many other areas, the CWSC went much further. It advocated and supported the need 
for an effective CW deterrent, the mass-production of nerve agents and even their 
potential first-use on the battlefield.37 For defence officials, this latter point would have 
solidified and confirmed the role and place of nerve agents in British defence policy, 
whilst removing doubts over whether the nerve agents would actually be used in a 
future war with the Soviet Union.  
The CWSC, supported by the analysis of the JIC, also firmly believed that the only real 
CW threat of note came from the Soviet Union.38 Figuring out how best to discourage 
Soviet first-use, retaliate against any actual Soviet use and gain an advantage over 
Soviet CW capabilities were therefore the main objectives of policy. In terms of 
deterring Soviet first-use, the CWSC reiterated the view that the ability to retaliate, as 
seen during the Second World War, was ‘one of the most powerful deterrents to the 
initiation of Chemical Warfare by an enemy’.39 The Second World War was thus still 
the prime case study for successful CW deterrence, which supported and coincided with 
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the arguments over developing a nerve agent capability. This deterrence line of 
argument also played down the horrors of actually resorting to CW, as their role was to 
deter and be held in reserve, rather than be employed at the outbreak of war. This 
retaliation only aspect was however increasingly a bone of contention, for the CWSC 
not only urged CW preparedness for CW deterrence, but it also supported nerve agent 
acquisition because the weapons were thought to be so militarily effective against 
Soviet forces.40 It can be argued that a weapon needs to be effective in order to deter, 
but the interest of the CWSC in nerve agent weapons went far beyond just finding a 
viable deterrent, it delved into considerations of British first-use.  
In August 1951, in addition to recognising the value of an anti-tank weapon, the CWSC 
surmised that nerve agent weapons had ‘tremendous potentialities’ against 
concentrations of troops.41 Importantly, nerve agent weapons could give small forces 
the power to inflict heavy casualties, and ‘offset the great numerical superiority of the 
Russians’.42 This numerical imbalance of conventional forces was a huge area of 
concern for British defence officials, as while nerve agent weapons were not the only 
solution to this problem, for the CWSC they certainly represented one of the most 
viable means of countering it. Even outside of the nerve agents, chemical weapons were 
judged to provide an advantage if used. Defence officials thought that sulfur mustard 
could be used to cover a retreat on the continent, slowing down the Soviet advance 
while nuclear weapons devastated the Soviet Union.43 In light of all these perceived 
advantages in British forces using a variety of chemical weapons, the CWSC concluded 
that it was actually beneficial for Britain to resort to CW; as CW use was judged to 
favour the Western Powers rather than the Soviet Union.44  
This belief in the perceived advantages of using chemical weapons gained traction 
despite dire warnings from Anglo-American intelligence agencies, and even with the 
poor state of British civil defence. Throughout the early 1950s, the British JIC warned 
that large-scale Soviet nerve agent production could have started in 1951, that the 
Soviet Union could possess enough nerve agent weapons for operational use in 1953 
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and have a considerable capacity available from 1956.45 While this Soviet threat was 
branded ‘formidable’, it was still believed that Soviet defensive measures were poor, 
leaving their forces exposed to Allied CW use.46 British experts also believed that 
‘good anti-gas training requires a high degree of intelligence in the individual’, which 
was dubbed more applicable to NATO soldiers than their Soviet counterparts.47 In 
defending against a CW attack, the sheer scale of Soviet ground forces was also thought 
to be a disadvantage and an added burden; equipping millions of troops with the 
required defensive equipment was an enormous task, and one which was presumed to 
be beyond the capabilities of the Soviet Union.48  
Despite these alarming claims and assumptions, intelligence on Soviet CW capabilities 
was itself of very poor quality, and it was not the most influential factor when it came 
to guiding policy. British CW policy was often conducted in partial to complete 
ignorance of the true nature of the Soviet CW threat, as intelligence could provide no 
verifiable evidence on Soviet nerve agent developments. This had led to the CWSC 
lamenting, in August 1951, that ‘practically no post-war information on [Soviet] CW 
has been secured.’49 Soviet security measures were cited as the primary reason for this 
absence of accurate intelligence.50 The level of security was deemed so thorough that a 
large-scale CW installation could exist without any real possibility of it becoming 
known to British intelligence.51 Of particular concern, when considering the potential 
use of chemical weapons in war, British defence officials were highly uncertain as to 
how the Soviet Union would respond. Cautious officials noted that if the Soviets 
adopted the same approach they had to minefields, ‘namely, to march their troops 
straight through and accept casualties’, then absolutely no reliance could be placed on 
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certain chemical weapons for slowing down a Soviet advance across Western Europe.52 
This was a core aspect and rationale to the military justification for the deployment of 
chemical weapons, as although the nerve agents would not be used solely in this role, 
Britain’s stocks of sulfur mustard would be.  
Ultimately, as a result of poor intelligence, British officials lacked the means to 
accurately assess the CW threat they faced. Instead, judgements were made which 
relied on information several years old. The CWSC therefore believed that a significant 
nerve agent threat existed, which needed to be deterred and countered, but they had no 
verifiable intelligence as to how Soviet officials approached CW, what form Soviet use 
of CW would take, or in what quantity it would be used.  
Regardless of the paucity of accurate intelligence, the Soviet nerve agent threat was still 
thought significant. For the CWSC, the perceived Soviet threat also had significant 
ramifications for civil defence, which was feared unsatisfactory.53 The quandary was 
that effective civil defence necessitated circulating information on the highly secret 
nerve agents; for if civil defence were to mitigate against Soviet CW use in the nerve 
agent age, doctors, regional medical staff and civil defence officials needed to be made 
aware of the threat and the very nature of the nerve agents.54 Attempts to address 
domestic vulnerability therefore entailed informing a far greater number of people, and 
of letting the previously tight control over information on the nerve agents slip ever so 
slightly. A partial revelation was now needed.  
Although information about the nerve agents was rarely reported on due to close 
adherence to tight secrecy, on 8 August 1952, the Daily Mail published an article titled 
‘New Gas Destroys Nerves’.55 The article warned that these ‘new’ nerve agents were 
almost odourless, colourless and that unlike typical CW agents, they produced no easily 
recognisable symptoms of exposure, such as itching skin or sore eyes. Most 
distressingly, the Daily Mail reported on the substantial dangers of Soviet air raids 
using nerve agents.56 The release of this information was not however some accidental 
slip-up, or a result of pioneering investigatory journalism, but a deliberate effort by 
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Government officials to slightly lift the shroud of secrecy and raise public awareness. 
With the nerve agent threat and the uncertain global environment, stringent levels of 
secrecy had to be deliberately weakened for the benefit of defensive preparedness. This 
revelation was also made despite serious concerns, which spanned the Atlantic, over the 
adverse publicity which would result from any mention of CW.57 The need for a strong 
and informed civil defence effort thus necessitated a public intervention by Sir Harry 
Garner, Chief Scientist at the Ministry of Supply.58 With Garner confirming the 
existence of the lethal nerve agents, revealing ‘detailed facts’ about them, and raising 
public awareness as to how best mitigate against their use.59 This increased civil 
defence effort represented a significant point in post-war British nerve agent policy, 
where the existence of nerve agents was confirmed and the threat was deemed 
substantial enough to warrant the careful loosening of extremely tight levels of secrecy.  
Even with this apparent civilian vulnerability and the paucity of accurate and verifiable 
intelligence on the Soviet CW threat, defence officials still remained committed to the 
view that Britain held the upper hand in any war with chemical weapons.60 Perceived 
Soviet defensive weakness combined with the substantial military advantages offered 
by nerve agent use fuelled this positive outlook. In terms of the relative balance of 
forces, actually using nerve agents was thus deemed a beneficial and militarily sound 
option. The CWSC also remained committed to the production of nerve agent weapons 
for use in war, to deterrence through an immediate retaliatory capability, and to the 
expansion of the sarin facility at Nancekuke.61 This drive by the CWSC for a stronger 
nerve agent role played a significant part in altering the direction of British nerve agent 
research and development. When the CoS came to review of CW policy in secret, it 
would heavily rely on the previous findings and advice of the Anti-Tank Defence 
Measures, the CWSC, and those of the DRPC. 
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In March 1952, the DRPC’s support for nerve agent weapons, whilst reflective of 
growing military interest in the utility and benefits of using nerve agent weapons 
against Soviet forces, was slightly more cautious. In a strategic role, against populated 
cities or production centres, the DRPC recognised that chemical weapons would pale in 
comparison to atomic weapons. In a tactical role, it noted that nerve agent weapons 
were ‘extremely important’, and the DRPC even reconsidered its prior dismissal of a 
nerve agent aerial bomb, which was now deemed ‘impressive’. 62 The highly toxic 
properties of sarin, which Britain was gearing up to mass-produce, were also 
recognised as hugely effective against Soviet forces. For not only did nerve agent 
weapons have a high chance of killing those that came into contact with them, but as 
supported and previously recognised by the sub-committee on Anti-Tank Defence 
Measures, they also had a substantial psychological effect.63 Death by nerve agent 
exposure would have been a particularly disturbing sight, and Soviet soldiers, fearful of 
nerve agent exposure and equipped with respirators, would be significantly less 
effective in battle.64  
However, this psychological benefit, and the very nature of CW, came with a 
seemingly unassailable obstacle. As the DRPC warned, the limitations placed on CW 
use by the Geneva Protocol cast serious doubts over whether researching, developing 
and deploying this type of weapon was a worthwhile endeavour due to the legal 
constraints. Coupled with this was the impact of economic cutbacks to scientific 
research and development funding under the Churchill Government.65 This 
combination, of international treaties banning first-use and economic restraints, led to 
the DRPC erring on the side of caution. The committee questioned the decision to 
invest heavy capital, of around £2 million, into the expansion of the Nancekuke facility 
and the mass-production of sarin if there were no assurances that nerve agent weapons 
would be used.66 As a result, the DRPC advised the CoS that there needed to be 
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assurances over the use of nerve agent weapons, for them to warrant the investment and 
commitment that mass-production required.67  
In April 1952, before the completion of the 1952 Global Strategy Paper and after 
receiving the analysis and recommendations of the Anti-Tank Defence Measures Sub-
Committee, the CWSC and the DRPC, the CoS re-assessed British CW policy. Based 
on emerging military assessments over the value and military utility of nerve agent 
weapons, the CoS believed that their development should proceed, that the nerve agent 
plant at Nancekuke should be expanded with haste, and that Britain must be in a 
position to wage CW at the start of hostilities.68  
Mirroring the CWSC and DRPC, the CoS found that the effectiveness of the nerve 
agents against massed troops and tanks held such great promise that it justified 
significant funding and development.69 The CoS observed that without this nerve agent 
production, Britain would be ‘entirely dependent on the United States’, which was 
thought an unacceptable last resort.70 It also alleged that if the Soviets were to discover 
any Western weakness in the CW field, they would engage in CW to offset Western 
atomic dominance.71 As such, it was thought increasingly important to maintain a 
strong CW posture with a viable nerve agent capability, for without one Britain would 
be unable to retaliate with ‘any worthwhile gas’.72 In the nerve agent age, the CoS thus 
decided that Britain needed to expand its production ‘as soon as possible’, as the 
weapons produced would provide a ‘considerable’ deterrent.73 
Even with this keen military support, and the Attlee Government’s prior political 
approval in 1950, the role and place of nerve agent weapons was still at the mercy of 
the conclusions of the 1952 GSP.74 Swept up in this review of all of defence policy, 
nerve agent development, in an economically harsh environment, was in a precarious 
position. If the outcome of the GSP towards CW policy were positive, then the 
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Nancekuke facility would be rapidly expanded to meet Britain’s Cold War nerve agent 
requirements. For a positive outcome, in a period characterised by the Churchill 
Government’s cutbacks in defence expenditure, defence officials needed to show that 
nerve agent weapons were essential to defence. Crucially, proving that they were 
essential morphed into proving that they would be used in the event of war, which for 
chemical weapons is very dangerous territory indeed. Under the Geneva Protocol, it 
would have been illegal for Britain to initiate CW, and thus there was no guarantee that 
nerve agent weapons could or would be used in a future conflict, casting doubt over 
their viability. However, this did not lead to military officials or the CoS backing down 
in their desire for nerve agent weapons; rather, they sought to change Britain’s 
interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.  
 
The 1952 GSP 
As Baylis and Macmillan have correctly noted, the section on CBW within the GSP 
was altered after feedback from Government departments; unfortunately, they were 
unable to find the original wording.75 But the original draft copy of the GSP, now 
available, holds substantial implications for British CW policy and defence policy, as it 
displays just how strongly the CoS and defence officials felt about nerve agent 
weapons. What is significant regarding CW policy, in this original version of the GSP, 
is that the CoS attempted to change British policy for the first-use of lethal chemical 
weapons, and distance the country from its commitments under the Geneva Protocol.76 
In their version of the 1952 GSP, the CoS wanted the Government’s approval for the 
following:  
We consider that the Allies should be prepared to use these [CBW] 
weapons in war when they think it to their advantage to do so, and that 
this should be reflected in their public attitude to the employment of these 
forms of warfare.77  
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This substantial shift would have taken the onus away from a policy of retaliation only, 
and it would have allowed military planners to use lethal chemical weapons when they 
thought it beneficial to do so. As reflected in existing military thinking, this potential 
British use of nerve agent weapons would likely have been immediate rather than 
hypothetical. If the option were on the table, the perceived military utility of nerve 
agent weapons and the numerical imbalance vis-à-vis Soviet forces all but assured 
British first-use on the European battlefield. The extra condition that the ‘public 
attitude’ of the Government also reflected this change in policy was a particularly 
potent point, which deviated greatly from the prior practice of keeping all information 
on actual nerve agent policy highly secret. This condition implied that if Britain were to 
renounce its no first-use policy, then it should publicly acknowledge doing so. This 
condition also had possible roots in the perceived need for a bold CBW deterrent, 
which defence officials thought required some degree of public recognition or rhetoric. 
In justifying this striking shift in policy, with it spurning both moral and legal qualms, 
the CoS claimed that military utility, the scale of the Soviet threat, developments in 
nuclear weapons and peculiarly the CW policy of the United States all justified 
changing Britain’s adherence to the legally binding Geneva Protocol.  
A crucial part of this rationale was the assessment that if war did break out, then it was 
believed that Soviet forces would easily overrun Western Europe, and that Soviet 
aircraft would attempt to destroy United States bases in the United Kingdom.78 Such a 
Soviet assault on Western Europe would likely have triggered a United States nuclear 
response, and as Churchill warned, this atomic retaliation would then further spur on 
Russian forces to over-run Western Europe as rapidly as possible, with the Red Army 
rolling relentlessly forward.79 Hindering this rapid Soviet advance was therefore where 
chemical weapons came to the fore in the original GSP. The nerve agents could be used 
to hamper Soviet progress across the continent and exert a considerable toll on Soviet 
ground forces, whilst atomic weapons struck at the heart of the Soviet Union. This 
argument over the scale of the Soviet threat chimed with the military utility of chemical 
weapons, for in justifying a shift in first-use policy the two arguments went hand in 
hand for the CoS: the exceptional scale and level of the Soviet threat required an 
exceptional military solution. 
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Although the nerve agents were recognised as weapons suitable for an exceptional 
circumstance, compared to the atomic bomb, the CoS also deemed them morally no 
worse. The Service Chiefs argued that ‘the moral objections to chemical warfare can 
surely be no greater than to atomic warfare.’80 While revealing an awareness of the 
moral and ethical dilemmas involved in CW, this comparison was actually further used 
to justify the use of chemical weapons in war. In the military-based logic of the CoS, if 
atomic weapons were to be used in a future war, then why not chemical weapons as 
well? In a total global war, all of Britain’s military capabilities would have to be thrown 
at the Soviet juggernaut. In terms of the scale of destruction, an atomic bomb far 
outweighed chemical weapons. The CoS thus queried why chemical weapons should be 
any different from that of atomic warfare, and why there were such moral objections to 
the use of chemical weapons.81 By comparing chemical weapons to atomic weapons, 
the CoS hoped to rationalise their use, even if this massively distorted and overlooked 
the moral aspects of resorting to such a form of warfare. Alongside legal constraints, 
the CoS was therefore also attempting to put forward its case for nerve agent weapons 
being morally no worse than other methods of warfare.  
Equally crucial for the CoS in justifying the first-use of chemical weapons was not just 
potential United States use of nuclear weapons, but also its CW policy. As alleged by 
the CoS, ‘the Americans have not adhered to the Geneva Convention and will certainly 
not hesitate to use either Bacteriological Warfare or Chemical Warfare if they consider 
it advantageous to do so.’82 In requesting British chemical weapons for use at the start 
of hostilities, the CoS therefore gave the impression that they were also harmonising 
British policy with that of the United States. Due to the potential use of CBW by the 
United States, it was therefore feared that Britain, regardless of its stance, could be 
dragged into a conflict with chemical weapons. Any first-use of chemical weapons by 
the United States would likely have resulted in Soviet reprisals against NATO forces, 
triggering the retaliation-only policy of the Geneva Protocol and lifting the legal 
constraints on British CW use.  
For British officials, the likelihood of the United States resorting to CW seemed to be 
given even greater credence by the ongoing Korean War. As outlined by Julian Perry 
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Robinson, senior defence officials in the United States, alongside front-line 
Commanders, were pressing to use chemical weapons during the war.83 The Chiefs of 
Staff of both the United States Army and Air Force were recommending changing first-
use policy to make possible the use of chemical weapons when it was deemed 
advantageous to do so.84 Previously, the United States had self-imposed a retaliation 
only policy, in line with the Geneva Protocol. But, this first-use shift was pushed for 
despite protests from a resistant Navy and even with concerns that a unilateral change 
might alienate the United Kingdom.85 This latter point reveals the influence of the 
Anglo-American relations, with United States officials taking British CW policy into 
account when formulating their own approach. Conversely, it also shows the relative 
isolation and confusion resulting from their respective debates over military utility and 
first-use policy; with both countries seemingly misreading, or at least highly uncertain, 
as to the actual first-use policy and intent of the other.  
What is apparent in the experiences of Britain and the United States is the degree of 
uniformity in how both countries viewed the military utility of chemical weapons, and 
how certain British and United States defence officials wanted to be able to use nerve 
agent weapons at the outset of war. The first-use dilemma was not a decision that could 
be taken in isolation, with it having substantial ramifications for allies. Defence 
officials in the United States were hesitant to change policy unilaterally, and the British 
CoS was keen to bring its policy in line with that of the United States, or at least in line 
with what the United States was predicted to do in a global war. The CoS, in their 
original version of the GSP, thus used the uncertainty of United States CW policy, and 
its potential first-use, as another reason and rationale for changing Britain’s adherence 
to an internationally recognised treaty banning the first-use of chemical weapons.86 
Unfortunately for the CoS, before their version of the GSP was sent for Cabinet 
approval in mid-1952, it was first circulated to other Government departments. In this 
process, the Foreign Office emerged as strongly resistant to Britain publicly reneging 
on an internationally recognised treaty, a treaty which Britain had adhered to even 
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during the Second World War.87 Representing more normative based arguments 
emphasising the rule of law, the Foreign Office crucially modified the GSP, arguing 
that the text should read: ‘the Allies should not take up a position which would deprive 
them of their ability to use chemical and bacteriological warfare in retaliation.’88 
Explicitly countering the wishes of the CoS, the Foreign Office re-draft thus reiterated 
that Britain was a signatory of the Geneva Convention and would only use chemical or 
biological weapons in retaliation.89 After this strong rebuttal, which was reflective of 
wider normative constraints and particularly British obligations under the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, the GSP was drastically changed. Any reference to the United States and its 
potential use of CBW, moral comparisons between CW and atomic warfare, and any 
mention of British first-use were all removed from the text of the GSP.90 The input of 
the Foreign Office proved a costly and bruising experience for CW advocates, with 
their envisaged policy for the first-use of nerve agent weapons substantially watered 
down and overridden.91  
In July 1952, aware of the hugely divergent stances of the CoS and the Foreign Office, 
Churchill put the topic of Britain’s first-use of CBW to the Cabinet’s Defence 
Committee for review.92 This decision by Churchill to hold a high-level meeting was 
also spurred on by concerned British BW experts, who had caught wind of the proposed 
changes in first-use policy put forward by the CoS. Here there appears some disconnect 
between CW and BW, for many British CW experts had strongly supported this change 
in first-use policy, yet for many BW experts it caused alarm and warranted the seeking 
of Ministerial clarification.93 This concern and the decision by Churchill to review the 
proposed changes, led to the Defence Committee directly addressing the topic of CBW 
and first-use.  
In the meeting in July 1952 political oversight and input was to prove a crushing blow 
for CW advocates, as from the outset members of the Defence Committee were highly 
sceptical of any proposed change in Britain’s retaliation only policy for CBW. 
Crucially, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was absent from the meeting, had he been 
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present British CW policy may have taken a very different turn.94 Without Eden’s 
presence, the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, lambasted the desired first-use 
policy change as ‘impossible’ to justify, and he argued that such a policy change could 
only ever be enacted ‘when we were fighting for our lives.’95 Lyttelton, clearly 
impassioned, was not alone in his damning assessment. The Defence Committee agreed 
that CBW first-use could only be considered in a time of war and in the most dire of 
situations, as it was too controversial a form of warfare to warrant publicity or a change 
in first-use policy. Even Churchill, a prior advocate of CW, shied away from the 
dramatic policy shift put forward by the CoS. He was especially cautious over the 
publicity aspect of revealing anything about British CW policy, which was all the more 
remarkable given that just a decade before he had publicly threatened to ‘carry out gas 
warfare on the largest possible scale’ against Germany.96 
Chemical and biological weapons were seen as so controversial and morally dubious 
that only in the most severe, desperate situation, would their first-use be considered. 
The exact origins of this moral aversion are hard to trace, and it is certainly not unique 
to British politicians. As argued by Price, the taboo nature of chemical weapons reflects 
a genuine and widespread moral rejection of this means of modern warfare, with CW 
contravening what was expected of technological states of the ‘civilized’ world.97 How 
a state should be seen to conduct itself thus to an extent amalgamates with the taboo 
nature of chemical weapons, with the chemical weapons taboo, a social and political 
construction, operating as a norm in international society.98 In the British case, 
perceptions of how a great power should act thus likely played a part in political 
aversion towards nerve agent weapons. A cultural element was also a particularly 
strong psychological factor in this aversion, with the legacy of the First World War, the 
shock value of the nerve agents themselves, and stories of Nazi death camps and human 
experiments all still within recent memory.99 However, regardless of the exact driver of 
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political aversion, in the absence of a global war, CW was thought such a controversial 
topic that even Churchill shied away from even publicly acknowledging a change in 
CW policy, let alone indicating British willingness to resort to nerve agent use. As a 
result Churchill and the rest of the Defence Committee decided, in July 1952, that no 
public announcement should be made unless they were obliged to, and they agreed with 
the Foreign Office that Britain should adhere to the Geneva Protocol.100  
Following the Defence Committee’s verdict, and after the Foreign Office review, the 
final 1952 GSP stated that:  
The United Kingdom is at present committed by the Geneva Convention 
not to use [chemical and biological weapons] except in retaliation… The 
new nerve gases can, however, be used tactically to great advantage and 
would provide the Allies with weapons of real value against an enemy 
who relies on massed formations.101  
While this final version of the GSP acknowledged the tactical value of the nerve agents 
against Soviet forces, it was a far cry from what the CoS had wanted it to say. Instead 
of granting the ability to use chemical weapons at the outset of war, British politicians 
had re-affirmed the country’s commitment to the retaliation only-policy of the Geneva 
Protocol. The arguments put forward by the CoS had fallen on deaf ears, with ministers 
on the Defence Committee finding the CoS request a step too far. This rebuff would 
have substantial consequences for British CW policy, with it significantly changing 
Britain’s relationship and engagement with nerve agent weapons and the direction of 
CW policy. 
 
An about turn  
The failed attempt to overcome the perceived limitations of a no first-use policy in the 
GSP would have a considerable impact on British CW policy and the decision to 
develop and produce nerve agents. A. E. Childs, the Director of the Chemical Defence 
Experimental Establishment at Porton Down, ruefully noted that the outcome of the 
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GSP was likely to be a ‘dampening effect, in that however good toxicological weapons 
might be, they could not be integrated with early and immediate war plans’.102 With no 
change to Britain’s interpretation of first-use, advocates of a British nerve agent 
capability had thus fallen at the Geneva Protocol hurdle. This rebuttal had transpired 
even after the military utility of nerve agents had been established and after prior 
political approval had been granted for production by the Attlee Government. The 
backlash and fallout from this failed attempt to alter first-use policy also coincided 
with, and was further exacerbated by, the deterioration of Britain’s CW stockpile and 
the Churchill Government’s economic cutbacks to defence expenditure. 
In late July 1952, shortly after the GSP decision, it was fully recognised that Britain 
was without a viable or truly effective CW capability. For the GSP had not only 
highlighted the military desirability of nerve agent weapons, but it also revealed the 
urgency and importance military planners attached to a nerve agent capability and 
deterrent. The GSP had demanded a CW capability, but Britain still only possessed 
outmoded forms of chemical weapons which did not offer a meaningful deterrent 
capability.103 As the Air Ministry warned, leftover stores of sulfur mustard bombs were 
no longer satisfactory, and phosgene bombs contained an ‘obsolescent agent’.104 Even 
with this damming conclusion, it was recommended that these outmoded and 
ineffective weapons still be retained, for they represented the country’s only real CW 
retaliatory capability, with captured German tabun bombs still largely unusable.105 The 
situation was so severe for defence officials that they clung to an obsolete, 
deteriorating, and inefficient CW capability, which could only realistically be used in 
an absolute ‘last ditch’ effort against the Soviet Union. Reflective of this desperation, 
and with doubts over the fate of a nerve agent capability after the GSP setback, the Air 
Ministry even approved the production of 19,000x1000lb sulfur mustard bombs.106  
In the Cold War nerve agent age, Britain was increasingly falling behind the 
superpowers. The situation was bleak for defence officials, as not only did the GSP 
quash the change in first-use policy, it also provided no concrete political guidance on 
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how Britain’s retaliatory CW capability was to be fulfilled, or what form it would 
take.107 Given this concerning situation, the Air Ministry searched for a potential 
remedy for the nerve agent shortage, with the new sulfur mustard bombs acting as a 
temporary stop-gap.108 The Air Ministry still believed that Britain needed a nerve agent 
capability, even if just for deterrence and retaliation, rather than for first-use. One 
potential solution was to modify captured German tabun bombs to better suit British 
means of delivery; this would have at least provided a slightly more credible retaliatory 
capability with nerve agents.109 
The second option suggested by the Air Ministry was the sounding out and revival of 
considerations of a potential nerve agent deal with the United States.110 This was 
thought a particularly promising avenue given the poor economic state of the country, 
and due to the fact that the expansion of the Nancekuke facility to 50 tons per week was 
now thought to require an investment of around £4 million, along with a further £5 
million for the chemical industry.111 Strangely though this proposal was suggested 
despite Britain not being alone in its poor CW preparedness, for the United States was 
also struggling to develop nerve agent weapons in mid-1952.112 The United States was, 
however, struggling for very different reasons. It had started the mass-production of 
sarin, but technical difficulties were hampering the level of output. While the United 
States was therefore grappling with the mass-production of sarin, after the GSP, Britain 
was left scrambling resources together to acquire some form of CW capability, even if 
it was only in the form of sulfur mustard bombs or through acquiring nerve agents from 
the United States.  
This disparity in effort and scale was further compounded with the souring of military 
enthusiasm for nerve agent weapons in Britain, and the introduction of harsh economic 
cutbacks in defence expenditure. Reflective of Childs’ concerns, without any guarantee 
over the use of nerve agent weapons, previous military interest in the nerve agents 
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waned. Previous advocates of nerve agent weapons, such as the DRPC, the War Office 
and the Air Ministry, also began to question the nerve agent requirement and domestic 
mass-production.  
In January 1953, when the CoS met to discuss the future of CW policy, the tone was 
markedly different.113 The Service Chiefs had oscillated and changed course very 
quickly in the aftermath of the GSP, with Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, taking a particularly negative stance on British CW policy.114 
Harding, representing the Army and in a substantial break from his predecessors, 
argued that Britain should confine itself to purely defensive research, abandon 
aspirations for a nerve agent capability, and scrap offensive research altogether.115 This 
reversal was all the more remarkable given that it was the Army which had previously 
been the main advocate and central driving force behind nerve agent weapons 
acquisition. Harding’s measures would have severely debilitated British CW policy, but 
he believed that in order to counter this Britain should willingly become entirely reliant 
on the nerve agent capability of the United States in order to save ‘large sums of 
money’.116 The second key advocate of nerve agent weapons, the Air Ministry, also 
changed course after the GSP failure. Although not as drastic as Harding, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir William Dickson, Chief of the Air Staff, concluded that while tactically 
useful, strategically CW was not of vital importance.117 Dickson believed that instead 
of forsaking nerve agent weapons altogether, Britain should seek to purchase nerve 
agent weapons from the United States. Such a step represented a possible solution to 
Britain’s nerve agent requirements, as it represented a potential financial saving from 
abandoning domestic production and it avoided the worst-case scenario of casting aside 
all aspects of offensive CW policy.118  
This turn against a British nerve agent capability also coincided with the defence 
cutbacks orchestrated by the Churchill Government, and with substantial advances in 
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British nuclear weapons capabilities; Britain tested its first atomic bomb in October 
1952.119 After this key juncture, and with the advent of the thermonuclear age, even 
greater attention, support and funding would need to be allocated to the field.120 This 
primacy of atomic weapons came at the cost of other areas of defence, and it 
undoubtedly played a part in defence officials revoking their previously strong support 
for a nerve agent capability. In light of the GSP and this shift in military opinion, the 
DRPC concluded with ‘great reluctance’ that plans for the expansion of Nancekuke 
should be abandoned.121 Financial constraints, the dominance of nuclear weapons, the 
adverse impact of prioritising nerve agent weapons over other ‘more urgent’ weapons, 
and the United States soon providing a substantial nerve agent deterrent all combined to 
undermine arguments for domestic nerve agent production.122 The arrival of a United 
States nerve agent capability was a particularly potent factor, with members of the 
DRPC observing that ‘as with the atom bomb, nerve gas would prove a powerful 
deterrent in the hands of the United States, even if we ourselves did not possess it.’123 
With there being no certainty of use and with the costs involved, military opinion had 
thus turned against nerve agent weapons, and the DRPC, Air Staff and Army all 
revoked their support and backing for domestic production.  
After reviewing policy, the CoS concluded in January 1953 that ‘in light of this 
country’s present financial position’, Britain could not ‘afford to provide the means of 
retaliation with modern CW nerve gas weapons.’124 The CoS, very much in line with 
the DRPC and existing military opinion, also counselled that as with the atomic bomb, 
nerve agent would indeed provide a powerful deterrent in the hands of the United 
States. With the United States providing the CW deterrent, and a potential avenue for 
future acquisition, Britain did not need to mass-produce its own nerve agent weapons. 
This decision was also thought a necessary sacrifice in order to fund other areas of 
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defence ‘of even greater importance’.125 During a period of economic cutbacks and 
with the ascendancy of nuclear weapons in defence policy, funding had to go towards 
weapons which were vital to defence and which would be used, rather than those that 
only might be used.126  
This substantial policy reversal was put forward by the CoS and met with widespread 
acceptance, except from the CWSC, which, under the Chairmanship of Sir Kenneth 
Crawford, put up bitter resistance. Crawford, in one of his final acts before retirement, 
condemned the direction of British CW policy, strongly criticised the stance of Harding 
and Dickson, and bemoaned the poor state of British CW preparedness.127 He argued 
that the ‘nerve gases, used as tactical weapons in the field, would be of a potency far in 
excess of anything previously known’ and that they would prove ‘a substantial 
deterrent’.128 Reminiscent of the CoS arguments in the original GSP, Crawford lobbied 
for nerve agent weapons, believing that they would be hugely important for the defence 
of Western Europe. He further warned that once atomic weapons were used, nerve 
agents would not remain ‘excluded for long’.129 Crawford thus dubbed first-use a non-
issue, for in an all-out war no weapon would be barred, and the Americans would use 
everything in their arsenal.  
The willingness to accept increasing reliance on the United States was also slammed by 
Crawford, who strongly questioned this complete reliance on the United States. He 
argued that prior Anglo-American cooperation was based on a degree of reciprocity, 
not complete dependence.130 If Britain chose such a position of dependence, then he 
cautioned that the depths and levels of Anglo-American cooperation would diminish, 
for Britain would be unable to supply the United States with information of value in the 
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CW field.131 Crawford concluded that Britain needed to maintain its contribution to the 
‘common fund of knowledge’ to warrant continued access to the United States 
programme.132 The Chairman of the CWSC therefore roundly condemned the direction 
and perceived decline of British CW policy, and he recommended that given the 
economic situation, Britain should not abandon nerve agent weapons, but simply seek 
the most economically viable means of possessing them.  
Testament to his influence, which amalgamated with lingering military hopes over 
acquiring a nerve agent weapon, Crawford’s harsh rebuke did not go unheeded. After 
his intervention, while the CoS accepted that the planned 50 ton a week nerve agent 
facility should indeed be abandoned, contrary to Harding they agreed that advanced 
British research into offensive CW must continue, particularly as the perceived Soviet 
threat remained ‘formidable’.133 Crawford’s desire for a more economical nerve agent 
capability also chimed with the Air Ministry, which had been advocating a potentially 
more economically viable nerve agent capability since the GSP failure. The Air 
Ministry believed that Britain could purchase nerve agents from the United States, 
whilst continuing its own offensive CW research. This middle-path compromise gained 
traction, especially since after the GSP the Service Chiefs had reduced the quantity of 
nerve agents they required for the outbreak of war; increasing the likelihood that the 
United States could fulfil Britain’s request. Before the GSP, the War Office and the Air 
Ministry had desired around 12,000 tons of sarin for military use, which would have 
proved a tall order for United States officials. However, immediately after the GSP 
setback, this figure was drastically curtailed to 2,500 tons.134 Given this comparatively 
low amount, and even with the stuttering nature of the United States CW programme, 
British officials were hopeful for a deal.135 As the Ministry of Supply observed, ‘the 
overheads required for us to produce our modest requirements seem out of proportion 
when considering the huge effort being expended in the United States’.136 
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Despite still not possessing any real nerve agent capability in early 1953 as a result of 
technical difficulties, the United States was rapidly approaching sarin mass-
production.137 This was greatly aided by the fact that after the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the United States CW budget was tripled, leaving Crawford to ruefully conclude 
that ‘the American effort is such as to make ours puny by comparison.’138 When the 
optimal level of United States nerve agent mass-production was reached, it would be 
producing 15,000 to 20,000 tons of sarin a year.139 British officials in the Ministry of 
Supply still thought this rapid expansion of nerve agent production highly ambitious, 
and reflective of earlier concerns they cautioned that it would be ‘surprising’ if the 
United States’ plans actually met the schedule envisaged.140 Owing to the degree of 
Anglo-American CW cooperation, British research did already directly benefit from 
this ambitious United States nerve agent research and production programme in other 
ways. British experts were allowed access to the production facility, given information 
on production techniques and they were regularly appraised of the progress of 
production.141 Due to domestic economic and political difficulties however, British 
officials wanted far more than just to learn methods of production from the United 
States, they also wanted the output. 
In 1951, the idea of acquiring nerve agents supplied by the United States had been 
rejected by British CW planners, yet by early 1953, British officials had shifted their 
position.142 Throughout 1953 advanced discussions took place between the United 
States Department of State, the Department of Defense and the British Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) over whether a nerve agent deal was viable, and over how much the 
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nerve agents would cost.143 The potential deal had the backing of the United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British CoS, but there were serious reservations on both 
sides and substantial obstacles to overcome. One problem was that while United States 
officials estimated that 2,500 tons of sarin would cost Britain around $10 million, the 
United States did not produce suitable weapons or casings for nerve agent use by 
British forces – meaning that if Britain wanted nerve agent weapons it would have to 
supply the delivery method, whilst the United States supplied the actual nerve agent 
filling.144 A novel solution was proposed, which again highlights the remarkable depth 
of trilateral cooperation in the CW field at the time; Canada would produce British-
designed casings for weapons, which would then be shipped to the United States, filled 
with sarin, and then these sarin-filled weapons would be shipped to Britain.145  
A second stumbling block to any deal was that Britain would have to wait for United 
States production to reach the required level, as in early 1953 production was not 
sufficient to meet the United States’ military requirements, let alone modest British 
ones as well.146 It was predicted that only by mid-1956 would the United States be 
ready for the large-scale use of nerve agents, thus opening the opportunity of potential 
British acquisition.147 This delay though caused some consternation on the British side, 
with concerns still simmering over whether the country should voluntarily become 
‘entirely dependent’ on the United States for a ‘potentially very powerful weapon’.148 
As discussions advanced, exploration of the nerve agent deal gained momentum, and 
with it emerged senior political interest in the form of the British Minister of Defence, 
Field Marshal Harold Alexander, and the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. In March 
1953, Alexander agreed with the CoS that a deal should be pursued.149 He believed that 
Britain’s nerve agent requirements were ‘comparatively small’ when placed next to the 
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substantial scale of the United States CW programme.150 Of the potential 2,500 tons to 
be acquired from the United States deal, it was also confirmed that 1,600 tons would go 
to the Army, with the rest going to the RAF.151 After this green light by Alexander, 
discussions over a potential deal gained even further authority and weight.  
However, the complexity of transporting nerve agents and the sheer costs involved 
began to take a toll on negotiations. With divides emerging in March-April 1953, 
Churchill attempted to take a more active role in the nerve agent negotiations.152 To 
procure nerve agent weapons for Britain, Churchill sought to use his relationship with 
General Walter Bedell Smith, the United States Under-Secretary of State and a close 
ally of Eisenhower, to push for a change in fortunes in negotiations.153 The proposed 
letter shows Churchill attempting to intervene at the highest level to secure nerve agent 
supplies for Britain.154 It also reveals that Churchill did not only want 2,500 tons of 
sarin for British forces, but a United States commitment to meet all of Britain’s nerve 
agent requirements should war break out, which would have been a substantial 
undertaking.155 Churchill’s direct intervention never came to fruition. The letter was 
scuppered by the very same person who had drafted it. Alexander actively discouraged 
the Prime Minister from intervening, warning that it might be ‘straining’ his contacts 
within the United States administration, especially since Bedell Smith was not even 
directly involved with the negotiations.156 Churchill, heeding Alexander’s advice, 
agreed to take a back seat.157 
Shortly after Churchill’s attempted intervention, in May 1953, negotiations encountered 
their most significant obstacle, with the CoS increasingly concerned by the burden of 
having to pay outright for the 2,500 tons of sarin, rather than receiving it on more 
favourable terms through US defence aid. Summarising the findings of the CoS, 
Alexander informed Churchill that the proposed deal, in its current form, was simply 
not a viable alternative to domestic mass-production.158 The expansion of the British 
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nerve agent facility at Nancekuke was predicted to cost in the region of £4 million, 
while the cost of purchasing nerve agents from the United States would have been £2.2 
million, creating a saving of around £1.8 million.159 This attractive saving, in a period 
of defence cutbacks, did not however include the costs of transporting the nerve agents. 
It was soon realised, after detailed negotiations and planning, that this saving of £1.8 
million would actually have been mostly, if not wholly offset, by the costs of filling the 
ammunition and transporting the weapons across the Atlantic.160 As a result of these 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Alexander informed Churchill that the nerve agent 
deal should be rejected in its current form, for it did not fulfil its primary purpose of 
providing Britain with an economically viable nerve agent capability.161  
While these negotiations were ongoing, Churchill was again drawn into nerve agent 
policy, when, on 7 May 1953, he was informed of British nerve agent experiments on 
volunteer soldiers.162 These experiments were a part of a much more extensive research 
programme, with nerve agent experiments carried out thousands of times a year at 
Porton Down. Although these trials were often on animals such as guinea pigs and 
rabbits, rather than humans, from 1949, scientists at Porton had thought it essential to 
begin testing small amounts of nerve agents on volunteer soldiers.163 This was deemed 
a necessary scientific step for the accurate measurement of the effects of nerve agent 
exposure in humans. In total, from 1949 to May 1953, around 1,500 soldiers were 
subjected to tests with lethal nerve agents.164 As Churchill was remarkably informed, 
these trials were ‘exceedingly mild’.165  
Churchill was notified of these activities as, on 6 May 1953, a British volunteer soldier 
had died from nerve agent exposure after an experiment at Porton Down.166 In the trial, 
researchers had exposed Leading Aircraftman Ronald Maddison to a small quantity of 
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sarin.167 After a short amount of time, he suffered from violent convulsions which 
resulted in a traumatic death. This experiment on Maddison was carried out despite, in 
the months preceding his death, numerous other instances of soldiers suffering 
seriously negative effects from the trials.168 In addition, many of the soldiers involved 
in these experiments were completely unaware that they were being tested with lethal 
nerve agents.169 And, despite queries in Parliament, Maddison’s death was referred to 
as a ‘fatal accident’, and the trials conducted at Porton, and the true nature of 
Maddison’s death, did not come to light at the time.170 The subsequent Home Office 
inquest was also kept secret, and Maddison’s death was labelled as accidental.171 It was 
not until 1960 that the Daily Mail reported that scientists at Porton Down had 
experimented on humans, but even then the scale was not fully appreciated or 
realised.172 In November 2004, after a second inquest and after 50 years had elapsed, it 
was finally determined that Maddison had been unlawfully killed by nerve agent 
exposure.173 For decades the public was kept in the dark about the extent of British 
nerve agent research and human experiments, which had reached this unfortunate 
climax in 1953.174 This adherence to secrecy was all the more remarkable given that 
Churchill, in May 1953, when receiving the report of Maddison’s death, had advised 
officials to ‘tell the truth’.175  
Given the perceived scale of the Soviet threat, the lack of an effective deterrent, and 
with the urgency resulting from falling behind in the nerve agent arms race, these 
British experiments on human volunteers had been thought justified. This unethical 
drive for scientific advances came at a substantial cost, with Maddison’s death marking 
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the end of a particularly gloomy and questionable period in British defence policy, 
which had also been dominated by considerations and military support for changes in 
the first-use of lethal chemical weapons.  
The period of 1951-53 therefore marked both the zenith of post-war British nerve agent 
policy and signalled the start of a rapid decline. In 1951, crucial committees like the 
CWSC and the DRPC were pushing for a prominent role for nerve agents in British 
defence policy. This groundswell of support, based on the perceived military utility of 
nerve agent weapons and the Soviet threat, led to the CoS drastically attempting to 
change Britain’s interpretation of the Geneva Protocol. This attempted change in first-
use however, met fierce resistance from both the Foreign Office and from senior 
politicians in the Defence Committee. The CoS and military advocates of British nerve 
agent weapons were rebuffed, with the political, economic, moral and reputational costs 
deemed too significant to overcome. Only in the darkest time, and facing a fight for 
survival, would political approval be given for a change in first-use policy. As a result 
of this setback, and with no guarantee that nerve agent weapons would be used in a 
future war, British nerve agent policy suffered from uncertainty and cutbacks. The 
expansion of the Nancekuke facility to allow the production of 50 tons of sarin per 
week was halted, and serious questions emerged over the future of British CW policy. 
While economic constraints severely hampered policy, instead of scrapping offensive 
CW policy altogether, defence officials attempted to salvage the dire situation through a 
potential nerve agent deal with the United States. These protracted negotiations, for an 
affordable nerve agent capability and deterrent, would continue into the mid-1950s, 
when British CW policy continued its drift and decline.176 
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3. Drift, Decline and Abandonment, 1954-19571 
 
If we were to kill each other by the million with gases we might yet earn 
the gratitude of the historians and archaeologists of the future, who might 
say that at least the inhabitants of the western countries, in the second 
half of the 20th century, were civilised or cultured enough to kill each 
other but not to destroy everything their ancestors had made during 
thousands of years of civilisation.2 
Geoffrey de Freitas MP, House of Commons Debate, 5 July 1954. 
After the substantial impact of the Korean War, which drew to a close with the 
armistice agreement of July 1953, the Cold War briefly quietened.3 The period of 1954-
55, despite it coinciding with West Germany joining NATO and the conflict in 
Indochina, thus represented a relative decline in Cold War tensions. Nikita Khrushchev, 
the emerging Soviet successor after the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, initially 
appeared to embrace the new atmosphere. When he met President Dwight Eisenhower 
at Geneva in July 1955, he agreed to Austrian neutrality and aired ideas of 
disarmament.4 However this climate of cooperation would soon prove short-lived, and 
tensions would again re-ignite when Khrushchev forcefully suppressed the Hungarian 
uprising in 1956.5 This environment of rising tensions and confrontation would take 
greater urgency with the ‘Sputnik effect’ in 1957, when Soviet breakthroughs in the 
area of ballistic missile technology added to growing fears of Soviet scientific and 
military capabilities in the thermonuclear age.6  
Navigating the fall and rise in Cold War tensions was no easy task for British Prime 
Ministers. Winston Churchill, keen to reinvent great power summitry after the death of 
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Stalin, attempted to secure a more active, moderating role for Britain.7 In April 1955 
however, he resigned, with his heir-apparent Anthony Eden taking over the reins. 
Eden’s premiership was marked by the disaster of the Suez crisis of 1956.8 Branded as 
a ‘traumatic clash’ in Anglo-American relations, Suez underlined the limits of post-war 
British power, with pressure from the United States forcing a humiliating British retreat 
from its military action against Egypt.9 In January 1957, following Eden’s resignation, 
Harold Macmillan became the third Conservative Prime Minister in less than two years. 
Once in office, Macmillan sought to repair Anglo-American relations as a first priority, 
and in May 1957 he witnessed Britain joining the thermonuclear club as the world’s 
third member during the Grapple series of tests in the South Pacific.10 
In parallel with the dominance of nuclear deterrence, the economic situation also took 
on renewed importance during this period.11 Defence expenditure was to witness a fall 
from 9.4% of GDP in 1954 to 6.8% in 1958.12 Duncan Sandys was appointed Minister 
of Defence by Macmillan, with a mandate to substantially reduce defence expenditure 
and manpower.13 His famous Defence White Paper, issued in April 1957, announced 
the end of national service, embodied strategic and economic arguments to justify 
reductions in defence expenditure and emphasised the pre-eminent role of the nuclear 
deterrent.14 British development of thermonuclear weapons during the Sandys era of 
defence policy was all the more important given that the nuclear arms race had begun to 
reach new heights. The United States had first tested a thermonuclear device in 1952, 
and the Soviet Union in 1955. For British policy-makers, this dawn of the 
thermonuclear age was a double-edged sword. Britain was a front-line target, yet 
thermonuclear weapons would also diminish the advantage of physically larger 
countries, which had been a clear benefit the Soviet Union possessed over Britain.15 
Along with this substantial thermonuclear development, with its horrifying level of 
destructive capability, increasing focus and emphasis was also placed on the deterrent 
role of nuclear weapons in broader British defence policy. This prioritisation of nuclear 
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weapons often came at the cost of other areas of defence, with thermonuclear weapons 
deemed integral for deterrence, for prestige, and viewed as a more economical means of 
improving security in comparison to conventional forces.16  
British CW policy, after the failure of the 1952 GSP, with substantial changes in the 
Cold War environment, and increasingly eclipsed by this ever-growing nuclear shadow, 
experienced a period of drift and decline. This chapter will first explore the legacy and 
fallout resulting from the 1952 GSP, and then it will analyse the crucial years of 1956-
57, with the decisions made during this period having substantial ramifications for 
British CW policy in the Cold War.  
 
Drift and decline 
By February 1954, any possible deal for acquiring nerve agents from the United States 
had fallen through. Despite energetic action by British officials, discussions had 
become bogged down in ‘legal difficulties’ and over the issue of payment.17 British 
defence officials also increasingly thought it unwise to rely wholly on the United States 
for a CW capability, especially since United States production was behind schedule, 
rendering it unlikely that they would have spare supplies for Britain to purchase in the 
immediate future.18 Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, informed Churchill that 
there were no financial gains to be found with the United States deal, as the total cost of 
purchasing and transporting the nerve agents would be comparable to Britain 
domestically producing them.19  
In light of this setback, the Cabinet Defence Committee initially, under the strong 
urgings of the Minister of Supply Duncan Sandys, again approved the domestic 
production of nerve agents.20 It also confirmed that the nerve agent deal, entailing 
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reliance on the United States, would be ‘abandoned’.21 Expenditure on nerve agent 
weapons could still, however, only be approved if they were deemed essential to 
defence, with their effectiveness against large numbers of Soviet troops believed to be 
an ‘essential part of our military equipment’.22 In 1954, the CoS and the Ministry of 
Supply still both believed that the ability to retaliate with nerve agent weapons was 
important, and with the United States falling through, they revived plans for the 
expansion of the sarin plant at Nancekuke.23 The immediate short-term consequence of 
the potential United States deal falling through was therefore that domestic production 
was once again confirmed, as the proponents of nerve agent weapons remained keen to 
possess a nerve agent capability for both its military utility and deterrent value, even if 
first-use was off the table.  
The expansion of the Nancekuke facility would cost millions of pounds, an outlay 
which still needed to be strongly justified, especially in a period of economic cutbacks. 
This was all the more important given that it coincided with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Rab Butler, warning that the overall cost of defence was ‘exceedingly 
heavy’.24 Britain was thus facing the challenge of meeting global defence commitments 
whilst remaining active in the thermonuclear arms race.25 As in 1952, chemical 
weapons again needed to be shown as essential to defence in order to validate 
significant expenditure. Given these formidable pressures, and despite initially 
approving production, the nerve agent requirement was again put under the spotlight in 
mid-1954. But, this time, in addition to defence officials, Cabinet members and the 
Foreign Office, MPs in the House of Commons also began to engage with CW policy.  
In July 1954, and in a substantial break from past practice, CW policy attracted political 
attention during a House of Commons debate on civil defence. Addressing the CW 
field, via civil defence, was undoubtedly spurred on by the deliberate loosening of 
secrecy which had occurred almost two years before, when defence officials released 
information on the nerve agent discovery to better inform medical and civil defence 
officials.26 Remarkably though, this rare parliamentary coverage was almost positive, 
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and at the very least it pointed towards a degree of acceptance by those MPs addressing 
the controversial field. Labour MP Geoffrey de Freitas started the debate, when he 
warned that we have ‘to be careful, in dealing with this problem [civil defence], not to 
concentrate entirely on the hydrogen bomb type of warfare…I have not heard any one 
refer to the problem of gas’.27 This was not alarmist, rather, it was a drive against 
complacency and the lack of attention afforded to chemical weapons. Bizarrely for a 
Labour MP in the post-war period, de Freitas was, in a round-about fashion, actually 
reinforcing views over nerve agent weapons and defence policy. He accepted the 
horrors of chemical weapons, but did not see how they could ‘be any worse than 
blowing people to pieces with high explosives’.28 While these remarkable comments 
were not reported on in any meaningful way in the press, they still reflected some 
information on highly secret CW policy trickling into the public domain. The 
comments also marked a stark change from prior practice, with previous Commons 
debates emphasising the novelty, horrors and exceptional nature of chemical 
weapons.29 The exact reasons and motivations as to why de Freitas made his 
observations are unclear, but in addition to coinciding with existing military thinking, 
his attempt at normalising chemical weapons could also have played a part in civil 
defence preparations through downplaying fears. 
In Parliament, de Freitas was not alone in addressing and drawing attention to chemical 
weapons. Although he clearly went the furthest, especially when he stated that CW use 
might ‘earn [us] the gratitude of the historians and archaeologists of the future’, his 
views were to a degree echoed by a select few MPs, who were also keen on drawing 
further attention to the CW field.30 Labour MP Austen Albu revealed to the Commons 
that he was hopeful, because similarly to the Second World War both sides possessed 
chemical weapons and thus they might not be used in the Cold War.31 This line of 
thinking, which touched upon CW deterrence through the fear of reprisals, was to a 
degree representative of earlier political thinking seen with Clement Attlee and other 
politicians in the 1940s, and these limited disclosures also spanned party lines. 
Conservative MP Brigadier Otho Prior-Palmer, supporting attempts to address chemical 
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weapons, drew lessons from CW deterrence to aid in further comprehending nuclear 
deterrence. He observed that:  
I think there is a great likelihood of it [nuclear warfare] being used, but 
there is just a faint possibility that, because of its appalling effect, rather 
in the same way that gas was not used in the last war, both sides may 
hold their hands.32 
Select disclosures and this rare parliamentary attention reveals that the horrific nature 
of CW was occasionally, and surprisingly, seen as a form of reassurance. The legacy of 
CW deterrence during the Second World War was also still holding sway in political 
considerations of CW deterrence in the Cold War, with Prior-Palmer using wartime 
CW experiences as a glimmer of hope for successful nuclear deterrence in the Cold 
War.  
While political views were shifting and being represented in multiple forms in the post-
war period, military assessments of the tactical advantages and role of nerve agents had 
seen little change. Additional research and trials had merely reinforced the perceived 
military benefits of nerve agent use, with one such example being the discovery that the 
British Centurion tank was ‘rather less vulnerable’ to nerve agent weapons than the 
Soviet T.34.33 In late 1954, the DRPC surmised that ‘a nerve gas attack will always 
have considerable success.’34 For even if casualties were low, fear of nerve agent 
exposure would lead to troops wearing gas masks for extended periods, which would 
severely hamper their manoeuvrability and fighting effectiveness.35 
Continuing interest in the military utility of nerve agents was also fuelled by NATO’s 
interest in formulating an approach to using chemical weapons on the battlefield.36 
During 1954, moves to involve the North Atlantic Council in any decisions made by the 
US Supreme Allied Commander Europe to release chemical weapons, prompted the 
realisation that this would also entail the tripartite countries sharing information with 
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other NATO countries.37 Included within this were details on their advanced CW 
developments, their level of CW preparedness and their research findings.38 This was 
information which had previously been kept highly secret within the tight-knit group of 
Britain, the United States and Canada. British CW experts strongly opposed these 
recommendations put forward by the United States, as they were worried that such a 
move would create more opportunities for the leakage of secret information.39 It was 
also feared that Britain’s ‘unpreparedness’ for CW, its limited ability to retaliate and 
the hollow threat of its CW deterrent would become known to the Soviet Union from 
NATO sources.40 Unsurprisingly, British officials therefore strongly resisted United 
States proposals for more comprehensive NATO CW discussions. The resulting 
compromise was that while NATO forces would be provided with defensive 
equipment, including detectors, respirators, and decontamination gear, individual 
NATO countries would not be obliged to supply chemical weapons to NATO or 
disclose their capabilities to other NATO countries.41 With adherence to secrecy 
prevailing, this brief disagreement added to the military desire in Britain for a nerve 
agent weapon, lest British vulnerability be uncovered and exploited by the Soviet 
Union, and with fears that British prestige would be adversely affected through allied 
discovery of its unpreparedness.  
Despite the continued recognition of the military utility of nerve agents, in November 
1954, the DRPC remained cautious over the sticking point of first-use and the 
ramifications this held for nerve agent weapons, particularly after the setback of the 
1952 GSP. For the DRPC, even with Defence Committee approval, there needed to be 
assurances that Britain could use nerve agent weapons in war for them to warrant 
funding and development. As such, the sub-committee advised the CoS that:  
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If, but only if, the Services can rely on being able to use chemical 
weapons from the beginning of a war [is] there … a strong justification 
for continued development of production methods and weapon designs 
for the use of chemical agents. If such a change in policy is not agreed, 
consideration should be given to reducing the programme to the 
minimum necessary to ensure adequate defensive measures…42 
Driven by the ‘immense importance of nerve gas weapons’ against ‘overwhelming 
numbers of land forces’, the DRPC advised the CoS to again review British first-use 
policy, which would provide chemical weapons with a confirmed place in future 
defence planning.43 Without this change, and with no guarantee that Soviet forces 
would breach the Geneva Protocol (by using chemical weapons first) and allow Britain 
the option of retaliation, the DRPC warned there was little hope of justifying the mass-
production of nerve agent weapons. Even though the DRPC predicted that objections 
over the first-use of chemical weapons would change markedly in the context of a 
global nuclear war, with nuclear weapons essentially lifting restrictions on CW use, in 
peacetime there were no certainties. If nerve agent weapons had no guaranteed option 
of use, or if they could not be included in defence planning, then they ‘would inevitably 
duplicate other weapons on whose use the Services know they can rely.’44 To warrant a 
place in defence planning chemical weapons thus required a confirmed role in a future 
global war, which still rested upon the possibility of first-use.  
British CW policy was in a precarious state, and at a tipping point, with the DRPC 
raising serious questions over the role, place and possession of nerve agent weapons in 
British defence policy. First-use, which was the primary area of contention between 
Foreign Office officials, Conservative ministers and defence officials in 1952, thus 
again became the fulcrum on which the future of a British nerve capability rested.  
Following from the DRPC warning and NATO pressures, and with the issue of first-use 
again being considered by defence officials, British politicians again found themselves 
publicly addressing CW policy. On this occasion, the Government found itself facing 
some difficult questions on sensitive areas of CW policy in the House of Commons, 
which was fuelled by Soviet actions. Coinciding with first-use considerations and 
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political attention, defence officials also increasingly realised that CW policy was being 
formulated in the dark, hindered by a concerning absence of verifiable intelligence on 
the Soviet CW threat.  
In early 1955, reports on CW were again emerging in British newspapers. This time, 
these accounts initially pertained to Soviet protests and parliamentary questions 
surrounding the issue of West German re-armament and the Paris Agreements of 
October 1954. In January 1955, after reviewing the text of the Paris Agreements, Soviet 
officials alleged that it approved the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons 
by Western European powers.45 Soviet officials charged Britain, and the other 
signatories, of subverting the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CBW. In its scolding appraisal, 
Soviet officials reminded Britain of the ‘outstanding role’ that the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol had played during the Second World War, and that even proven war criminals 
of the ‘Hitlerite Government’ had abided by its principles.46 Although undoubtedly 
manipulated for political point scoring, with Soviet accusations misrepresenting the 
Paris Agreements, it did lead to some awkward questions for the British Government. 
In February 1955, Churchill found himself facing questions on the stockpiling of 
chemical weapons in West Germany, and on whether Britain was now tied in and ‘the 
hostage of ex-Nazi military adventurers’.47  
Even with Churchill effectively shutting down the discussion with minimalist replies, in 
March 1955 there were further parliamentary questions fuelled by Soviet accusations 
and by reservations over West German rearmament. Harold Macmillan, then Minister 
of Defence, faced queries over British CBW first-use policy, and British commitments 
to CBW deterrence and retaliation.48 These doubts and concerns forced Macmillan to 
clarify that while Britain reserved the means to retaliate with chemical and biological 
weapons, it was bound by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which ‘forbids the use of such 
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weapons in war’.49 These questions from MPs, fuelled by Soviet public accusations, 
reveals a degree of concern and fear over the combination of German rearmament and 
the controversial issue of CBW. Though there were further questions over British 
adherence to the Geneva Protocol, the story and Soviet public remonstrations soon 
eased, with coverage of CW policy again returning to its shroud of secrecy.50  
While Soviet statements and accusations had prompted some difficult questions for 
British politicians domestically, British intelligence still had little verifiable information 
as to what was occurring in the Soviet Union in terms of CW policy or preparedness. In 
assessments of the Soviet CW threat intelligence officials continued to struggle to 
uncover any tangible evidence that could inform policy.51 In an attempt to counter this 
bleak situation, British intelligence liaised heavily with CW scientists in an attempt to 
gain further insights in spotting a nerve agent facility. This step would however only 
further highlight the difficulties involved in attaining accurate CW intelligence in the 
Cold War. British scientists at Porton Down gloomily reported that ‘there is very little 
that can be said to be typical of a CW manufacturing plant.’52 The equipment used in 
producing nerve agents is similar to any chemical industry, and although ventilation at 
the site would be noticeably different, only a trained chemical engineer or plant 
operative would be able to spot these differences.53 Requirements for electricity, water 
and refrigeration, although significant, would also not be outstanding, and the 
production of intermediate chemicals such as phosphorus trichloride could be carried 
out off-site. Even the storage of nerve agents would likely be in underground bunkers, 
and out of sight of prying eyes.54 The difficulties of recognising and assessing nerve 
agent production were therefore extraordinary, especially when combined with the 
security conscious Soviet Union. The JIC thus concluded that a large Soviet CW 
installation could exist, without there being any significant chance of it ever being 
discovered by British intelligence.55  
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In light of these intelligence gathering problems, the JIC admitted that ‘we have no 
evidence to show whether large-scale production of any chemical warfare agent is or is 
not in progress in the USSR.’56 Perceptions of the Soviet CW threat were therefore 
based on rough estimates and the scouring of Soviet scientific publications, and for 
planning purposes, it was assumed that there was parity in the level of development.57 
Similarly to Britain, intelligence officials in the United States also relied heavily on 
published scientific research to form intelligence assessments. More broadly, they 
found that the level of research in fields related to CW also indicated that there was a 
‘scientific capability for the development of new or improved chemical agents’.58 
Ultimately, neither British nor United States intelligence agencies had any direct or 
verifiable information on Soviet chemical weapons development, production or intent. 
The Anglo-American partners did however agree on a rapid reappraisal of Soviet 
defensive CW preparations, which was partly fuelled by the acquisition of a Soviet 
civilian respirator, dubbed the ‘G-4’ model.59 Prior intelligence assessments had 
emphasised a relative Soviet weakness in civil and military defensive measures, but 
after 1953 this view had begun to shift dramatically, as the respirator offered a high 
degree of protection against nerve agents and it showed rapid Soviet progression in the 
field.60 This development in defensive preparations added to growing concerns over the 
Soviet threat, as despite a lack of verifiable intelligence on Soviet nerve agent 
production, there were still some indicators available, which revealed the seriousness 
with which Soviet officials were approaching the CW field.  
It was in this period of poor intelligence but relative quiet after Soviet public 
accusations, that, acting on the advice of the DRPC, the first-use of nerve agent 
weapons was again explored with renewed vigour. Based on the guidance of the DRPC, 
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the CoS had launched a further evaluation of the value of chemical weapons in the 
thermonuclear age. The study, completed in April 1955, was thought a necessary 
precursor to a second attempt to secure Ministerial approval for a potential change in 
first-use policy.61 The first-use issue had therefore not gone away, it had lingered under 
the surface, and defence officials were again pressing for the option of using nerve 
agent weapons at the outset of war.  
In April 1955, this updated evaluation took the form of a War Office report, which 
provided a robust account of the benefits of chemical weapons in the thermonuclear 
age, and it strongly supported the DRPC’s stance on the need for a change in first-use 
policy. Again, confirming the distinct role of nerve agent weapons, the War Office 
accepted that while chemical weapons could not compete with nuclear weapons in a 
strategic sense, it reiterated the argument that they were, in fact, complementary. The 
report thus emphasised the argument that tactically nerve agent weapons offered 
substantial advantages and, unlike nuclear and conventional weapons, that they offered 
a means of warfare that did not destroy infrastructure.62 The War Office also contended 
that nerve agent weapons would cost significantly less than conventional or nuclear 
weapons, and that even in the thermonuclear age, Britain could not afford to forego 
such a ‘powerful and comparatively cheap ancillary weapon’.63 
The War Office also controversially directly attacked existing British policy and the 
Geneva Protocol, lambasting a retaliation policy as ‘neither logical nor militarily 
sound’.64 Tactically, such a strong commitment to retaliation also prevented defence 
officials from benefiting from the element of surprise in initiating CW.65 In order to 
counter the decline and uncertainty surrounding CW policy, to fully utilise the military 
utility of nerve agent weapons, and to consolidate a role for nerve agent weapons, 
military officials thus thought it vital to again seek to re-define Britain’s interpretation 
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Abiding by the Geneva Protocol was branded a ‘grave 
handicap’.66 With both the DRPC and the War Office pushing for this re-consideration 
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of British first-use policy, alongside fears over the Soviet CW threat and with 
increasing pressure from the United States at the NATO level, the CoS acquiesced, and 
first-use was again pushed to the forefront of British CW policy debates in mid-1955.67  
As in 1952, when the CoS was previously contemplating such a drastic change, it was 
again the Foreign Office which provided strong opposition to military officials and 
which intervened to block any controversial change of first-use policy. The Foreign 
Office, again representing legal and political arguments, thus once again found itself 
combatting defence officials keen to possess and use nerve agent weapons. The Foreign 
Office informed the CoS that ‘CW would only contribute to the deterrent if the Geneva 
Protocol were publicly denounced… in our view such a denunciation is out of the 
question.’68 Political and diplomatic ramifications of publicly denouncing the protocol 
were thought to far outweigh the tactical benefits of nerve agent weapons, even if these 
weapons could be used at the outset of hostilities. Foreign Office officials were also 
sceptical as to whether a public denouncement of the Geneva Protocol would even 
render first-use viable, since they argued that the Geneva Protocol was primarily 
intended as an expression of existing understandings in international law. The Protocol 
was representative of existing international norms and values, and so simply changing 
Britain’s interpretation of it would still not render first-use viable, as the internationally 
accepted understandings, underpinning and supporting the Protocol, would remain. 
Britain, in essence, was tied to a broader international framework that extended beyond 
the Protocol itself, with the Protocol reflective of widely held views and beliefs.69 The 
alternative option of a secret shift in first-use policy was also dismissed, as such a 
change in policy would not be publicised, leaving British intent and preparedness 
unreported. This lack of publicity was thought to undermine military arguments that a 
re-interpretation of the Protocol would add to the deterrent; without a publicity aspect 
to a change in first-use policy there was no justification that it would better deter the 
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outbreak of CW.70 In the eyes of the Foreign Office, unilaterally re-interpreting the 
Geneva Protocol was simply unacceptable; arguments over deterrence and military 
utility could not override these legal or political considerations.  
Facing substantial pressure from the Foreign Office, the CoS nevertheless requested 
that the Joint Planning Staff examine the advisability of changing CW first-use policy. 
Trapped between an unyielding Foreign Office and defence officials adamant as to the 
military benefits of nerve agent weapons, the CoS went for the middle ground. The 
resulting assessment was to be for the consideration of Ministers, but most importantly, 
it was written with Foreign Office consultation.71 The study thus represented a strange 
military and diplomatic hybrid, which provides a unique insight into British CW policy 
in the Cold War. By addressing first-use policy, the report also effectively decided 
whether CW policy was to be deemed an essential item of defence and warrant 
significant funding, or if it was to be without a major role and potentially drastically 
reduced, as the DRPC had forewarned.  
In July 1955, the Directors of Plans observed in their resulting report that in comparison 
to the superiority of thermonuclear weapons, CW ‘pales into relative insignificance’.72 
However in a tactical role, they believed that chemical weapons continued to hold 
many advantages. Chemical weapons could be used effectively against Soviet tanks and 
troops, and provide a means of temporarily neutralising an area without material 
destruction.73 Furthermore, there were surprise and shock benefits to be derived from 
first-use, where the country initiating CW would gain a significant advantage and 
probably already be prepared defensively for subsequent retaliation. Such a scenario of 
beneficial first-use was only thought likely to occur in a global war, with CW use in a 
limited war deemed highly improbable. In a global war, where chemical weapons might 
be used, it was also doubtful as to whether other countries would abide by the terms of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Soviet Union was thought ‘unlikely to adhere to its 
conditions’, which would allow British retaliatory use, and the same assessment was 
made for the Chinese Government.74 But, perhaps of greatest concern, it was also 
feared that there was a significant chance that the United States would initiate CW. 
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The sheer scale of United States production, research, and development in the CW field 
raised British concerns that the United States may be gearing up for the potential use of 
nerve agent weapons.75 Adding to this fear was the perceived military utility of nerve 
agent weapons, which could offer substantial tactical benefits against numerically 
superior forces, and the United States not being a signatory of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol. As with justifications made by the CoS in 1952, the Directors of Plans 
thought that subsequent Soviet retaliation with chemical weapons against NATO forces 
would release Britain from the confines of the Geneva Protocol, allowing the use of 
nerve agent weapons by British forces. The challenge was attempting to juggle British 
assessments of potential first-use, with there being great uncertainty as to potential 
Soviet, Chinese and United States actions during a global war. This led to the Directors 
of Plans ruefully observing that ‘we might…find ourselves confronted with the 
initiation of chemical warfare by our major ally or by the enemy’.76  
The Directors of Plans also crucially intervened on the subject of CW deterrence and 
publicity, finding that: 
A decision now to initiate the use of chemical weapons in war would 
have no deterrent effect in the Cold War, since it would have to be kept 
secret. Such a decision would also have to be taken in the light of the 
effect of the probable enemy retaliation on the population of this country, 
and the enormous provision that would then inevitably have to be made 
for it.77  
This went against existing military thinking and interpretations of CW deterrence, 
which rested upon a public announcement regarding an intent to use chemical weapons, 
alongside preparedness to retaliate. A commitment to secrecy seriously undermined one 
of the key military arguments for acquisition, that of deterrence, and it went against the 
legacy and ingrained interpretation of successful CW deterrence present during and 
after the Second World War. This aversion to publicity, and of any change entailing 
adherence to secrecy, consolidated the view that even if first-use policy were changed, 
there would be no positive effect on CW deterrence, and thus no clear justification for 
doing so. As noted by the Joint Planning Staff, consideration also had to be given to 
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possible enemy retaliation against the civilian population, the moral consequences of 
this, and the enormous toll such an attack would exert on civil defence. While the moral 
dilemmas of the first-use of lethal nerve agent weapons were included with reference to 
the shocking price in terms of civilian casualties, the same arguments could also be 
made for soldiers. Defending against a large-scale CW attack would be a substantial 
task, and one which would take a considerable psychological and moral toll.  
Despite recognising the arguments for chemical weapons, and even with the uncertainty 
surrounding the intent of other powers, the Directors of Plans ultimately sided with the 
Foreign Office. Given the seemingly overwhelming negative factors involved in a 
change in first-use policy, the Directors of Plans recommended to Ministers and to the 
CoS that Britain should not plan to use nerve agent weapons at the outset of war, and 
that it should only plan to use these weapons in retaliation.78 The military benefits of 
using chemical weapons again failed to provide sufficient justification for repudiating 
political and diplomatic concerns and Britain’s commitments under the Geneva 
Protocol.79  
After this second major review of first-use policy in less than three years, the CoS 
withdrew any attempted revision to first-use policy.80 This second failure was to prove 
all the more damaging, and it would trigger substantial ramifications in the future of 
British CW policy, by creating great uncertainty over the role and place of nerve agent 
weapons in defence policy. As forewarned by the DRPC, without a clear and confirmed 
role in defence planning the decline of offensive CW policy appeared highly likely. In a 
harsh economic climate and with the dominance and ascendency of thermonuclear 
weapons, expenditure on such an uncertain area of defence policy became infeasible.  
Soon after this second failed attempt to alter British interpretations of the Geneva 
Protocol, the DRPC, as promised, returned to the troublesome issue of British CW 
policy in October 1955. This time, with a lack of accurate intelligence and with no 
change in first-use policy, the DRPC withdrew its support for offensive nerve agent 
                                                 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 TNA, DEFE 5/58, ‘Chemical Warfare Policy’, P.H. Dean, 7 May 1955; TNA, DEFE 6/29, ‘Chemical 
Warfare Policy’, Director of Plans, 20 July 1955, Annex. 
80
 The CoS deferred and downplayed any potential change, focusing instead on the Long Term Defence 
Programme review, as well as the condition that CW would likely on be used in a global war. See: TNA, 
DEFE 4/78, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 22 July 1955. For later confirmation, see: 
TNA, DEFE 10/34, ‘Research and Development Programmes’, Chairman of the Defence Research 
Policy Committee, 8 October 1955, Attached report. 
109 
 
weapons altogether.81 Carrying through with its prior warning over the impact of failing 
to change first-use policy, the DRPC proposed that plans for the large-scale production 
of nerve agents, and the development of anti-tank and anti-personnel nerve agent 
weapons, all be cancelled.82 The DRPC was not alone in its more pessimistic outlook; 
the Service Chiefs were also united in recognising the decline of offensive CW policy. 
The War Office and the Air Ministry acknowledged that cuts to CW policy were now 
necessary, with economic pressures cited as the cause.83 It is however worth noting that 
these reductions in expenditure were only considered after attempts to alter first-use 
policy had been exhausted, and after efforts to consolidate a role and place for nerve 
agent weapons had failed. With no guarantee that chemical weapons would be used, 
focus and resources had to be given to other means of defence which were guaranteed 
to be of use. 
While uncertainty and decline dictated British CW policy from within, public accounts 
were emerging that argued that there was, in fact, a potential role and value to 
possessing chemical weapons, especially in terms of deterrence. In September 1955, the 
Daily Telegraph had reported on the publishing of a book by T. H. O’Brien on civil 
defence during the Second World War. In the book, O’Brien repeated the claim that 
Germany did not use chemical weapons due to fear of Allied reprisals.84 This 
assessment closely reflected existing military thinking towards CW deterrence, which 
had long emphasised the need for a credible retaliatory capability to deter Soviet first-
use. Shortly after, in November, an article in The Economist also alluded to a potential 
role for chemical weapons, with the emergence of concepts of ‘graduated deterrence’.85 
In the article, it was argued that chemical weapons could operate and be used in the 
middle tier of graduated deterrence, after conventional weapons but before nuclear 
weapons.86 Unfortunately for the few remaining advocates of nerve agent weapons, 
these arguments and public assessments gained little purchase inside the defence 
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establishment, as even major new developments in the CW field failed to alter the 
DRPC’s adverse forecast.87  
This substantial technological advance in the CW field came in the form of the V-
agents, which although unable to alter the immediate direction and decline of British 
CW policy in the mid-1950s, would have a legacy far beyond the Cold War. The V-
agents, apparently named V for venomous as a result of their skin-penetrating 
characteristics, are a series of chemical compounds of immense lethality. They were 
first discovered by researchers at Plant Protection Limited (PPL), a subsidiary of 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), in the early 1950s.88 The discovery of the V-agents 
was a result of a long search for new CW agents, during which Government officials 
co-opted colleagues from the British chemical industry. Government officials requested 
that any particularly lethal toxic compounds, which were not viable as commercial 
products, be shared with the Ministry of Supply. In a similar vein to the German 
discovery of tabun, British scientists at PPL had been searching for an effective 
insecticide, but instead they discovered what would later be branded as Amiton. Too 
lethal for civilian use as an insecticide, and revealing the close and secret ties between 
industry and scientific defence research, Amiton was shared with Porton Down.89 Soon 
after securing greater information from industry, scientists at Porton Down began 
actively researching what was then designated C11, the structure of which was either 
identical or extremely closely related to Amiton. Labelled with the military code VG, 
by May 1954 this V-agent discovery had been shared with the United States.90 
The initial assessment by Porton officials was that the V-agents might further enhance 
the military advantages of CW use, as unlike sarin which lasted around one day, some 
of the V-agents could remain lethal and persistent for just under a week.91 Reflective of 
their designated name, the V-agents were also known for their high percutaneous 
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toxicity, as they could take effect quickly through the skin.92 Aiding in assessments of 
its potential military application was also the consistency of V-agents, with agents such 
as VX having a thick, oil-like quality, meaning that they can adhere to surfaces and that 
they are subsequently extremely difficult to remove.93 By early 1956, after tests and 
trials, British officials fully appreciated that the V-agents represented a substantial 
upgrade in CW capabilities, with the persistent nature of the V-agents leading to the 
conclusion that:  
The plight of a man whose person, clothing, equipment and surroundings 
are contaminated is certainly unenviable. He could possibly save himself 
from the effects of the first shell by careful decontamination of his skin, 
stripping off his clothing, avoidance of surroundings and administration 
of atropine, but he is then in a sorry state as a fighting soldier and 
unprepared for the next shell.94 
The V-agents were a weapon to kill quickly. They were thought lethal in 1-10 minutes, 
and the best of the V-agents was believed to be five to ten times more poisonous than 
the best-known German nerve agents, such as sarin.95 Additionally, V-agents such as 
VX were found to have little or no smell, and they could be produced at ‘attractively 
low expenditure rates’.96 In April 1956, the Ministry of Supply informed the DRPC that 
the V-agent discovery represented ‘another big stride forward in chemical warfare 
research’.97 Remarkably though, the significant V-agent discovery yielded few 
immediate changes in policy, and it alone could not reverse the tide resulting from the 
recent failures to change first-use policy. In the thermonuclear age, and even with this 
substantial development, nerve agents still lacked a clearly defined role as an essential 
item of defence.  
The decline of offensive CW policy culminated in June 1956, when the Minister of 
Defence, Walter Monckton, recommended substantial changes to British CW policy. 
Based on the DRPC’s original analysis, Monckton recommended that Britain dispose of 
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CW stocks, cancel programmes for the mass-production of nerve agents and halt the 
development of chemical weapons.98 Monckton’s initial recommendation overlooked 
British stockpiles of sulfur mustard, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold 
Macmillan, soon reminded him that Britain still possessed 6,000 tons of the agent, 
along with considerable facilities for its production.99 In addressing his oversight, 
Monckton thus included sulfur mustard into his sweeping cutbacks, as he pushed for 
the abandonment of large-scale nerve agent production, weapons development, and the 
disposal of existing stocks of sulfur mustard and leftover tabun.100 Such drastic changes 
had not only political support, but also senior military support. The First Sea Lord cited 
the potential moral benefits of not possessing nerve agent weapons, and the War Office 
and the Air Ministry both accepted the need for cuts to CW expenditure.101 While 
Monckton’s views on CW policy received support from key military officials and 
senior Cabinet members, there remained one significant and somewhat surprising 
obstacle to his drastic reductions in CW policy, the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony 
Eden.102  
 
The last man standing 
Even with military and political support, Monckton faced stiff opposition to his 
proposals from Eden in June 1956. This was despite Eden’s keen focus on defence cuts 
after succeeding Churchill in April 1955, fuelled by his concerns over increasing 
inflation, rising import costs and growing defence expenditure.103 To combat this 
negative slide, Eden believed in restoring the vitality of the economy, and that Britain 
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must ‘now cut its coat according to the cloth’.104 This tough stance on defence 
expenditure did not however cover CW policy, as Eden was resistant to Monckton’s 
attempts to cut costs in the CW field. While the Prime Minister conceded that it might 
be best to dispose of sulfur mustard given the economic and strategic circumstances, he 
strongly opposed any plans to reduce facilities for the production of nerve agents.105  
The comparatively small amount of expenditure required to acquire a nerve agent 
capability was likely one factor for Eden’s resistance, but of even greater importance 
was his commitment to CW deterrence. When questioning the rationale behind the 
proposed cuts in June 1956, Eden recalled ‘how valuable chemical warfare preparations 
have been to us in the past as a deterrent.’106 Here he was referring to the role of 
chemical weapons during the Second World War, where the threat of retaliation 
alongside British preparedness to wage CW was thought to have successfully deterred 
German first-use.107 Interestingly his take on the success of CW deterrence during the 
war also aligned very closely to the views of his former War Cabinet colleague, 
Clement Attlee, who had approved the British acquisition and development of nerve 
agent weapons in 1950. It is, though, difficult to trace the particular evolution of Eden’s 
attitude towards CW deterrence, especially since he was not present at the crucial 1952 
Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on first-use policy. In his reflections on his First 
World War experiences, though, CW can be seen to have had an impact. In 1916, he 
had overseen the placing of gas canisters on the western front, and encountered a near-
miss with a German gas attack, noting that a gas alarm had saved him from a ‘grave 
danger’, which was a new German gas.108 Eden’s experiences in the First World War 
and the Second World War, as well as the impact of the nerve agent discovery and the 
Cold War climate, were all influential in shaping his position on CW deterrence in 
1956.  
Eden, perhaps inadvertently, was supporting and reflecting military arguments, by 
emphasising preparedness to wage CW as a critical component of successful 
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deterrence. Yet he was doing so at a time when the military support for this form of 
CW deterrent had drifted away, with the DRPC and the Service Chiefs accepting that 
the CW deterrence requirement alone, without the possibility of first-use, was not 
sufficient to justify the production or possession of nerve agent weapons. Some defence 
officials were, in fact, extremely frustrated by the Prime Minister’s involvement, noting 
that Eden was attempting to redirect policy ‘as soon as we try to save money!’109  
Irrespective of Eden’s scepticism and resistance, Monckton pressed ahead, and he 
sought approval from the Defence Committee in July 1956.110 In a persuasive 
memorandum to his ministerial colleagues, which was based on the judgements of the 
DRPC and the earlier report by the Directors of Plans, Monckton pressed for a 
significant shift in offensive CW policy.111 His memorandum sought approval for the 
abandonment of large-scale nerve agent production, the disposal of existing CW stocks 
and the abandonment of offensive weapons development. The two main exceptions, 
and thus spared from these sweeping cuts, were broader CW research and defensive 
CW research, both of which would continue.112 In justifying this substantial reduction 
in CW policy, Monckton stated that under the Geneva Protocol Britain could only ever 
retaliate with chemical weapons, as first-use had never been an accepted policy.113 The 
limitations of a retaliatory-only policy brought into question the financial expenditure 
necessary to acquire a nerve agent capability, and whether the weapons were 
‘absolutely essential’ to defence.114 Monckton also believed that for CW deterrence, 
Britain did not need to possess a nerve agent capability, and he stated that: 
Our American allies are devoting a considerable effort to the 
development of nerve gas weapons and this will provide a powerful 
deterrent against the initiation by Russia of chemical warfare.115 
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While acknowledging the tactical benefits of nerve agents, Monckton also included 
justifications which were aimed at placating advocates of nerve agent weapons. For 
example, he outlined how by continuing to work on CW research, knowledge of the 
field would be kept alive. Stemming from this, Monckton also used the development of 
the lethal V-agents, the next generation of nerve agent weapons, to support his policy 
shift. After revealing that the V-agents provided a far greater hazard than nerve agents 
such as sarin, he stated that the future production of these new more effective and 
persistent nerve agents would not be adversely affected by abandoning plans for sarin 
production. His reference to the V-agents also implied that nerve agents such as sarin 
were already outdated by more recent developments in the field, and that additional 
discoveries might yet be made.116 Monckton essentially used the V-series discovery, a 
hugely significant development in the CW field, as an argument to reduce aspects of 
existing offensive CW policy. Brandishing the stick of drastic cuts, he also offered the 
carrot of future V-agent production. To further undermine the importance of sarin-
based weapons, Monckton informed the Committee that:  
I feel myself that our possession of nuclear weapons and the massive 
American nuclear armoury together with their chemical warfare potential 
justify us in our present economic circumstances in abandoning our own 
capacity to wage offensive chemical warfare.117  
The rest of the Defence Committee agreed with Monckton’s policy changes, yet Eden 
remained unimpressed, and he frustratingly wrote ‘I am not convinced by this. We 
always seem to make small cuts at the deterrent and none at the “Admirals”… 
Something should be kept going.’118 While Eden’s comments were reflective of his 
disgruntlement with wider defence policy, they also reveal the importance he attached 
to Britain possessing a nerve agent capability, with the Prime Minister continuing to 
strongly resist any cutbacks to CW policy.119  
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Eden further believed that a nerve agent capability would not just deter the outbreak of 
CW, but form a part of the deterrent as a whole, with British possession of nerve agent 
weapons discouraging the Soviet Union from any attack on Western Europe.120 In this 
interpretation of CW deterrence, Eden’s views differed greatly from British defence 
officials. In contrast to Eden, defence officials firmly believed that CW preparedness 
and the ability to retaliate would primarily deter Soviet use of chemical weapons during 
a war, rather than war itself. Increasingly in defence circles, nuclear weapons were 
increasingly seen as not just a deterrent for conventional war or nuclear war, but also as 
a deterrent against Soviet use of any form of WMD.121 Sir Frederick Brundrett, the 
Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, was a key supporter of this, 
informing Monckton that ‘in a world in which we rely on a nuclear deterrent…the only 
sensible answer to an assault on this country by chemical weapons would be nuclear 
retaliation.’122 Eden’s interpretation of CW deterrence also collided with the views and 
judgement of his Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook, who informed the Prime Minister 
that the possession of chemical weapons was ‘unlikely to be a factor in preventing a 
major war.’123 Brook further counselled Eden that with the need for defence cuts, ‘very 
grave risks’ had to be taken.124 
Facing this significant opposition, Eden gave ground. However, while he conceded to 
the proposed policy changes, in July 1956, he erected one final and considerable 
hurdle.125 The Prime Minister wanted assurances from the United States before Britain 
unilaterally abandoned chemical weapons, as after the policy change Britain would be 
largely dependent on the United States for CW deterrence, and completely dependent 
on its close ally for a CW retaliatory capability.126 Although initially the United States 
was merely to be informed of Britain’s policy change, Eden soon escalated this after the 
meeting to securing guarantees from the United States over CW retaliation on behalf of 
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British forces, and of continued United States nerve agent production.127 Eden had thus 
deemed it prudent to secure guarantees so that if Britain abandoned its CW capabilities 
it should ensure that there would be at least one power in NATO with the ability to 
retaliate against Soviet first-use.128  
In late July, Monckton, wary of Eden’s interventions and his desire for strong United 
States commitments, attempted to push through changes in CW policy without United 
States consultation. Eden firmly resisted. He was adamant that cutbacks to CW policy 
would not be finalised until talks with the United States.129 The Prime Minister then 
became even more involved in CW policy when he judged that these talks should be 
carried out at the political level, rather than the military level. Again going against the 
advice of his Minister of Defence and senior defence officials, including Brundrett, 
Eden decided that Britain’s shift in CW policy warranted a personal message from 
himself to the President of the United States.130 In pushing for such a communication, 
Eden caused significant friction with his senior advisors and with his Minister of 
Defence. One disgruntled official noted that Eden’s decision was a ‘very great 
mistake’, and that the Prime Minister’s course of action was due to him having a very 
different view on CW policy from everyone else.131 Monckton, in particular, bemoaned 
Eden’s decision, arguing that there was no need to bring such British defence policy 
changes to the attention of the highest authority in the United States. The Minister of 
Defence, supported by Reginald Maudling, the Minister of Supply, and Norman Brook, 
sought a more nuanced approach to Britain’s disposal of offensive chemical weapons 
and abandonment of weapons development.132 Monckton believed that ‘it would be 
better to represent them not so much as a major change in policy but as a re-
arrangement of our resources in the light of present conditions.’133 He also concluded 
that it should be the role of the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, not the Prime 
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Minister, to seek guarantees from the United States and to convey and downplay 
Britain’s decline in offensive CW policy.134  
Despite this strong opposition, Eden again steadfastly resisted any further 
encroachment on his stance, insisting that it should be he who communicated directly to 
President Eisenhower.135 Whereas Monckton wanted to downplay Britain’s substantial 
shift in CW policy, Eden thought that securing United States involvement and a 
confirmed CW deterrent for Britain trumped all else.136 A key reason for Eden’s 
commitment and desire to be heavily involved was rooted in his strong views on CW 
deterrence and the importance he attached to it, but another was also his desire to 
maintain national prestige. Eden cautioned that if the United States were informed of 
the policy change by someone other than himself, then ‘the effect of such action would 
surely be to diminish still further the regard which the United States Service authorities 
have for our defence effort.’137 Clearly concerned over the potential damage that 
Britain’s withdrawal from offensive CW capabilities would cause to Anglo-American 
relations, Eden continued to insist on taking the lead. While Monckton and defence 
officials thus wanted to downplay the policy reductions, Eden wanted to be direct and 
open with the United States. Eager to limit United States criticism, Eden was thus 
adamant that he play the personal card with Eisenhower, to both secure United States 
CW commitments and to reduce the potential damage to Anglo-American relations. 
Given Eden’s steadfast commitment to communicating directly with Eisenhower, and 
in order to avoid further confrontation with the entrenched views of the Prime Minister, 
Monckton and defence officials relented.138 
Before Eden could inform Eisenhower of Britain’s CW policy reductions, or request 
assurances, other events came to dominate political considerations. From mid-1956, the 
upcoming Presidential election in the United States overrode all considerations of 
contacting Eisenhower, with the consensus being not to disturb him with matters of CW 
policy at such a sensitive time.139 Defence officials attempted to persuade the Prime 
Minister to accept the cutbacks to CW policy without assurances from the United 
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States.140 Eden, however, yet again proved uncompromising, and he continued to delay 
any CW policy change. In the meantime, his government was consumed by the final 
phases of the Suez crisis which reached a climax with the Anglo-French invasion of 
Egypt in November 1956.141 Following the Suez failure, and the rift in Anglo-American 
relations that was opened, Eden unsurprisingly chose to delay communicating with 
President Eisenhower on CW policy, and ignored all requests for political approval to 
implement the changes agreed in the July 1956 Defence Committee meeting. By the 
end of the year, despite defence officials claiming that the ‘dust of Suez has settled’, 
British CW policy continued in limbo, with the Defence Committee decision still 
awaiting final confirmation and implementation.142 British defence officials found 
themselves without political guidance, and Eden was unable to attend to this aspect of 
policy as his premiership collapsed.143  
This policy stalemate continued until, in poor health and politically weakened by Suez, 
Eden resigned on 9 January 1957.144 As Prime Minister, Eden had fought for a British 
nerve agent capability and deterrent. He attached great importance to a nerve agent 
capability, so much so that he was willing to go against his Minister of Defence, who 
was representing the assessments of the DRPC, the Directors of Plans and the CoS. 
While Eden did eventually accept the arguments in favour of cutting British CW 
commitments, he hindered and delayed the change until the very end. Eden had thus 
remained firmly committed to Britain maintaining access to some form of CW 
deterrent, whether belonging to Britain or the United States, and with his resignation, 
British CW policy lost its most influential advocate. 
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In the short-term, Eden’s actions had directly clashed with the emerging consensus in 
military circles, that without assurances over first-use, nerve agent weapons were not a 
vital area of defence. As Brundrett summarised in March 1957:  
Unfortunately, the late Prime Minister, against our advice, ruled that the 
notification to the American Government must be done by him direct to 
the President. As events turned out, it was never considered an 
appropriate moment to make the communication. Consequently nothing 
has been done and we go on, therefore, as we were.145  
British CW policy, primarily as a result of Eden’s intervention, had been in stasis for 
over eight months. However, after Eden’s resignation, with a lack of senior political 
support, the increasing dominance of thermonuclear weapons and the failure to change 
first-use policy in both 1952 and 1955, British offensive CW policy suffered the severe 
setback which had long been on the horizon.  
Finalising decisions on CW policy coincided with the arrival of Duncan Sandys as the 
newly appointed Minister of Defence, and with Harold Macmillan becoming Prime 
Minister in January 1957.146 Sandys was a key advocate of reducing defence 
expenditure, and with little military support leftover, implementing the Defence 
Committee’s suggested reductions to offensive CW policy was a mere formality.147 
Without Eden blocking the path, changes and cutbacks to CW policy were rapidly 
implemented in mid-1957, with the winding down of offensive weapons development 
programmes, the deletion of programmes for the mass-production of nerve agents and 
the disposal of stockpiled chemical weapons.148  
Although the Defence Committee’s decision and its implementation were detrimental 
to offensive CW policy, for advocates of nerve agent weapons it was not all doom and 
gloom. After forecasting the impact of the 1956 policy decision, investment into CW 
policy for the 1957-58 financial year was predicted to be reduced by around 30%, from 
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an annual amount of around £1.3 million, with broader CW research and research into 
defensive measures continuing.149 Though a substantial percentage, this in itself did not 
mark the end of British interest or activities in the CW field. The decision and impact to 
follow through with the policy reductions should therefore be viewed, and to a degree 
moderated, with the caveats that extensive research continued, Britain could still decide 
to produce the recently discovered V-agents, and Britain still had access to cutting edge 
research through increasingly important tripartite cooperation.  
Britain could still decide to produce the V-agents at a later date, and research into the 
V-agents was still in its relatively early stages as experts attempted to measure and 
assess their military utility and role.150 The V-agents were thought of as a potential 
weapon to cover a large area with lethal effect, and perhaps most importantly, they 
could do so with only a ‘small expenditure’.151 It was estimated that a V-agent plant for 
mass-production would only initially cost around £4-5 million.152 This area for further 
research and potential production thus represented another avenue for offensive 
weapons, which was not directly ruled out by the Defence Committee decision of 1956. 
As Monckton had implied, this technological development was in itself a reason to 
dispose of outdated wartime stocks, and it had been spun as a possible ray of hope for 
advocates of an offensive CW capability. 
Continued British access to cutting edge research, and its ability to later produce V-
agent weapons, was greatly aided by tripartite cooperation with Canada and the United 
States. This collaboration in CW research and development had continued to flourish 
despite wider fluctuations in Anglo-American relations, and even after Britain’s 
decision to dispose of chemical weapons and to cut weapons research and 
development.153 Through this intensive cooperation, Britain retained access to the 
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highly advanced and extremely well-funded CW research effort in the United States. 
Officials in the United States, after British scientists had supplied them with 
information on the V-agents, had already begun a crash course in V-agent research.154 
In April 1956, United States officials had even established a specialist V-agent Team, 
which was tasked with testing and evaluating V-agent delivery systems.155 And, after 
extensive research leading to the United States military creating around 50 different 
types of V-series agents, they settled upon VX for large-scale production in February 
1957.156 
The substantial gulf in scale between the Anglo-American partners was thus growing 
even larger in 1957. Britain was implementing policy reductions, and terminating plans 
for the mass-production and development of nerve agent weapons, whereas the United 
States had reached its peace-time capacity for sarin production and its programme was 
a comparative behemoth.157 Britain did however contribute to this much more extensive 
United States research effort through tripartite cooperation, and through bilateral 
cooperation in the form of the United States-United Kingdom Mutual Weapons 
Development Program. This bilateral programme, originating from US Congressional 
approval for the Mutual Security Act of 1953, covered the costs of six CW-related 
projects.158 These projects were run on a conjoint cost-sharing basis, and included 
research on V-agent chemistry, methods for V-agent detection and methods for V-agent 
production.159 As a core part of the country’s contribution to tripartite and bilateral 
cooperation, British scientists still used the Nancekuke facility, despite it not reaching 
mass-production, to produce small amounts of VX to test industrial production 
techniques.160 
This remarkable level of cooperation, unbeknownst to Eden and other senior 
politicians, had also rendered aspects of the debate over informing the United States of 
Britain’s potential policy change slightly redundant. For example, during the Eleventh 
Tripartite Meeting in 1956, Porton officials had already revealed the virtual 
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abandonment by the Government of all offensive CW capabilities.161 Even without a 
formal letter from the Prime Minister to the President, United States and Canadian 
experts were thus already well aware of the CW policy situation in Britain.162 During 
the Twelfth Tripartite Meeting in 1957, the three countries also agreed to a further 
division of labour in V-agent research, which continued to provide Britain with 
invaluable information. At the meeting, it was decided that the United States would 
take on the bulk of the work by developing land and air munitions for VX, Britain 
would evaluate the military potential of VX, and Canada would determine the hazards 
from contaminated terrain.163 Tripartite cooperation facilitated the division of resources 
and the sharing of significant research findings, which after the 1956 Defence 
Committee decision was vital for British research. This advanced cooperation 
facilitated Britain staying abreast of CW developments and remaining at the forefront 
of research. This very scale and scope of the substantial United States CW research 
effort also provided British officials with the appealing option and incentive of 
willingly increasing dependence, as while the country could continue reductions in 
defence expenditure, it might still retain access to cutting edge research.  
This continuing access to highly advanced research into the V-agents was all the more 
critical given evolving perceptions of the Soviet CW threat in 1957. Although exact 
figures on Soviet capabilities were unknown, United States intelligence estimated that 
the Soviet Union had the materials and skills available to produce a staggering 40,000 
to 60,000 tonnes of CW agents.164 Soviet reserves of CW agents were also thought 
sufficient to allow the sustained use of nerve agents for several months in a global 
war.165 In these assessments of Soviet offensive CW capabilities, Anglo-American 
intelligence agencies increasingly drew on the United States programme to determine 
Soviet progress, a practice that given the severe difficulties in attaining intelligence was 
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one of the few courses of action left.166 In line with this process of mirroring, when the 
V-agents were discovered it was assumed that the Soviets would probably already be 
aware of this latest development, or that they already possessed something similar.167 
These fears were further fuelled by the fact that ICI had published details surrounding 
the V-agents in the magazine Chemical Review.168 The JIC thus believed that ‘Soviet 
workers cannot have failed to notice some closely related work which has been 
published in the United Kingdom’.169 In reality, however, Soviet scientists had only 
developed R-33 by this stage, otherwise known as Substance-33, which was not as 
efficient as VX and too unstable for long-term storage.170 The advantage that the United 
States and Britain possessed with the V-agents was therefore not recognised, and the 
perceived balance of power in the CW field was actually increasingly thought to be in 
favour of the Soviet Union.  
The belief in a growing Soviet threat, and of expanding Soviet capabilities, was again 
further exacerbated by intelligence gains on Soviet CW defensive measures, one of the 
few areas where CW intelligence continued to yield results. In 1957, Soviet forces were 
thought to be well prepared to defend against CW attacks, with United States National 
Intelligence Estimates concluding that Soviet defensive preparations for CW might, in 
fact, be superior to those of major Western nations.171 A shift in appreciations was also 
evident in intelligence assessments of Soviet CW doctrine, as United States intelligence 
surmised that extensive programmes were underway to train both military and civilian 
personnel in defensive techniques.172 British intelligence also reached a similar 
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conclusion, observing that the ‘Soviet Army possesses a chemical arm which is 
specially trained in both the offensive and defensive aspects of this type of warfare.’173 
This growing appreciation of the Soviet threat came at a time when Britain had 
significantly decreased its own CW capabilities, and it was increasingly reliant on the 
United States for CW deterrence and retaliation. These intelligence forecasts, however, 
changed little in terms of the direction of British CW policy, which was predominantly 
shaped by the resignation of Eden, the issue of first-use, economic restraints and by the 
strength of the United States CW programme.  
It was Anthony Eden, amongst British Prime Ministers, who took the most active 
interest in British CW policy during the 1950s. Eden, keen on a British nerve agent 
capability for deterrence and retaliation, faced substantial opposition. This opposition 
included his Minister of Defence and defence advisors, and even after giving ground, 
he delayed and resisted any actual change to CW policy by insisting he personally 
notify President Eisenhower. Unfortunately for the few remaining advocates of nerve 
agent weapons development, Eden’s resignation condemned offensive CW policy to 
cancellation, and confined British CW policy to research and defensive measures. 
Without Eden’s support, and with no guarantee of use, nerve agent weapons failed to 
justify a place as an essential item of defence in an age dominated by thermonuclear 
weapons and economic cutbacks. In particular, it was the disagreement over, and failure 
to change, CW first-use policy which had the most significant bearing on military 
support for nerve agent weapons. Without a guarantee of use, funding and production 
were simply not viable options, even with the CW deterrent requirement.  
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4. A Reverse Course: From Dependence to Acquisition, 1958-1963  
 
We rely on the United States for CW retaliation, although rather 
curiously we appear not to have appraised them of this reliance.1 
Brief for the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, ‘Chemical, Biological and 
Radiological Warfare’, 4 August 1960. 
From 1958, superpower Cold War relations showed clear and unmistakable signs of 
deterioration. In November of that year Khrushchev issued an ultimatum, with a six 
month deadline, calling for the withdrawal of allied military forces from West Berlin.2 
The ultimatum served to dramatically increase tensions between East and West, as the 
United States and its Western allies made clear that they would rather fight than 
surrender their position or recognise the legitimacy of the East German state.3 In June 
1961 Khrushchev revived his ultimatum and calls to create a free city in Berlin when he 
met the new American President, John F. Kennedy, in Vienna. This fresh crisis was 
only averted when the Communist authorities opted to instead construct a wall to 
isolate West Berlin in August 1961.4 But, superpower tensions would reach their 
climax during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, when the world was brought 
to the very brink of nuclear war.5 
In this age of superpower confrontation, dominated by the figures of Kennedy and 
Khrushchev, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan attempted to chart a path for Britain.6 
Macmillan, as with many British Prime Ministers in the post-war period, was gravely 
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concerned by the country’s economic woes and by the substantial costs of defence.7 He 
judged that one clear avenue and a potential remedy for these economic woes was for 
Britain to strengthen further the Anglo-American relationship. He believed that Britain 
could ‘play Greece to America’s Rome’.8 This desire for greater cooperation with the 
United States was also reflected throughout British defence policy, but particularly in 
nuclear weapons cooperation. Where, after the signing of bilateral agreements in July 
1958 and May 1959, Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear weapons research 
reached new levels.9 These agreements facilitated the transfer of highly secret nuclear 
technology, with even seemingly independent British nuclear capabilities, like Blue 
Streak, benefitting greatly from information supplied by the United States.10 Given the 
scale and depth of information being sent across the Atlantic, it is no surprise 
Macmillan thought that he had acquired the ‘great prize’.11 In public, and to maintain 
appearances, Macmillan stressed Britain’s independent nuclear capabilities, but behind 
closed doors he was putting substantial emphasis on further interdependence with the 
United States.12  
Reflective of Macmillan’s drive for greater Anglo-American collaboration, highly 
secret plans were also underway to further integrate Anglo-American cooperation in the 
CW field. After the implementation of the 1956 Defence Committee decision to 
abandon offensive weapons development and production, attention shifted to consider 
whether revitalised Anglo-American cooperation could pave the way for even greater 
British reductions in CW expenditure. While discussions over Anglo-American 
cooperation in nuclear weapons oscillated between independence and interdependence, 
in CW, the only options appeared to be even greater interdependence, or complete 
dependence on the United States for CW deterrence, retaliation and research. British 
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CW policy, after the resignation of Eden, was in a parlous and precarious state in 1958. 
After exploring these discussions of greater interdependence and reliance on the United 
States, this chapter will analyse the influence and impact of a spate of negative 
publicity in the CBW field in 1959-60, and the emergence of an unprecedented level of 
post-war political and public scrutiny over British CW policy. This chapter will then 
end by revealing the important influence of Sir Solly Zuckerman on British CW policy, 
as well as a drastic change in tact and direction in 1962.  
 
Growing dependence  
After the decision to abandon both CW stocks and the mass-production of nerve agents 
in 1956-57, Britain was completely dependent on the CW deterrent and retaliatory 
capability of the United States. British CW capabilities and potential production were 
deemed ‘negligible’, and the country was not capable of producing nerve agents on a 
significant scale. Nerve agents were possessed, but only in an extremely small quantity 
for laboratory testing and experiments.13 In terms of sarin, while Britain still maintained 
the one ton-a-week pilot plant at Nancekuke, its production had been halted in 1956.14 
The site, from 1954, had only produced around 20 tons of sarin, and even if production 
were restarted, it was unable to meet military requirements which were thousands of 
tons for the initial stages of war.15 Ramping up the production of nerve agents 
domestically would have taken years, and necessitated the restarting of production at 
Nancekuke, as well as its expansion. Other developments, such as in tear gases, held 
promise as incapacitating agents for military use, but most of Britain’s domestic 
production was already ‘booked for [military and private] customers’, rendering mass-
production for military stockpiling highly unlikely in the short-term.16  
In stark contrast, by 1958 British defence officials observed that the United States CW 
programme was running ‘full bore’.17 The United States had stockpiled thousands of 
                                                 
13
 TNA, DEFE 5/84, ‘Biological and Chemical Warfare’, Note by the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, 19 August 1958, Annex. 
14
 TNA, DEFE 7/700 Ministry of Supply to C. Wright, 6 July 1956.  
15
 Ibid; TNA, DEFE 5/84, ‘Biological and Chemical Warfare’, Note by the Secretary of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 19 August 1958, Annex; Tucker, War of Nerves, pp.120-121. For a summary of the 
work and research conducted at Nancekuke, see: The National Archives Web Archive, ‘Nancekuke 
Remediation Project’, Defence: about defence, Archived 8 December 2010. 
16
 TNA, DEFE 5/84, ‘Biological and Chemical Warfare’, Note by the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, 19 August 1958, Annex.  
17
 TNA, WO 32/21950/2, Untitled Minute, Lt. Col. Saunders, 8 October 1958.  
129 
 
tons of sarin, along with blister agents such as sulfur mustard.18 Advanced delivery 
methods for these lethal CW agents had been researched and developed, including 
mortar shells, artillery shells, aerial bombs and the M55 rocket.19 In all areas of CW 
policy, in production, stockpiling, weapons and research, the United States CW 
programme dwarfed that of Britain’s, and from 1958, the United States dominated the 
West’s ability to retaliate with, and deter Soviet use of, chemical weapons.20 Defence 
officials surmised that while ‘the West must continue to possess an offensive capability 
in BW and CW’, this did ‘not require the United Kingdom itself to possess such a 
capability.’21 This willing reliance on the United States for a CW retaliatory and 
deterrent capability opened up a further avenue of dependence, when, from late 1957 
onwards, attention turned to developing and deepening Anglo-American CW 
cooperation yet further. While British CW research had continued and survived the 
cutbacks of 1956-57, given the scale of the United States CW programme and Britain’s 
economic woes, senior British defence officials contemplated even scrapping this last 
vestige of British activity in the CW field.22 Defence officials thus considered the 
option of eliminating all CW research at Porton Down, including on the nerve agents, 
either through ‘reliance on the United States or as an acceptable military risk’.23  
Importantly, the proposed policy shift towards even greater reliance on the United 
States had the support of the Air Staff. Edmund Hudleston, the Vice-Chief of the Air 
Staff, believed that as the United States was devoting considerable resources to CW 
research, Britain might be able to eliminate its own.24 This was a drastic change from 
the Air Staff’s prior assessments of CW research, which just nine months before had 
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branded such work a ‘comparatively cheap insurance’.25 In August 1958, though, the 
Air Ministry had changed its tune, and it was now keen to secure British access to the 
substantial United States CW programme through the framework of interdependence. 
Hudleston also suggested that British CW scientists, who would be without a role after 
the elimination of expenditure on British CW research, could be sent to work on the 
United States CW programme.26 This remarkable level of dependence on the United 
States was thought to offer the dual benefits of strengthening collaboration, whilst 
reducing British defence expenditure.  
These strong policy recommendations, for almost complete dependence on the United 
States, were also supported by the DRPC, which increasingly referred to the CW 
capabilities and research of the ‘Western Powers’, rather than focusing on the British 
effort in isolation.27 This interpretation of CW requirements, and the placement of them 
within this much wider framework of an overall Western effort, further facilitated 
increasing British dependence on the United States. In July 1959, after exploring the 
options and requirement for British CW research, the CoS agreed with the Air Ministry 
and with the DRPC, concluding that while ‘the West as a whole’ must continue 
research in the CW field, there was no obligation for British CW research.28 Similarly 
to the DRPC, by framing CW requirements as those needed by the West as a whole, 
British CW research was seen as an unnecessary expenditure and a duplication. At its 
core, this was effectively another argument in favour of greater dependence on the 
United States, as when referring to the ‘Western Powers’ senior British defence 
officials were, in essence, referring to the United States programme, which dwarfed 
those of all the other Western powers. The CoS, supporting and reflecting the opinions 
of defence officials, thus seriously considered the option of eliminating nearly all 
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British CW expenditure and research through a ‘framework of interdependence’ with 
the United States.29  
Shortly after Britain had disposed of all CW stocks, the development of offensive 
weapons and the scrapping of large-scale production, this drastic step would have 
deprived Britain of nearly all CW research, both offensive and defensive. The CoS had 
gone far beyond considerations interdependence, and demonstrated a willingness to be 
completely dependent on the United States for all areas of CW policy.30 The possibility 
of complete dependence in military circles had therefore spread from CW deterrence 
and retaliation, which was already a reality, to CW research as well; putting the very 
existence of any form British CW research in doubt.  
This potentially extraordinary shift in CW policy was however conditional, as in a 
remarkably similar vein to Eden in 1956, the CoS stipulated that this level of 
dependence would only be enacted if assurances were attained from the United States.31 
Even though it was willing to explore complete dependence, the CoS still appreciated 
the importance of CW deterrence and nerve agent weapons. However, given the 
economic climate and with no guarantee of use, they could not justify a British nerve 
agent capability. Confirmation that Britain would continue to have access to the United 
States effort, and that the West would still possess a CW deterrent, was therefore vital 
to determining whether the country could realistically remove its own CW expenditure. 
Bizarrely though, after enquiries from the Foreign Office in August 1958, it was 
realised that the United States had never at the senior level officially been informed of 
Britain’s drastic CW policy reductions in 1956-57.32 This was despite the policy 
changes entailing British reliance on the United States for CW retaliation on behalf of 
British forces, and for CW deterrence. Senior United States officials were thus 
seemingly oblivious of the fact that Britain had chosen to become completely 
dependent on their CW capabilities, and they were unaware that in 1958 British 
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officials were contemplating complete dependence on the United States in CW research 
as well.  
Although surprising, not informing senior United States officials of British reliance 
was, strangely enough, in part a deliberate policy. In July 1960 defence officials 
observed that politically, there was no benefit to informing senior United States 
officials of Britain’s dependency, which was thought a weakness.33 At the technical 
level of cooperation, United States officials were already well-aware of Britain’s 
position through close bilateral and trilateral cooperation.34 Updates on the status of 
Britain’s CW policy had already been shared through the yearly Tripartite 
Conferences.35 In a sense the officials who needed to know already did, and if more 
senior US officials were informed it was believed that there would be negative political 
consequences. For British officials, they feared that more senior United States officials, 
upon learning of Britain’s unpreparedness for CW, would insist on storing chemical 
weapons and the means of delivery in Britain.36 Had such a situation arisen and been 
uncovered, of the United States storing lethal nerve agent weapons on British soil, then 
the public and political backlash would likely have proved severe for any political 
leader.  
In evading this feared outcome, this strange state of play and adherence to secrecy had 
thus continued into mid-1960, several years after British policy changes. In August 
1960, Hudleston was briefed by his staff that ‘we rely on the United States for CW 
retaliation, although rather curiously we appear not to have appraised them of this 
reliance.’37 This remarkable situation also shows a substantial divide between the 
technical and political levels of CW cooperation between the Anglo-American partners. 
At the technical level, United States officials were keen to continue close collaboration, 
and they were already long aware of the reductions to British CW policy. Yet at the 
senior political level, United States officials were deliberately not informed of a 
substantial shift in British defence policy, despite the policy reductions leading to 
complete British reliance on the United States for both nerve agent capabilities and for 
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CW deterrence. Another reason for this secrecy and the withholding of information was 
also likely that of prestige and/or embarrassment. There was a realisation that for years 
Britain had been completely reliant on the United States, but that senior United States 
officials had not actually been informed of this British reliance and dependence, nor 
consulted on Britain’s substantial policy reductions in 1956-57. With complete 
dependence on the United States requiring guarantees, necessitating that senior United 
States officials actually be informed of British dependence, consideration of full 
dependence on the United States for CW research, development and deterrence 
stuttered.  
Coinciding with this significant and largely self-constructed hurdle of informing and 
securing guarantees from the United States, serious concerns had also emerged over the 
potential damage that British dependence would cause to Anglo-American and tripartite 
cooperation. Throughout 1959, and after its earlier scepticism, the DRPC had begun to 
fully appreciate the immense damage that British withdrawal from the CW field would 
cause, with the impact of abandoning CW research thought potentially severe to Anglo-
American relations.38 Reminiscent of Crawford’s arguments some years prior, in which 
the former Chairman of the CWSC lambasted the decline of CW policy, the DRPC 
observed that:  
The tripartite integration which has been achieved in these fields is a 
model and information flows more freely between the three countries in 
these subjects [CBW] than in almost any other. In short, interdependence 
in these fields was a reality ten years before the word was coined.39 
The DRPC judged that this remarkable level of secret cooperation would be threatened 
if Britain drastically cut back its engagement and involvement in the CW field.40 The 
DRPC warned that if Britain brought nothing to the table, then there could be ‘no 
doubt’ that the United States would cease or severely limit bilateral cooperation. And, it 
concluded that the potential savings from cutting CW policy were therefore not worth 
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the political and scientific consequences.41 The yearly cost of around £1 million for CW 
research was also deemed a small subscription to pay, especially in light of all the 
benefits accrued from both domestic research and trilateral cooperation.42 Warnings 
over the potential damage to Anglo-American relations and the awkward situation of 
withholding Britain’s CW dependence from senior United States officials thus 
combined and undermined arguments for complete dependence on the United States. 
By mid-1960, arguments against scrapping all CW research prevailed.  
 
Unwelcome publicity 
While resisting complete dependence on the United States for all aspects of CW policy, 
occurring concurrently with these secret policy discussions were unwelcome 
disclosures and public revelations. An unprecedented tide of publicity had struck the 
CW field in 1959, yet in 1958 there had been minimal warning of this impending 
publicity, with coverage of the CW field relatively quiet. Brief mentions were made 
regarding the deterrent value of CW, and the almost reassuring lessons that could be 
drawn from its non-use during the Second World War. Here CW deterrence again 
coincided with arguments over nuclear deterrence, and its prior non-use was again used 
to reiterate and support preparations for nuclear war. For example, in March 1958, Lord 
Freyberg confidently announced to the House of Lords that ‘if chemical warfare was a 
deterrent, how very much greater will the deterrent effect be of nuclear war!’43 To some 
extent, even in the late 1950s, CW non-use during the Second World War continued to 
be seen as vindication for nuclear deterrence, with successful preparation and an 
effective retaliatory capability thought crucial to preventing the outbreak of that form of 
warfare. Many observers at the time also believed that the more horrific and devastating 
the weapon, then the lower the chance that it would actually be used. Eric Reading, 
writing for the Daily Telegraph, elucidated this when he wrote that Britain should go on 
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producing bigger and better nuclear weapons, as ‘they need never be used – any more 
than poison gas was used in the last war’.44  
Although publicity and coverage of CW was relatively quiet in 1958, in 1959 this 
changed dramatically.45 British defence officials, when considering greater dependence 
on the United States, were already cautious of the impact of publicity in the CW field, 
fearing that it would ‘have a deplorable effect both at home and abroad’.46 It was also 
deemed likely that if information on British CW research went public, then the situation 
would easily get out of control, with journalists and opposition MPs not heeding the 
justification or explanations that nerve agent weapons would only be used in retaliation, 
or that research was focused on defensive aspects.47  
In January 1959, publicity on British BW policy dragged British CW policy into the 
spotlight, with Labour MPs, including Emrys Hughes and Emanuel Shinwell, enquiring 
about the nature and role of British BW research.48 At this stage the Government 
provided minimal responses to questions, outlining how the perceived scale of poisons 
developed in Britain was ‘greatly exaggerated’, and that the BW programme was 
‘almost entirely defensive’.49 These attempts to moderate some of the emerging 
negative coverage fell short, and by mid-1959 questions over British BW research had 
expanded to animal testing, which included coverage of CW research.50 During these 
debates, Conservative MP Eric Johnson even questioned his own Government, and on 
the 15 June 1959, he informed the House that 3,000 animals had been killed in just 6 
months of CBW experiments.51 Following this revelation, on 29 June, Johnson asked in 
Parliament for information on British CW research, with the MP requesting information 
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on highly sensitive information, such as on staff numbers, costs, when British CW 
research was started, and what it was intended to provide defence against.52 While 
initially thrust into the public spotlight through its close association with BW policy, 
CW policy soon became the focal point for public and parliamentary attention, as 
parliamentary scrutiny continued to gain momentum throughout 1959.  
With British CW research receiving such scant coverage and operating under the 
highest levels of secrecy in the post-war period, one official had to look back almost 30 
years to find a comparable scenario to draw lessons from.53 After some digging, it was 
ruefully observed that ‘it is often said that history repeats itself…in the years 1930 and 
1931 the CW organisation suffered attacks in Parliament and adverse articles in the 
press not dissimilar from those we have had to deal with in the last few months.’54 For 
defence officials accustomed to the quiet of secrecy, this was only the beginning.  
Fuelling further parliamentary questions, and much to the consternation of British 
defence officials, MPs and newspapers began reporting on growing CW publicity and 
commentary in the United States. Amongst the questions, in July 1959, a United States 
press release on Soviet CW capabilities led Samuel Silverman MP to ask Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan whether he had discussed chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament with Khrushchev, and whether Khrushchev would abide by the 1925 
Geneva Protocol.55 After further interest and continuing parliamentary questions on 
British CBW research and disarmament, Macmillan felt obliged to provide a 
parliamentary statement clarifying and justifying British CBW policy. In December 
1959, the Prime Minister informed the Commons that: 
Our position is perfectly clear towards both chemical and bacteriological 
weapons. We are pledged or bound not to use them except in retaliation, 
but I remember, for instance, that in the Second World War it was 
necessary for us to prepare methods of retaliation in chemical warfare, 
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and perhaps the fact that we were known to have prepared them had some 
effect on their not being used.56 
Although scrapping offensive weapons development in 1957, Macmillan chose not to 
mention this, and instead hinted that Britain was still preparing a retaliatory CW 
capability. Macmillan was thus also following the same interpretation and approach 
regarding CW deterrence as Attlee and Eden; showing a degree of continuity between 
the three Prime Ministers. In the face of strong questions from Labour MP Emrys 
Hughes over this ‘new kind of horrible deterrent’, Macmillan remained steadfast, 
arguing that defence and retaliatory capabilities had ‘certainly served us well in the last 
war’.57 Macmillan was reflecting and representing one core interpretation of CW 
deterrence and wartime experiences, again in a similar vein to Attlee and Eden, and 
Hughes another. Macmillan’s views coincided with those MPs who, throughout the 
post-war period, had argued in favour of CW deterrence and its positive reinforcement 
of nuclear deterrence. Hughes, by contrast, was a part of a growing movement against 
chemical and biological weapons, which was increasingly prevalent within the Labour 
Party and which emphasised the immoral and controversial nature of chemical and 
biological weapons. 
British CW policy was to receive yet more attention when it was thrust centre stage by 
journalists and MPs in early 1960. Even after the best efforts of British officials and 
Macmillan, the tight shroud of secrecy around British CW policy was beginning to 
show signs of potentially unravelling. A key reason for this was again CW policy in the 
United States. United States officials were keen to make a public statement on its mass-
production of VX, which they thought necessary to aid and inform civil defence and to 
pre-empt domestic criticism.58 For British officials however, this proposed statement 
caused great alarm, as it included revealing where the V-agents were discovered. It was 
feared that Britain’s discovery of the lethal V-agents and its continued involvement in 
CW research would perforate across the Atlantic, and into British newspapers and 
Parliament. This potential dilemma had been on the radar for British defence officials 
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since 1958, yet in early 1960 it was gaining traction and urgency, with United States 
officials increasingly adamant that a statement needed to be made.59  
A clear sign of the impending trouble came on 22 February 1960, when Macmillan was 
pessimistically informed that our ‘position has been complicated by the fact that Mr 
Chapman-Pincher has now got hold of this story and may reveal it at any moment.’60 
Henry Chapman Pincher was an investigative journalist working for the Daily Express 
who was attracted to the most secret areas of British defence policy and intelligence.61 
In February 1960, he had approached British defence officials for comment on an 
article he was writing, and in doing so, revealed that he knew that British scientists had 
discovered the V-agents and that this discovery had been shared with the United 
States.62 Surprisingly Chapman Pincher had actually had the nerve agent story for over 
three months before he approached officials, and he had simply been ‘keeping it on 
ice’.63  
On 24 February 1960, after recognising the impending and looming danger of negative 
publicity, Macmillan took the step of forewarning the Cabinet Defence Committee.64 
Ominously though, and on the very same day that the Defence Committee met, the 
Daily Mail ran with an article titled ‘New war gases “worse than H-bombs”’.65 The 
article, based on a speech made by Dr Cecil Coggins in the United States, alleged that 
the Soviet Union possessed enough stocks of nerve agents to ‘wipe out the entire 
population of 1,000 cities the size of Manchester and Liverpool’.66 Though shocking, 
the story contained no information on Britain’s CW policy or the sharing of the V-agent 
discovery with the United States, but it was a sign of things to come. In attempting to 
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organise a coherent Government response, during the Defence Committee meeting 
members were urged to avoid referring to the British V-agent discovery and to say ‘as 
little as possible’ about the United States CW programme.67 In order to limit the flow of 
information from across the Atlantic, the Defence Committee also decided to try to 
control what United States officials would say in their public statement on VX 
production. Cabinet members were keen on pressing United States officials to focus on 
the defensive aspects of their CW programme, and to emphasise that VX production 
was a necessary retaliatory capability and a deterrent, in a similar vein to prior British 
justifications.68  
Macmillan was particularly concerned by this planned United States public statement, 
so much so that he made clear his ‘misgivings’ and proposed contacting President 
Eisenhower personally in an attempt to head-off the unwelcome publicity. As with 
Churchill and Eden before him, Macmillan thus became yet another Prime Minister in 
the post-war period who thought CW policy important enough and sensitive enough to 
warrant his personal involvement.69 However, even with these doubts and Prime 
Ministerial misgivings, United States authorities remained set on issuing a public 
statement. With some form of publicity seemingly inevitable, Macmillan was advised 
that ‘what, if anything, we do now, is a question of tactics’.70 
One tactic British officials used was to try and continue to delay any official United 
States press release on VX production, thus buying more time. The Foreign Office, 
under political pressure, managed to secure successfully a temporary delay on this 
public statement until early March 1960.71 This was achieved by arguing that both the 
V-agent discovery, and the level of tripartite cooperation, were exceptionally sensitive 
areas of British CW policy, of which the British public was largely unaware.72 In 
justifying its requests for a delay, the Foreign Office was also keen to point out that a 
United States statement would seriously affect Britain on political grounds, and that it 
would also impact East/West relations and ‘be especially damaging to us in the 
uncommitted countries’.73 This line of argumentation reveals a strong apprehension 
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over the moral and ethical qualms of nerve agent research and the reputational damage 
any revelations would cause Britain both at home and abroad. As a result of these 
feared ramifications, Britain had ‘not shown the same alacrity as the United States 
Chemical Corps in telling the world about new agents’.74  
Even after applying diplomatic pressure and attempting to manage publicity in the 
United States, British officials could do little when, on 7 March 1960, Chapman 
Pincher finally decided to publish his story on the front page of the Daily Express.75 
Titled ‘American V-gas Starts Rumpus’ Chapman Pincher divulged that the highly 
lethal V-agents were discovered by British scientists and supplied to the United States, 
which was now mass-producing them.76 Allegedly he received this significant 
breakthrough from someone working at the British company ICI, which had discovered 
the V-agents.77 Pincher proclaimed that these V-agents were of ‘unprecedented power’, 
1,000 times more lethal than German nerve agents such as sarin, and ‘a powerful extra 
deterrent to the H-bomb’.78 While grossly inflated, the release of this information also 
highlights the dangers of adverse CW publicity, with the tendency for it to create fear 
and shock through misunderstandings and exaggerations. Interestingly though, Pincher 
also touched upon the divide between the Anglo-American partners over the publicity 
and role of the V-agents, revealing that an ‘American proposal that poison gas 
weapons…be brandished as a new Western deterrent is causing consternation in 
Whitehall’.79  
This investigative journalism by Chapman Pincher opened the flood gates for 
unprecedented scrutiny of post-war British CW policy by MPs and journalists. 
Capitalising on the rare appearance of information on CW policy, swiftly after the press 
release MPs asked difficult and direct questions. The majority of the MPs to pounce 
upon Pincher’s revelations were, in a similar vein to their earlier critiques, opposition 
backbenchers from the Labour Party. On 21 March 1960, Marcus Lipton raised 
concerns over CW research and human experiments, and Barbara Castle warned of the 
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‘disquiet among public opinion’ over British research.80 Two days later, on 23 March, 
Konni Zilliacus queried what information, about ‘a powerful nerve gas development’, 
had been shared with the United States, and Arthur Henderson questioned whether the 
dangers of CBW were greater than in 1944.81 On 30 March 1960 MPs asked further 
questions; Frank Allaun asked what information on new methods of CW was supplied 
to the United States, Silverman enquired about the impact of the United States not 
being a signatory of the Geneva Protocol, and William Warbey questioned whether the 
Minister of Defence knew of United States plans for the mass-production of V-agents.82 
Public opinion and parliamentary scrutiny were not only holding Government policy to 
account, but also exerting considerable pressure in a highly sensitive and secret area.83  
Under this barrage of questions Government officials attempted to stick to what was 
agreed in the Defence Committee, namely minimal and tactical responses to any and all 
questions. Amidst the scale of public and parliamentary interest, though, they were 
forced into providing some limited concessions. As Minister of Defence Harold 
Watkinson conceded that there was indeed an agreement in place for the interchange of 
CW information between Britain and the United States, and that this exchange of 
information held no restrictions on how either country used the information.84 In 
another debate, when asked about British chemical weapons production, the Secretary 
of State for War Christopher Soames remarkably conceded that Britain only produced 
chemical weapons in laboratory quantities.85 This in itself appeared a substantial 
admission, and one which was necessitated by the level of public and parliamentary 
scrutiny, as well as by the desire of British officials to distance themselves from the 
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large-scale production activities of the United States. On more complicated questions, 
Government representatives simply evaded and provided extremely limited replies.86 
Frustrated by the relative lack of information, on one occasion Samuel Silverman called 
a point of order in the Commons, to which the Speaker simply replied, ‘I cannot make 
the Minister answer if he does not want to’.87  
Further revelations, coinciding with the Chapman Pincher article and parliamentary 
questions, expanded the debate to human experiments and the disposal of chemical 
weapons. This pressure pushed the War Office to publicly confirm that Britain had 
indeed been testing nerve agents on volunteers from the armed forces. But, as with 
other partial disclosures, information on deaths and the true extent remained secret. The 
public justification for these human experiments, as reported in The Observer, was that 
they were vital to discovering suitable antidotes, antidotes which had ‘saved many 
lives’.88 In March 1960 The Times also reported on the British scuttling of ships filled 
with CW agents, which could cause a ‘chain reaction explosion that would…let loose 
enough gas to poison the whole of the Western Baltic and much of the northern coast of 
Germany’.89 It was alleged that as a result of poor planning, Britain had inadequately 
disposed of chemical weapons at the end of the Second World War, with them now 
leaking toxic chemicals into the Baltic Sea. In order to remedy this, The Times reported 
that divers had spent three months bringing these toxic shells to the surface, which were 
then placed in metal drums, coated in cement, and simply re-dumped at sea at a deeper 
location.90 Soames, and Government officials, attempted to reassure MPs and the public 
that there was in fact ‘no danger to anyone’ from these chemical weapons.91  
Under pressure, Soames made yet further admissions when he conceded that from 1955 
around 25,000 tons of chemical weapons had been disposed of in the Atlantic.92 
Remarkably he also conceded that the disposal of chemical weapons included 17,000 
tons of German ‘gas bombs’, which was a striking revelation.93 Soames had essentially 
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revealed British vulnerability in the CW field, with the dual admission that Britain had 
disposed of its captured German tabun bombs, and by previously stating that Britain 
possessed only a laboratory scale production capacity for new nerve agents. Yet even 
after making these concessions, the magnitude of which seemed to go largely 
unnoticed, the Government was unwilling to fully capitalise on the fact that it had 
essentially unilaterally disarmed in the CW field. Rather than seek to benefit from the 
disposal of chemical weapons and abandonment of offensive chemical weapons 
development, just enough information was revealed to quieten hostile questioning, but 
this stopped far short of outwardly and deliberately capitalising on a situation which 
could have offered numerous political benefits. Policy, publicity and secrecy had thus 
created a strange situation, with tactical concessions amounting to the admittance of 
non-possession, but with adherence to some form of secrecy still preventing outright, 
clear and direct admission.  
Three key reasons can be identified in explaining why the Conservative Government 
proved unwilling to benefit from what was in effect unilateral chemical weapons 
disarmament in 1960. Firstly, there was the Government’s ongoing commitment to 
some degree of secrecy, and security considerations, with officials unwilling to 
contemplate directly and explicitly revealing British vulnerability in the CW field. 
Secondly, there was the Anglo-American dimension, with any British decision to 
unilaterally renounce chemical weapons and take the moral high ground, at the same 
time as the United States was publicly announcing its own mass-production of VX, 
undoubtedly causing substantial friction. Such a step would also have made it 
abundantly clear to senior officials in the United States the extent of British reliance for 
CW deterrence and retaliation. In addition, it would have entailed the United States not 
just bearing the entire economic burden, but also all the political and moral costs of 
nerve agent production as well - leaving Britain to benefit from United States 
retaliatory capabilities while reaping the political benefits of unilateral disarmament. 
Thirdly, despite secretly disposing of chemical weapons and offensive weapons 
development, military officials did not support the indefinite removal of the nerve agent 
weapon option. The 1956-57 reductions were seen as a temporary measure given the 
economic climate, the issues over first-use and the dominance of thermonuclear 
weapons in defence planning. For defence officials, the shift was not a resounding 
moral re-orientation or a drastic and permanent revision of the perceived military value 
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of nerve agent weapons and CW deterrence. Thus, it did not represent the indefinite 
removal of the possibility of ever acquiring nerve agent weapons, or their complete 
removal from defence planning, which publicly embracing unilateral disarmament may 
have entailed. Ultimately, despite effectively unilaterally disarming and essentially 
revealing that the country possessed no military CW capabilities, Britain could not fully 
capitalise on the potentially politically beneficial situation.  
Before the United States press release and Chapman Pincher’s article, the majority of 
MPs were oblivious of trilateral cooperation in the CW field, and of the British 
discovery of the V-agents. After these stories emerged however, backbench Labour 
MPs and British newspapers succeeded in pressing a reluctant Government into 
confirming the existence of an agreement with the United States, acknowledging the 
British discovery of the V-agents and revealing Britain’s experiments on volunteers. 
However even after securing these rare admissions, MPs, on the whole, were provided 
with extremely limited and tactical responses designed to leave the shroud surrounding 
CW policy relatively intact. This was very much in line with what the Defence 
Committee had agreed in February 1960, before the rush of publicity. As Cabinet 
Secretary Norman Brook was informed in the immediate aftermath of the Chapman 
Pincher article, ‘it looks as though we shall be able to hold the position…by saying 
virtually nothing’.94 Limited and tactical scraps of information, concessions and non-
answers thus played a substantial part in the Government’s approach to discouraging 
further criticism, and with but a few exceptions, questions over British CW policy 
gradually subsided from April 1960.95  
The British Government’s handling of this adverse publicity also reveals the very 
different approaches towards CW publicity taken by Britain and the United States. 
Britain took a more cautious and secretive path, designed to mitigate and reduce 
publicity, whereas United States officials were not afraid to proactively engage and 
combat the negative image of chemical weapons. In the United States, stoking media 
attention was occasionally a tactic to aid CW policy and to secure greater funding. As 
astute writers in The Times noted in March 1960, ‘there is constant and strong pressure 
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from certain groups within the Pentagon, notably the Army Chemical Corps, for more 
funds and more publicity for chemical and biological weapons’.96 The newspaper also 
reported that the United States Chemical Corps had hired civilian experts in public 
relations to try and portray chemical weapons as a more ‘humane’ weapon.97 This 
publicity coincided with, and was to an extent part of, ‘Operation Blue Skies’, which 
was an attempt by the United States Chemical Corps to attain greater funding for CBW 
policy.98 The United States Chemical Corps and influential figures interested in 
securing greater CW funding were more than willing to use the press as a tool in 
accomplishing this aim. This was in stark contrast to British officials, who were 
strongly resistant to publicity. As Prime Minister Macmillan was counselled, ‘why 
should we run the risk of political criticism (both domestic and international) by giving 
in to the insidious pressure of the American publicity machine?’.99 
British officials had little desire to draw attention to the country’s CW capabilities. 
While Britain was withholding its reliance on the United States for CW deterrence and 
retaliation, British intelligence was also seriously concerned by the publicity drive by 
the United States Chemical Corps. The JIC was fearful that by drawing attention to the 
CW field, and to the Soviet Union’s chemical weapons stockpile, the United States 
Chemical Corps risked escalating the chemical weapons arms race by prompting an 
increase in Soviet CW preparations.100 It was also thought that this United States 
publicity drive would trigger significant alarm as it attempted to normalise chemical 
weapons and make their use more acceptable to the public. This attempt to alter public 
perceptions of CW could, therefore, potentially be seen by rival powers as laying the 
foundations for the future initiation of CW.  
For many connected to British defence policy, publicity was problematic and 
unwelcome. As War Office officials noted, the coverage of CW policy had been 
‘adverse’, and in September 1960 the CoS warned that CW policy ‘should be treated as 
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one of great sensitivity in view of the serious consequences of any publicity.’101 This 
secrecy was paramount given that Britain was about to undertake a substantial review 
of CW policy, during which controversial arguments over the development and 
possession of nerve agent weapons would again resurface.  
 
The Zuckerman effect  
In September 1960, after the period of intense negative publicity and with the dismissal 
of complete reliance on the United States, defence officials returned to the CW field. 
This time, in stark contrast to prior reviews, there was also one notable difference. For 
joining the CoS was the new Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence and 
Chairman of the DRPC, Sir Solly Zuckerman.102 Those more favourable to 
Zuckerman’s character and role would describe him as a one-man think tank and of 
having a significant influence on policy.103 However he has also been accused of 
having a disproportionate influence on the military and strategic policies of the 
Government, and of being ambitious, arrogant, and of having a propensity for making 
enemies.104 At the time, Chapman Pincher even observed that several career civil 
servants resented Zuckerman’s appointment so deeply that they resigned in protest.105 
Zuckerman was also believed to have routinely ‘delighted in undermining’ and 
challenging the views of his own officials, which was particularly the case in sensitive 
areas such as nuclear weapons policy.106  
In 1960, though, Zuckerman emerged as a hugely significant figure at a crucial time in 
British CW policy. Despite branding the DRPC a ‘gentlemanly forum in which the 
Services competed with each other for a share of the trivial amount of new money’, he 
wasted little time in acting upon the changing mood in military circles in regards to 
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nerve agent weapons, with defence officials increasingly questioning previous 
assessments and policy decisions.107  
Zuckerman, supported by the DRPC and the War Office, informed the CoS, in 
September 1960, that previous conclusions and assessments of CW were ‘no longer 
valid’.108 A substantial factor for this change in approach were ‘great advances’ in the 
CW field, with developments in dissemination methods and with the toxicity of the V-
agents now deemed even higher than previously thought. Zuckerman also relayed the 
point that developments in incapacitating agents had opened up another avenue for CW, 
with these relatively new weapons offering the means of nullifying a threat without the 
ensuing level of casualties often associated with chemical weapons.109 The War Office, 
in particular, looked very favourably upon them, believing that incapacitating agents 
might actually ‘revolutionise the attitude to the use of chemical agents’.110 With 
incapacitating agents, defence officials hoped that there might be some wiggle room as 
to whether these weapons were included under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and in terms 
of how they were perceived. These new capabilities and advances in the CW field were 
thought all the more imperative given the potential risks and opportunities associated 
with nuclear sufficiency, with both superpowers soon thought to possess enough 
nuclear weapons to inflict such a scale of devastation on the other that they would be 
deterred from using nuclear weapons altogether. Zuckerman believed that this scenario 
might rule out the nuclear option, leaving room for other weapons in British defence 
policy, such as the nerve agents.111 
After receiving Zuckerman’s advice, the CoS agreed, believing that a far-reaching 
review of CW policy was now essential ‘to establish the facts’.112 Members of the CoS 
also cautioned that in addition to the dangers and potentialities brought about by 
nuclear sufficiency, there was a risk of becoming too ‘mesmerised’ by the concept of a 
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nuclear exchange which was to the detriment of other areas of defence, such as the 
possibilities of CBW.113 These new advances in, and appreciations of, the CW field 
also coincided with simmering tensions in the Cold War, with the superpower 
confrontation over Berlin still ongoing. This amalgamation of events added a degree of 
urgency and potency to this substantial re-appraisal of the utility and role of chemical 
weapons in British defence policy.  
A core part of this substantial review of CW policy was an updated intelligence 
assessment of the Soviet CW threat, which would be used to inform policy 
formulation.114 The early 1960s, contrary to prior difficulties, represented a golden era 
for British CW intelligence, and by 1962 the JIC had acquired ‘good evidence’ that the 
Soviet Union was actively involved in CW research.115 One key reason for this change 
in fortunes was the acquisition of sources on Soviet CW preparedness, which provided 
a much-needed insight into Soviet capabilities and intent. From 1959, increasing 
sources had slowly started to emerge, with military officials increasingly concerned by 
the nature of the CW threat.116 Intelligence gains included a Soviet publication which 
stated that the ability to mass-produce chemical weapons and deliver them on a large 
scale had ‘considerably increased the prospects of using war gases in modern 
warfare’.117 In the same year, Anglo-American intelligence agencies attained an article 
by Major-General Drugov, who wrote that Soviet scientists regarded it ‘as their 
patriotic duty to study the action of poisons and to develop counter-measures’.118 In 
1960 sources also included references to Soviet civil defence measures, which further 
emphasised the seriousness with which Soviet officials were taking CW.119  
One of the most important intelligence gains in this period came from a jointly run MI6 
and CIA informant in the Soviet Union, Soviet Army Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. During 
1961 and 1962, Penkovsky furnished his handlers with some much-needed information 
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on Soviet military capabilities.120 While the value of Penkovsky’s information has been 
debated and his credibility questioned, for British intelligence he provided some crucial 
insights into Soviet CW preparations, with prior intelligence assessments hindered by a 
scarcity of sources.121 In a meeting in July 1961, Penkovsky disclosed that while he was 
not directly involved in CW, he did have some knowledge of Soviet CW activities.122 
He subsequently revealed limited details on Soviet delivery methods for nerve agents, 
which included spray tanks, artillery shells and warheads filled with CBW agents.123 
Penkovsky also informed MI6 and the CIA that there was a 7th Directorate in the Soviet 
General Staff working on CBW, that there was a dedicated section within the Ministry 
of Defence working on CW, that there was an experimental station near Moscow, and a 
testing ground at Kaluga, south-west of Moscow.124 Additional intelligence came in 
December 1961, when Penkovsky supplied key insights from the top-secret Soviet 
journal Military Thought.125 In one article addressing the deployment of Soviet soldiers 
in a global war, Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko warned Soviet Commanders to 
‘evaluate thoroughly and in the quickest possible time the…complex radiation, 
chemical, and bacteriological situation evolving in the entire area of army 
deployment’.126  
On Soviet defensive capabilities and intent, Penkovsky provided his handlers with 
reports that Soviet planners believed they were, in fact, better prepared for the outbreak 
of CW than Western powers, which coincided with existing Anglo-American 
concerns.127 The JIC already believed that Soviet troops would be well-equipped to 
mitigate against a CW attack, with respirators, protective suits, manually-operated gas 
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detectors and atropine syrettes.128 Advanced Soviet defensive measures, reinforced by 
published Soviet articles and by Penkovsky, thus revealed preparedness for the 
outbreak of CW.129 These Soviet defensive preparations also seemed to confirm long-
held suspicions over Soviet interest and intense activities in the CW field. Penkovsky 
also provided a glimpse into Soviet intent. As he alleged that not only was Khrushchev 
preparing for CW, but that alarmingly the political decision regarding first-use had 
already been made, with Soviet doctrine allowing individual Field Commanders to 
decide.130 Such a decision, if true, made CW use far more likely in a continental war.  
 In light of these alarming reports, the Soviet CW threat was gradually revised upwards 
from 1960, placing even greater urgency on the review of British CW policy.131 This 
more informed intelligence picture would add to, and coincide with, growing military 
support for a significant re-thinking of British CW policy, its direction, and the need for 
a British nerve agent deterrent.  
In tandem with British intelligence gaining valuable sources on the Soviet CW 
programme, Zuckerman had established an independent sub-committee to review 
policy in late 1960, even though the War Office had already begun the process.132 The 
CoS had requested a single unified report to inform policy, yet with Zuckerman’s 
intervention there were now two concurrent reviews of British CW policy. One review, 
the original, was to be conducted by military officials in the War Office, and the other 
was an independent panel established by Zuckerman and chaired by Sir Alexander 
Todd.133 Unsurprisingly, Zuckerman had chosen someone he could rely on for this task, 
for he and Todd had a long working relationship dating back to the Second World 
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War.134 The two also met for dinners and discussions, and once becoming Master of 
Christ’s College, Cambridge, Todd invited Zuckerman to become a Fellow 
Commoner.135 As decided by Zuckerman, the compromise was that Todd’s assessment 
was to look at the bigger picture for CBW policy, while the War Office review, with 
input from the Air Ministry and the Admiralty, was to take the form of operational 
assessments of offensive and defensive CBW.136 Before Zuckerman’s intervention in 
the form of the Todd Panel, the War Office review had been intended to provide the 
foundation for future considerations of British CBW policy. Zuckerman had thus 
overridden military officials by establishing his own committee, which reported directly 
to him; from the outset his strong character was already beginning to directly impact 
the course and direction of British CW policy.  
By late 1961, both substantial reviews were complete, and unsurprisingly, the Todd 
report closely reflected Zuckerman’s views, and vice versa. Importantly the Todd report 
also acknowledged the changing intelligence picture, warning that British civilians and 
soldiers, both at home and abroad, were now seriously vulnerable to Soviet CW 
attacks.137 In response to this threat, and with developments in chemical weapons, Todd 
argued that Britain should now do everything up to the point of chemical weapons 
mass-production, namely offensive and defensive research, weapons development and 
weapons testing.138 He placed much greater emphasis on offensive research, in contrast 
to existing CW policy, which was blamed for creating ‘uncertainty and diffusion’.139 
The War Office reports also left open this possibility of developing a nerve agent 
capability, and its assessments, like that of the Todd report, supported the expansion of 
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British CW policy.140 The War Office also went slightly further, by stating that an 
independent chemical weapons capability ‘would materially increase the potential of 
our forces’.141 This nod to nerve agent weapons development, by both the Todd report 
and the War Office, was a marked change from years of policy. Nerve agent weapons 
thus still had military advocates, with possession thought useful for deterring enemy 
first-use and in slowing down and hindering Soviet ground forces.  
The two reviews, despite not being vastly different in terms of assessments, caused 
significant friction within the DRPC. The CoS required a single cohesive and unified 
assessment to inform discussions on the future of British CBW policy, but now they 
had two. Initially, the Defence Research Policy Staff attempted to combine the findings 
of the Todd report and those of the War Office.142 However, there was a clear split 
within the DRPC over how this should be done, with Zuckerman again clashing with 
his own staff. Zuckerman fought for the pre-eminence of Todd’s assessment, while 
military personnel in the Defence Research Policy Staff favoured the War Office.143 
Zuckerman, undeterred, directly confronted his own staff, accusing them of focusing 
too heavily on the views of the War Office, and he made it abundantly clear that the 
future of British CW policy would be considered ‘on the basis of the Todd report’.144  
As a result of the disjointedness between the Chairman of the DRPC and his staff, the 
DRPC was unable to crystalise its views on CW policy and so was unable to provide 
any concrete policy recommendations to the CoS in 1961. Zuckerman, clearly unhappy 
with the work of his own staff, pushed for the establishment of another sub-committee, 
which, under the chairmanship of Dr Walter Cawood, would be responsible for 
producing a combined and unified assessment of CBW policy.145 This new sub-
committee would be responsible for providing a ‘single, simplified short paper’ for the 
CoS.146 Cawood, as both Scientific Advisor to the War Office and answerable to 
Zuckerman, certainly had an unenviable position, which was further hampered by, as 
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Cawood noted, some of the ‘conflicting’ aspects of the Todd and War Office reports.147 
With all these organisational divisions over the future of CBW policy, it was not until 
November 1962 that the CoS received a combined assessment on CBW policy, an 
assessment it had requested over two years before.148 Given Zuckerman’s hugely 
influential and forceful nature, it was perhaps to be expected that Cawood’s review for 
the CoS leaned towards the Todd report. The sub-committee, though, agreed with both 
Todd’s assessment and the War Office, in that it approved the drive for increased 
funding and for an expansion in CW research and weapons development.149  
Coinciding with Zuckerman changing his mind over the issue, Cawood’s review also 
remarkably pushed for the acquisition of a tactical nerve agent capability. Defence 
officials were thus once again fully behind a nerve agent capability. Helpfully alongside 
the official report by Cawood, the CoS also received a special appendix written by 
Zuckerman.150 In this appendix, Zuckerman informed the CoS that:  
We should give thought to the implications of developing an offensive 
lethal CW…capacity:- 
(i) to make it clear to the enemy, as a deterrent, that 
we have the means of retaliation; and 
(ii) for actual use in retaliation if this would be to our 
military advantage.151 
After waiting over two years for an updated assessment, the CoS was now advised not 
only to increase British CW funding and to re-start weapons development, but also to 
acquire an independent nerve agent capability. On 1 November 1962, just days after the 
ending of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CoS approved the recommendations of the 
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Cawood report, and they heeded Zuckerman’s guidance; Britain should once again 
acquire a nerve agent capability.152  
In addition to the prolonged review and Zuckerman’s influence, this CoS support for a 
nerve agent capability was undoubtedly spurred on by events in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The crisis had either shown the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and 
implicitly reinforced the need for a nerve agent deterrent, or it had highlighted the 
fragility of the superpower balance, and the need for British preparedness. The CoS 
thus believed that while arguments for chemical weapons had typically struggled on 
political grounds, in the thermonuclear age these political constraints could be 
questioned.153 In a similar vein to arguments over graduated deterrence, the CoS 
concluded that chemical weapons might, in fact, delay or reduce the escalation to all-
out nuclear war, or at the very least that they would provide a capability somewhere in 
between conventional forces and nuclear weapons.154 The crisis had also alarmingly 
shown the risks of weapons proliferation in the Third World. Britain, like the United 
States in Cuba, potentially could be caught out by the proliferation of advanced 
weaponry in Third World countries. A nerve agent capability was now dubbed a vital 
addition to British capabilities.  
With CoS backing, the request for a British nerve agent capability was passed up to the 
Secretary of State for Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, who supported the acquisition of a 
lethal nerve agent capability.155 In April 1963, almost seven years after Britain had 
decided to unilaterally dispose of chemical weapons and abandon offensive weapons 
development, Thorneycroft advised his Defence Committee colleagues that ‘we should 
equip ourselves with a small retaliatory capability with a lethal chemical agent’.156 In 
presenting his case for the acquisition of nerve agent weapons, Thorneycroft was 
formulating policy in the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis, while representing the 
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views of the CoS, the DRPC and Zuckerman. It was the coming together of these key 
supporters and events, alongside perceptions of the external threat and advances in the 
CW field, which drove Thorneycroft to seek this political approval for the acquisition 
of a British nerve agent capability. 
In justifying the necessity of nerve agent weapons, Thorneycroft gave the Defence 
Committee the impression that Britain was falling behind. He argued that while the 
United States and the Soviet Union had extensive research programmes and large 
stockpiles of chemical weapons, Britain had no chemical weapons and possessed 
inadequate defensive measures. The superpowers were pulling ahead. Britain was even 
falling behind NATO requirements, which from 1962 had requested that forces be 
equipped with a retaliatory CW capability.157 Thorneycroft also disturbingly reported 
that not only was Britain at risk of falling behind the superpowers and NATO 
requirements, but that Britain was now at risk of CW attack in the Third World, by 
Soviet proxies armed with Soviet chemical weapons.158 This aspect to nerve agent 
considerations was gaining increasing traction, fuelled by the legacy of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, which had displayed the alarming situation of Soviet weapons in the 
Third World. The increasing focus on the Third World also coincided with emerging 
reports and accusations that the United States was using chemical weapons in Vietnam, 
of Castro using sarin in Cuba against rebels hiding in the Escambray Mountains, and 
shortly after stories also started surfacing of Egypt using chemical weapons in 
Yemen.159 Without a nerve agent capability, Thorneycroft warned that Britain would be 
at a significant, unacceptable, and potentially humiliating disadvantage in the Third 
World, for if the Soviet Union supplied another country with chemical weapons, British 
forces ‘would have no power to retaliate.’160 Thorneycroft therefore strongly advised 
that Britain acquire a lethal CW capability ‘in view of the access which our potential 
limited war enemies might have to Soviet technology.’161  
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While acknowledging the military utility of possessing nerve agents and the retaliatory 
option they provided, Cabinet members raised concerns over the political consequences 
of producing and deploying nerve agent weapons in peacetime. As another variation of 
post-war political concerns and normative considerations clashing with military 
requirements, they believed that the: 
Manufacture of these agents would present political problems. If we 
manufactured them it would be desirable to keep the fact from becoming 
known, but this would not be possible if we told our NATO Allies what 
we were doing.162  
As the feared political ramifications were thought to be so substantial, the condition and 
price of a nerve agent capability was thus secrecy, even from NATO allies. Providing 
secrecy was adhered to, the Defence Committee supported Thorneycroft’s 
recommendations, and it was agreed that Britain would acquire a nerve agent 
capability.163 As Prime Minister Harold Macmillan concluded in May 1963, British CW 
policy would now prioritise: 
1. Research in order to keep up to date with techniques and with 
American information. 
2. The development of [an] offensive capability as a deterrent against 
such agents being used against us. 
3. Defensive measures.164 
In this approval of nerve agent acquisition, intense political desire to avoid any negative 
publicity and political aversion to nerve agent weapons had essentially meshed and 
clashed with arguments over military utility. This strange blending of conditions and 
requirements led to a bizarre CW policy, which was almost impossible to implement. 
The May 1963 Cabinet Defence Committee decision had at its core two inherent 
contradictions, which either went unnoticed or were swept aside.165 
Firstly, the Defence Committee had approved the development of a secret deterrent, 
which resulted in a very confused policy. Macmillan wanted a CW capability to deter 
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others from using chemical weapons against British forces, but he also wanted the 
British acquisition of chemical weapons kept secret.166 A secret deterrent is slightly 
paradoxical, as how can a weapon be secret and still function as an active deterrent? 
The very nature of deterrence entails an enemy being somewhat aware of the weapon’s 
existence, as otherwise an enemy cannot be deterred by it: an invisible deterrent has no 
obvious deterrence value. Ultimately, while secrecy in the domestic sphere was seen as 
a good thing, as it mitigated against potential criticisms of Government policy, in the 
international arena a secret weapon had a limited, possibly non-existent role as a 
deterrent.167 This seemingly strange contradiction, which went unclarified, further 
reveals another example where political concerns directly clashed with military utility. 
This Defence Committee approved policy also reveals a clear red-line for politicians, 
who, while appreciating the military necessity of a nerve agent capability, could not 
contemplate the political ramifications of publicly defending that same capability. This 
political fear of publicity was all the more potent given the bruising experiences of 
limited revelations in 1959-60.  
The second contradiction in the Defence Committee’s 1963 policy is again tied to the 
stringent desire for secrecy, and it further reveals the strength of political concerns 
surrounding any potential public backlash, as well as the influence of negative 
connotations and perceptions of nerve agent weapons. In addition to keeping a British 
deterrent secret from the domestic population and rival powers, the Defence Committee 
also stipulated that Britain’s production and development of nerve agent weapons 
should be kept secret from NATO allies. This was a remarkable position, which in 
practice British defence officials had initially taken to mean even excluding the United 
States.168 British officials were worried about informing close allies such as Australia, 
Canada and the United States of the decision to develop chemical weapons, and of it 
leaking. The more who knew, the higher the chance that the Macmillan Government’s 
decision to acquire chemical weapons would be unveiled, which was thought extremely 
likely to draw negative political repercussions; secrecy was therefore of paramount 
importance. 
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After attempts to maintain this stringent level of secrecy, it was however soon realised 
that keeping Britain’s decision to develop lethal chemical weapons a secret from the 
United States was exceedingly impractical.169 Remarkably close levels of collaboration 
in the CW field rendered the attempted secrecy almost impossible, for as defence 
officials noted, the United States would undoubtedly have realised that Britain was 
keeping something secret.170 In addition, British defence officials noted that if the 
country was to develop a CW capability ‘efficiently and economically’, it needed to 
make full use of United States experience and expertise in the field.171 Withholding this 
policy change from the United States thus appears to be more an issue of 
miscommunication between politicians and defence officials over the level of secrecy, 
with the secrecy condition in practice referring to NATO but excluding the tripartite 
countries. The fear of political consequences and the strict secrecy measures thus 
created confusion even amongst British defence officials, and erring on the side of 
caution they initially informed no allies of the policy change, and even excluded the 
United States and Canada.  
This attempt at secrecy, or the very least this miscommunication in terms of the 
tripartite angle, occurred even with the importance of the United States CW programme 
fully recognised in the Defence Committee’s decision. As Macmillan instructed, 
keeping in touch with the advanced research taking place in the United States was of 
the highest priority.172 The sheer scale and effort of the United States CW programme 
made continued access vital, especially if Britain wished to remain in the chemical 
weapons arms race and develop its own capability. By 1963, the United States Army 
had produced over 25,000 tons of sarin, and it had 4,000 tons of it stockpiled at the 
Rhine Ordnance Depot in West Germany.173 United States officials, wary of the Soviet 
threat, planned to increase its stockpile of chemical weapons in Europe to over 30,000 
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tons, with the weapons stored in West Germany, France and Sicily.174 The United 
States possessed a fully operational VX mass-production facility and it had developed a 
frightening array of CW capabilities, with its chemical weapons including mortar 
shells, artillery shells, land-mines, M55 rockets and aerial bombs containing varying 
CW agents such as sulfur mustard, sarin and VX.175 The colossal scale of the United 
States CW programme, while underlining just how far behind Britain was, continued to 
provide Britain with unrivalled access to significant advances and developments in the 
CW field.176 
While there were some inherent contradictions within the Defence Committee’s policy 
changes, there were still substantial benefits for CW advocates. Approval had been 
granted for the research and development of nerve agent weapons, and the acquisition 
of a nerve agent capability and deterrent. Another important gain came with the 
securing of greater funding, with British expenditure on CW research and development 
rising by around 40%. Annual funding for CW research at this time was only around 
£1.1 million, but with the additional funding this was increased to just over £1.5 
million.177 This significant increase now meant that CW research was receiving around 
three times as much funding as BW research.178  
From 1958 to 1963, the direction of British CW policy had therefore almost completely 
reversed course. In 1958, serious consideration had been given to abandoning all 
British CW research and of becoming almost entirely dependent upon on the United 
States, but in 1963, Macmillan’s Government had approved nerve agent weapons 
development and production, providing it was kept secret. This strong desire for 
secrecy had clear ties to 1960, with Cabinet members facing hostile Labour 
backbenchers and a multitude of questions on a highly secret and sensitive area of 
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defence policy. The uncomfortable questioning, both in newspapers and in Parliament, 
seemingly confirmed the negative public and parliamentary image of CW policy, and 
the potential damage and political backlash of any information leaking. While this 
experience was politically difficult, it was not enough to override or prevent the seismic 
shift in British CW policy which occurred in the early 1960s, with developments in the 
CW field, fears of Third World proliferation, a better appreciation of the Soviet threat, 
the need for a CW deterrent and the influence of Sir Solly Zuckerman all amalgamating 
to dramatically reverse the direction of policy from 1963.  
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5. A Secret Deterrent and a ‘campaign of criticism’, 1964-69.1 
 
“Deterrence” in nuclear terms means spending an enormous amount of 
money and making loud noises about it; in chemical and biological terms, 
there is no need to spend much, and there are strong political objections 
to boasting about what we do spend.2 
Sir Joseph Percival William Mallalieu MP, Minister of Defence for the Royal 
Navy, on WMDs and Deterrence, 22 August 1967.  
The period of 1964-69 was characterised by substantial changes and a significant shift 
in the very dynamics of the Cold War. While the early-1960s had been fraught with 
danger and fears of escalation, the latter part of the decade witnessed a comparative de-
escalation in superpower confrontations, with tensions eventually giving way to a 
period of détente.3 This climate of greater cooperation was shaped and facilitated by the 
arrival of nuclear parity, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, the stabilization of the 
Berlin problem and reduced US global power and influence as a result of its bruising 
war in Vietnam. For the United States, despite rapidly increased involvement in 
Vietnam from 1964, including the commitment of ground forces in 1965, the aftermath 
of the Tet Offensive saw the Johnson administration pursue a negotiated settlement.4 
Taking up office in January 1969, President Richard Nixon also sought a way out, and 
he began to withdraw US troops later that year. This was therefore a period of great 
anguish and uncertainty for the United States, with the punishing war in Vietnam 
costing significant international prestige, as well as producing domestic political strife 
and severe economic strains at home.5 
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The Vietnam War was also a crucial juncture in the Anglo-American relationship, with 
Britain not sending troops to assist United States forces.6 Combined with the 
devaluation of Sterling in 1967 and the planned withdrawal from East of Suez, Labour 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson had reneged on all three key United States desires of 
Britain in this period.7 As a result some scholars, such as Baylis, would argue that in the 
mid-to-late 1960s we see a cooling of relations between the two countries.8 Fortunately 
for both the Labour Government and British defence policy, between 1964-70, they had 
the combative personality of Denis Healey as Secretary of State for Defence to manage 
and mitigate against any difficulties.9 Healey could, in his own words, transcend 
traditional criticisms of Labour MPs as being ‘pacifists’ or ‘column-dodgers’, on 
account of his former military service.10 As Defence Secretary, he did not shy away 
from confrontations or defence cuts, and he maintained a constant drive for ‘cost-
effectiveness’.11 It was thus under the combative Healey, and in this turbulent Cold War 
environment that would eventually give way to détente, that British defence officials 
turned to consider just how they would acquire a nerve agent capability. After assessing 
this initial phase of nerve agent acquisition, this chapter will then move on to analyse 
the political-military divide which brought CW policy to a standstill in the mid-1960s, 
and it will end by examining the impact and scale of a tide of publicity which struck the 
CBW field in 1968.  
 
Acquiring a capability 
The May 1963 Cabinet Defence Committee decision, which had approved the British 
development of a nerve agent capability and the revival of offensive weapons research, 
triggered a period of intense activity in the CW field. In attempting to implement this 
new policy, the War Office, in consultation with the Royal Navy and the Air Ministry, 
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expanded defensive research and created a two-phase programme for acquiring a nerve 
agent capability.12  
In CW defence, British experts increased research, and they rapidly implemented a 
series of trials.13 To test British defensive preparedness, the Army launched Exercise 
Tureen in late 1964, which consisted of a number of trials at Imber Range, near 
Salisbury.14 As officials noted at the time, ‘this appears to have been the first British 
Chemical Exercise with troops for about a generation’.15 This greater focus on 
defensive measures was in direct response to the perceived Soviet nerve agent threat, 
with British intelligence still benefitting from the rush of intelligence gains in the early 
1960s.16 The Soviet Union was believed by the JIC to possess warheads filled with VR-
55, an analogue of VX, as well as multi-rocket launchers, artillery shells and land mines 
for the delivery of lethal CW agents.17 The JIC also warned that Soviet satellite 
countries in the Warsaw Pact were beginning to receive Soviet-supplied, and nerve 
agent-filled, FROG and SCUD warheads.18 Perhaps of greatest concern for British 
defence officials, though, were reports alleging that Soviet officials viewed chemical 
weapons as a ‘normal feature of modern warfare’, and that the country would not 
hesitate to use them.19 This consolidating picture of the Soviet threat played a 
significant part in further adding to the urgency with which British defensive 
preparations were expanded from 1964.  
In meeting Defence Committee approval for the acquisition of a lethal nerve agent 
capability, which was both for Europe and to counter potential proliferation in the Third 
World, the War Office, the Royal Navy and the Air Ministry all agreed to a two-phase 
process.20 Phase one would be the securing of an interim CW capability, likely from the 
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United States, which would be operational from 1965-1969.21 This initial requirement 
would be met by all three Services and cost just under £3 million.22 For the Royal Navy 
and the Air Ministry, their chosen capability was an aerial spray system for the 
dispersal of VX.23 This aerial system was to be designed for delivery by the Royal 
Navy’s Buccaneer and the RAF’s Hunter GA9, despite safety concerns that the plane 
could crash and release VX, or that there could be an accidental release of VX due to 
human error.24 For the Army, the interim capability would be the procurement of 
22,000 sarin-filled 105mm shells from the United States.25 These capabilities were, 
however, only temporary solutions, intended to bridge the gap until the completion of 
phase two, which was the development of a domestic capability to meet long-term CW 
requirements from 1970.  
A core part of this reinvigorated CW policy also came in the form of a series of war 
game exercises, which were sponsored by the War Office and the MoD.26 The war 
games, running from mid-to-late 1965, plotted the predicted use of chemical weapons 
on the Western front at the outbreak of war in Europe, and they contained some 
surprising revelations for British defence officials.27 The war games forecast that with 
the widespread use of chemical weapons, much of the West German countryside would 
have become contaminated. The hazardous area would stretch back around 20 
kilometres from the border. Even with this large area of contamination hindering a 
Soviet advance, MoD officials did not believe that CW was substantially militarily 
beneficial for Allied use against well-equipped Soviet forces.28 They noted that 
‘chemical warfare…does not appear to have any decisive effect in slowing down the 
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rate of advance of a well-equipped and trained force.’29 This finding, reinforced by 
perceptions of increasingly advanced Soviet defensive preparations and equipment, was 
in itself a substantial shift in attitudes towards the military utility of chemical weapons. 
Since the late 1940s, chemical weapons had been thought of as useful in hampering any 
Soviet advance and in countering the Soviet Union’s numerical advantage in tanks and 
troops. It was also ruefully noted that VX did not cause casualties quickly enough, 
which would allow Soviet troops to don protective equipment before fatalities became 
widespread. This was all the more important given that the Russian CW agent VR-55 
was ‘believed to be’ in the category envisaged for a genuinely effective CW agent.30 
This perception of the Soviet Union possessing an edge in CW capabilities further 
added to the feeling that Britain was being left behind.  
The war games also revealed another major concern. As defence officials noted, ‘any 
force that was ill-equipped or badly trained would be very vulnerable’, yet British 
intelligence believed that Soviet forces were very well-equipped and very well-
trained.31 This left one group, which while not a force, certainly was within the conflict 
zone and ill-prepared for nerve agent exposure: West German civilians. Shockingly it 
was predicted that after the outbreak of CW in Europe, around 240,000 to 300,000 
West German civilians would be within the hazardous CW zone.32 Unprepared and in 
the centre of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, these civilians would 
be at serious risk of nerve agent exposure from chemical weapons employed by both 
sides.33 For British defence officials, given that CW use did not offer any real military 
advantage in slowing down Soviet forces, and that it would expose hundreds of 
thousands of civilians to lethal chemical weapons, the main aim was increasingly seen 
as preventing the outbreak of CW in Europe altogether, through deterrence.34 
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The war games were crucially important for considerations of the impact of nerve agent 
use, but the negative conclusion as to their military value led the CoS to further re-
consider the role of chemical weapons in Europe. While the war games were limited to 
Europe and affected considerations of a CW capability for continental defence, the need 
for chemical weapons in the Third World to counter possible proliferation remained 
unquestioned. Over this European role, though, there emerged some disagreement 
within the CoS. Chief Scientific Advisor Solly Zuckerman, once again exerting 
considerable influence over British CW policy, argued that given the apparent lack of 
operational effectiveness of chemical weapons against Soviet forces, there was no 
justification for their acquisition for a European war.35 Even though the rest of the CoS 
accepted the apparent military shortcomings of nerve agent weapons in Europe, they 
were hesitant to commit to Zuckerman’s interpretation. They placed much greater 
emphasis on deterrence and on the option of having a retaliatory capability, and they 
also thought the ability to use nerve agent weapons had other benefits.36 Firstly, it was 
believed that possession of chemical weapons would cause a degree of uncertainty in 
any Soviet decision to initiate CW.37 Secondly, they thought that the ability to retaliate 
in kind was not only a deterrence factor, but it was a morale booster for British troops, 
particularly if they themselves were under CW attack.38 The CoS thus used this morale 
argument in a highly dubious way, with the benefits of boosting British troops at the 
harrowing cost of NATO civilians and Soviet troops, not just a seemingly acceptable 
cost, but a justification and reason for weapons acquisition and deployment.  
In September 1965, and even after re-affirming the need for a CW capability for the 
Third World, the CoS was hesitant to follow through with nerve agent acquisition. By 
fostering a degree of doubt over the utility of chemical weapons in Europe, a divide had 
emerged between Zuckerman and the rest of the CoS, which had created uncertainty 
over the direction of British CW policy as a whole.39 By undermining the role of 
chemical weapons in Europe, Zuckerman and the war games had inadvertently brought 
the entire nature of a British CW capability into question.  
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In addition to this uncertainty surrounding the military role of chemical weapons in 
Europe, the CoS was also wary of the significant political and financial costs involved 
in following through with the production of nerve agent weapons, especially with 
difficulties again emerging over securing a nerve agent capability from the United 
States.40 The deal had been thrown into doubt when, much to the surprise of British 
officials, the United States State Department blocked the sale of nerve agent weapons. 
This was even though the United States Army and Department of Defense supported 
the selling of nerve agents to Britain, with the State Department arguing that as CW 
policy was under review in the United States, no sales could be made.41 British officials 
dubbed this setback a ‘bitter blow’.42 Due to the decision being made mid-level in the 
State Department, a British Ministerial level intervention was thought necessary to 
secure nerve agent weapons from the United States.43 This would have entailed asking 
the Labour Government, under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to intervene and 
purchase nerve agents from the United States. The political cost of such an endeavour 
was substantial, and in tandem with concerns arising over the role of nerve agent 
weapons in Europe, Ministerial guidance was thought vital. In October 1965 the CoS 
thus sought Ministerial clarification over nerve agent weapons and the direction of CW 
policy.44  
 
The publicity red-line 
This CoS request for Ministerial input and clarification was sent to the Secretary of 
State for Defence, Denis Healey. While Healey deemed continued investment in 
defensive measures ‘unobjectionable’, he believed that the production of nerve agent 
weapons, regardless of the 1963 Defence Committee decision, necessitated Prime 
Ministerial approval.45 On 8 November 1965, Healey sought Harold Wilson’s backing 
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for nerve agent weapons, warning him that the superpowers had pulled far ahead, and 
worse still, that the Soviet Union might supply chemical weapons to Third World 
countries ‘to embarrass us outside of Europe’.46 Though Healey supported a limited 
capability for the Third World, he also agreed with Zuckerman’s analysis that in 
Europe chemical weapons were unlikely to have a significant effect in slowing or 
hampering the Soviet juggernaut. His support for a CW capability was therefore 
conditional on it being restricted to limited wars outside of Europe, for deterring CW 
use by a country in the Third World, and that it be kept secret until used, which also 
raised serious questions as to the possibility and viability of a secret deterrent. Although 
Healey addressed the contentious issue of publicity and deterrence, his insights perhaps 
confused the situation even further, whilst revealing the extent of political aversion to 
any publicity over nerve agent weapons. Reflective of his appreciation of the wider 
public’s aversion to the nerve agents, and to the potentially serious domestic and 
international backlash resulting from any publicity, Healey seriously doubted whether it 
would be possible to deter an enemy’s first-use of chemical weapons. Deterring first-
use necessitated publicity, which Healey thought unacceptable; as such, he informed 
Wilson that: 
Although our possession of this capability would not be publicised and 
might not, therefore, deter an initial use of chemical weapons by an 
enemy, it would enable us to provide a quick response in retaliation and 
thereby we hope deter further use.47 
With the politically sensitive nature of chemical weapons, Healey did not want to deter 
the first use of chemical weapons, as this would have necessitated their existence and 
possession being publicised. Consequently, Healey’s stance represented a slightly 
bizarre interpretation of CW deterrence, whereby publicity was not needed, but where 
the deterrent effect would come into play once British forces had already been exposed 
to lethal CW agents.48 It was therefore for this policy, of a limited CW capability to be 
kept secret and used in retaliation against countries outside of Europe, which Healey 
sought Prime Ministerial approval for in November 1965. For Healey and the CoS, 
though, their timing was unfortunate.  
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From 1964-66, Wilson’s first Labour Government only had a very narrow majority, 
which made it extremely vulnerable to both internal and external pressures.49 Wilson’s 
first Government was also dominated by electoral concerns, as the Prime Minister was 
preparing for another election to secure a larger majority, which took place in March 
1966. 50 In the build-up to this second election, Wilson was keen to defer any decisions 
on politically sensitive topics, and unsurprisingly, he delayed considerations of highly 
controversial nerve agents weapons until things were ‘a little quieter’.51 With pressing 
electoral concerns, and the evolving and dangerous situation in Rhodesia, where UDI 
had been declared in November 1965, CW thus dropped down the list of priorities.52 
For although the combative Healey initially backed the acquisition of nerve agent 
weapons and Macmillan’s 1963 decision to acquire chemical weapons, even he stood 
little chance of securing the approval of Wilson, especially on such a controversial 
issue and in the face of such a political backdrop.  
However, even after winning a significant Labour majority in the March 1966 election, 
Wilson continued to delay any decision on nerve agent weapons. In this second Wilson 
Government, Healey, who had retained his position as Defence Secretary, was also 
increasingly becoming sceptical as to the political cost of acquiring nerve agent 
weapons. In June 1966, Healey’s Assistant Under Secretary for Policy, Frank Cooper, 
echoed these concerns when he advised Healey that: 
The whole concept of an independent British CW capability seems 
reminiscent of the Pre-Suez era or even earlier…Are we going to spray 
nerve gas on Africans, Indonesians or even the Chinese? Can there be a 
deterrent if we do not admit to having, let alone publicise, the weapon?53 
For Cooper, merely the option of having a retaliatory capability was questionable, 
regardless of its actual use or role, and he thought that an independent CW deterrent, in 
mid-1960s British defence policy, an outdated and unnecessary cost. Implicit in his 
rebuke was the point that if the political fallout from just the production and 
development of nerve agents was thought unacceptable, then how could the 
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Government justify their actual use, especially in a limited war with a Third World 
country? This not only conjured up images of Britain aggressively attempting to flex its 
muscles abroad, but it also portrayed a remarkably similar and comparable image to the 
hugely controversial Italian use of gas warfare in Abyssinia in the 1930s.54 In a global 
war with nuclear weapons, CW could perhaps be justified, but this was certainly not the 
case for nerve agent weapons in a limited conflict in the Third World. The envisaged 
military role of nerve agents, to counter and deter the proliferation of Soviet chemical 
weapons in the Third World, was therefore significantly at odds with concerns of 
negative publicity and political fallout. As Cooper’s insights attest, deterrence and 
publicity was an increasingly clear, contradictory and seemingly insurmountable bone 
of contention between politicians and defence officials.55 For while the political and 
public ramifications of the acquisition and brandishing of nerve agent weapons were 
too significant for politicians to contemplate, for military planners this same publicity 
was not a choice, but a necessity for successful deterrence. 
Senior British defence officials remained wedded to the idea of publicising British 
nerve agent weapons, as this was viewed as an inseparable part of deterrence, and thus 
integral to CW policy. Defence officials needed guarantees that they could publicise a 
British nerve agent capability before they acquired one, as without these guarantees the 
acquired capability might have little deterrent value. The Assistant Chief of the Defence 
Staff surmised in December 1966 that, regardless of any feared negative publicity, ‘the 
military need has been established’, and the Government should acquire a nerve agent 
capability.56 This was even after defence officials acknowledged that Ministers might 
find the ‘political criticism’ of producing nerve agents too substantial, and that when it 
comes to CW ‘public opinion tends to be governed by emotion rather than reason’.57 In 
July 1965, Michael Quinlan had already surmised the views of Chief of the Air Staff, 
and wider military views on CW deterrence, when he wrote that ‘a deterrent 
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weapon…can deter only if the enemy knows about it’.58 Quinlan represented the views 
of many defence officials when he argued that publicity was needed in some form, and 
that for a weapon to act as a deterrent enemy countries not only needed to be made 
aware that Britain possessed CW stocks, but that Britain was willing to use them.59 
Interestingly Quinlan had also proposed a measure to both appease political 
dissatisfaction and meet military requirements, when he suggested that the Government 
deliberately loosen security classifications in British CW policy.60 This measure could 
have led to some limited information on British intent and policy seeping into the 
public domain, being picked up by Soviet intelligence, and thus fulfilling the deterrent 
requirement. Although not acted upon, it again revealed military officials attempting to 
find some wiggle room in the political red line over publicising a nerve agent 
capability, with Quinlan proposing a potential alternative which did not entail a bold 
Government announcement over intent and the acquisition of controversial nerve agent 
weapons.  
Even with these tentative attempts at compromise, the disagreement over publicity and 
deterrence was an impassable obstacle in the nerve agent debate, and it exposed a stark 
divide in approach by Labour politicians and defence officials. In light of all these 
difficulties, controversies and contradictions associated with CW policy and nerve 
agent acquisition, rather than directly engage with the nerve agent decision, Healey 
decided to defer and marginalise it.61 With political considerations and the feared public 
backlash resulting from approving the production and possession of nerve agent 
weapons, CW policy was thus essentially sidelined. This lack of senior political 
guidance also caused some confusion for civil servants within the Cabinet Office, who, 
by late 1966, were uncertain over how to deal with the matter.62 Cabinet Office officials 
were in the dark as to whether they needed to ‘continue to pigeon-hole’ CW policy, or 
if the nerve agent question actually needed addressing at the Ministerial level.63 For 
Healey, his frustration with defence officials insisting on publicity for CW deterrence 
would grow progressively worse from December 1966, after the Defence Research 
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Committee (DRC - formerly the DRPC) finished a substantial review of CBW policy 
for the CoS. 
Completed in December 1966, the DRC review was intended to inform CoS CW policy 
after the setbacks and delays which had plagued it since the May 1963 Cabinet Defence 
Committee decision.64 Defence officials believed that once the review was complete, 
and if it still supported the acquisition of nerve agent weapons, then they should make a 
fresh approach to Ministers. The review was also intended to answer ‘mutterings’ from 
within the defence establishment, which accused the Army of spending too much on 
CBW research.65 As soon discovered by the DRC, even though it was intended to 
provide a cohesive report and inform Ministerial deliberations, it could accomplish 
little due to the uncertainty surrounding existing political thinking.66 The DRC felt 
unable to recommend any substantial policy changes due to what was in essence policy 
paralysis at the most senior level, with senior politicians refusing to engage with the 
topic and defence officials lacking a clear direction. As such, its report mostly agreed 
with and reinforced existing military thinking.67 One area where the DRC review 
reverberated with prevailing tensions between politicians and defence officials was 
over publicity and the role of CW deterrence, with the DRC arguing that: 
We are always so secretive about having a lethal CW capability that it 
has no deterrent effect; all we have is the ability to retaliate. If we 
develop CW weapons, we should let the fact be known…68 
The DRC, like Quinlan before, also considered a possible half-way measure to bridge 
the political-military divide, which was to rely on foreign intelligence agencies 
uncovering British nerve agent capabilities.69 This would have created the unusual 
situation where the domestic population would be deliberately kept in the dark, but 
where defence officials actively wanted, and in fact for deterrence purposes needed, 
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foreign intelligence agencies to unearth British CW capabilities.70 Following more 
detailed considerations, the DRC recommended not taking this half-way approach, as 
the chances of the domestic population finding out, and of awkward parliamentary 
questions arising, was deemed too high. There was also no guarantee that Soviet 
officials would keep this information secret and, as seen in previous cases, Soviet 
officials were not averse to using CBW as a publicity tool.71 While not acted upon, the 
example again illustrates the extent to which defence officials wished to possess a nerve 
agent capability.  
When the DRC proposed publicising British nerve agent capabilities, it was 
representing the existing views of senior defence officials, and its findings were 
endorsed by the CoS.72 The CoS believed that there was a genuine advantage in 
publicising any British decision to acquire nerve agent weapons, due to it being deemed 
an integral part of successful CW deterrence. To pre-empt negative publicity, and in a 
similar vein to the United States Chemical Warfare Service in the early 1960s, which 
had recruited civilian public relations consultants to improve the image of CBW, the 
CoS also envisaged a public relations campaign for British CW policy.73 Such a 
measure was thought necessary to temper the predicted political and public backlash 
resulting from publicising a nerve agent capability.  
While this emphasis on publicising a British nerve agent capability was endorsed and 
accepted by the CoS in October 1967, the CoS also expanded their request for nerve 
agent weapons. Not only did they request a CW capability for the Third World, but they 
now again wanted one for Europe, despite the findings of the war games.74 In reaching 
this additional conclusion, the CoS was aided with the removal of one significant 
obstacle: Solly Zuckerman had left as the MoD’s Chief Scientific Advisor in 1966, and 
the CoS was no longer divided.75 This request for a nerve agent capability for Europe 
also had roots in perceptions of the Soviet CW threat, with British intelligence still 
possessing ‘considerable knowledge’ of Soviet CW capabilities, and of Soviet intent to 
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use chemical weapons in battle.76 The CoS thus attached even greater weight to a 
British CW deterrent to ward against any potential Soviet first-use, despite defence 
officials recognising that CW offered no significant operational advantage against 
Soviet forces. Deterrence was increasingly important as it was in NATO’s interest that 
CW did not become a feature of war, especially with the fighting likely occurring in 
West Germany and with Soviet forces potentially better equipped.77 A European CW 
deterrent had therefore re-emerged as a primary purpose for a nerve agent capability, 
and for defence officials it necessitated publicity.78  
In late 1967, when Healey was again approached to approve the acquisition of a nerve 
agent capability, it was for this much broader role, and publicity for deterrence was an 
essential component.79 The CoS request entailed Healey dropping his red line over 
publicity, and accepting the need for advertising the British acquisition of nerve agent 
weapons.  
This time, when the nerve agent question again reached Healey, rather than just defer, 
he deferred and delegated. Initially Healey again deferred by informing the CoS that 
any Ministerial meeting on CW would detract from important ongoing discussions on 
British nuclear policy.80 Yet after these Cabinet discussions on British nuclear policy 
had finished, Healey still refused to engage with the nerve agent question, and he 
instead decided to delegate the issue to his Minister of Defence for Equipment, Roy 
Mason.81 Mason has been labelled as an ‘uncompromising’ figure who frequently took 
a tough line, and he is predominantly known for his later dealings with the IRA as 
Northern Ireland Secretary.82 In late 1967 and early 1968, he was responsible for setting 
the direction of British CW policy after Healey’s decision to divulge himself of the 
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controversial issue. Mason, as Minister of Defence for Equipment, also wielded 
considerable influence over CW policy, as Porton Down came under his purview.  
In forming a decision on the future of British CW policy, Mason benefitted from the 
prior analysis of another Minister of Defence, Sir Joseph Percival William Mallalieu 
MP, then Minister of Defence for the Royal Navy.83 Mallalieu, Oxford-educated and a 
journalist, also fought in the Royal Navy during the Second World War.84 When he had 
assessed CW policy in August 1967, he provided one of the most open, frank, and 
forthcoming considerations of CW policy in post-war Britain, and he ruefully started 
his review by stating that ‘it is a tall order to rush in where the Prime Minister declines 
to tread.’85 Mallalieu further observed that Wilson had maintained a ‘masterly silence’ 
on the subject and that the Prime Minister had even managed to stifle Conservative MP 
Michael Hamilton’s enquiries into CW research at Porton Down, despite Hamilton 
being the local MP. In terms of the controversial and divisive subject of CW deterrence, 
Mallalieu rather succinctly noted that:  
“Deterrence” in nuclear terms means spending an enormous amount of 
money and making loud noises about it; in chemical and biological 
[warfare] terms, there is no need to spend much, and there are strong 
political objections to boasting about what we do spend.86 
Mallalieu elaborated that while nuclear weapons were ‘expensive and nasty’, chemical 
weapons were ‘cheap and nasty’.87 Picking up on fears of proliferation in the Third 
World, just as Thorneycroft and Healey had done so before him, he also crassly warned 
that unlike nuclear weapons, any ‘tin pot country’ could acquire a CW capability.88 
Perhaps most importantly for British CW policy however, Mallalieu did not support the 
1963 policy to acquire nerve agent weapons. He instead stated that British CW 
scientists should instead ‘find out enough to be able to defend ourselves, but go no 
further’.89 This, he believed, had already been the implicit policy for CW for three 
years, and he felt that unless the CoS really needed this implicit policy shift explicitly 
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clarified to them, then there should be no further need for political guidance. All 
Mallalieu thought should happen, was that the CoS should confirm what they had long 
suspected, which was that while the policy of acquiring chemical weapons would not 
be acted upon, it would also not be entirely or directly dismissed. Britain would keep 
the nerve agent option open, in secret, but not act upon it and not officially re-define 
what its actual policy was. 
Unfortunately for the CoS, Roy Mason, when tasked by Healey with deciding the future 
of CW policy, took a similar line to Mallalieu’s assessment.90 In January 1968, while 
acknowledging that defensive research and expenditure should continue due to there 
being little political risk in the area, Mason warned the CoS that: 
It is quite unrealistic to suppose that we would get any support from the 
Prime Minister, for the foreseeable future, to spend more money to 
develop a CW retaliatory capability, let alone to publicise our doing 
so…91 
Mason took a tough line on the CoS request to acquire and publicise a nerve agent 
capability, and he flatly refused to endorse the 1963 policy. He also admonished the 
CoS, informing them that the only reason policy was not explicitly reversed was due to 
it being in line with NATO requirements for member states to possess a CW 
capability.92 Instead of attempting to secure greater funding for CW, he advised them 
that they needed to step up efforts to reduce expenditure in the field. Although avoiding 
the same fate as BW research, which was undergoing a process of ‘civilianisation’, 
Mason cautioned that there would need to be closer scrutiny of CW research 
expenditure.93 In January 1968, the state of affairs was thus made abundantly clear to 
the CoS and defence officials, when Mason felt obliged to explicitly clarify British CW 
policy: publicity for deterrence was out of the question, acting on the 1963 decision to 
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acquire chemical weapons was unrealistic, and CW research was fortunate not to be 
‘civilianised’.94  
Even with this harsh rebuke, Mason stopped short of seeking Cabinet approval for a 
reversal of policy, and a nerve agent capability was not indefinitely ruled out. Instead, 
he decided that CW policy would not be reviewed for another two years, implementing 
a period of abeyance.95 After these two years had elapsed, as he surely knew, there 
would likely be a new Government in power to deal with the nerve agent problem. 
Mason therefore not only slapped down the CoS request, but he refused to address it 
further, and he left the controversial review of nerve agent weapons for his successor to 
address in 1970.96  
Following Mason’s intervention, instead of expanding CW capabilities and research, 
significant cutbacks looked possible. In light of this adverse political reaction, the CoS 
willingly accepted Mason’s suggested two-year abeyance period.97 The Army, in 
particular, was happy to accept the idea, as officials were fearful that if the question of 
a nerve agent capability had actually reached the Cabinet level, then it would have been 
rejected and the direction of CW policy resoundingly reversed by Wilson.98 The 
Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff believed that such a policy reversal would have been 
immensely damaging to British CW policy, as it would have led to the ‘irrevocable 
closure’ of Britain’s nerve agent pilot plant at Nancekuke and the cutting of vital 
funding for research.99 In accepting the proposed abeyance period of two-years, the 
CoS thus avoided the direct and unwanted attention of more senior political figures 
such as Wilson and Healey, while they ensured the continuance of CW research, and 
they kept open the possible future acquisition of a nerve agent capability.100 This 
tactical CoS acceptance of two years of abeyance did not go unnoticed. Cabinet Office 
officials pondered the reasons for defence officials accepting abeyance when it ran so 
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starkly against their wishes, and they were highly sceptical as to the motives of the 
CoS.101 Cabinet Office officials correctly surmised that the CoS was, in fact, simply 
biding its time in preparation for a future approach to acquire chemical weapons, when 
the political climate was more sympathetic.102  
Alongside Ministerial deferrals, and importantly for the future of CW policy, there was 
also a wider re-orientation in British global defence commitments. In January 1968, 
coinciding with Mason’s rebuke, the CoS recognised that the Labour Government’s 
policy of significantly reducing British commitments East of Suez would undermine a 
key role and reason for Britain acquiring a CW capability in the 1960s.103 Withdrawal 
from East of Suez would seriously undermine the Third World role of chemical 
weapons. Thorneycroft in 1963, Healey in 1965 and the CoS throughout the 1960s had 
all emphasised the need for a CW capability outside of Europe, which was to deter and 
retaliate against chemical weapons proliferation in the Third World. However, in 
January 1968, the CoS noted that these ‘changes in our Defence policy East of Suez 
had considerably reduced the need for this capability outside of Europe’.104 With the 
change in policy and the subsequent reduction in British commitments outside Europe, 
there was now no need to deter or retaliate with chemical weapons if British forces 
were not active in the region to be threatened by them.105 Crucially, this left an 
offensive nerve agent capability only one potential role: deterrence and retaliation in 
Europe. The CoS was set on acquiring a CW capability, and after years of justifying the 
CW requirement as necessary for deterrence and retaliation in the Third World, it 
simply re-orientated its focus entirely on the European deterrent dimension.106 This re-
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orientation would have a lasting impact, for at the heart of a nerve agent capability for 
continental defence lay deterrence and publicity.107  
A ‘campaign of criticism’108 
Political aversion towards approving a nerve agent capability and the publicity 
dimension was seemingly justified, when, from 1968, Labour Cabinet members faced a 
‘campaign of criticism’ over British CW policy, with grass-roots movements, student 
activism, the press and MPs all becoming involved and actively engaged with British 
CW policy.109 Similarly to the spate of publicity in 1959-60, much of this attention 
afforded to British CW policy in 1968 was not triggered by British actions. Even 
though Britain did not send troops to fight in Vietnam, United States actions there had a 
pervasive impact on British domestic politics by fuelling a wider public appreciation 
and awareness of CBW.110 United States forces had initially relied on herbicides to 
counter North Vietnamese guerrilla warfare tactics, but this had escalated to 
incapacitating riot-control agents, such as CS gas, which were believed to be militarily 
highly effective.111 In 1965, when seeking authorisation from President Lyndon B. 
Johnson for their use in Vietnam, United States officials had noted that despite 
predicted international criticism, approving their use was ‘common sense’.112 The 
perceived advantages in using CS gas against North Vietnamese forces led to the 
procurement of it increasing by a factor of 24, from 1965 to 1969, and in total, it is 
estimated that United States forces used just under 7 million kilograms of the agent in 
the Vietnam War.113 
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Due to the nature of the war, which was broadcast into the homes and lives of United 
States citizens, the extensive use of riot-control agents by United States forces did not 
remain hidden for long. Domestic protests against CBW subsequently gained traction in 
the United States, and in 1967, 5,000 scientists signed a petition calling for a review of 
United States CBW policy.114 Many commentators were fearful that escalation would 
continue, and that lethal nerve agents might be used. Reflecting these concerns at the 
time, Elinor Langer wrote that what is ‘unthinkable at one moment may be policy the 
next’.115 Such fears and domestic pressures triggered a public statement by President 
Johnson, who claimed that United States forces would only ever use lethal chemical 
weapons with the explicit approval of the Commander-in-Chief.116 
Spurred on by this emerging information on the CBW field from the United States, very 
public questions began being asked about British CW policy and its involvement in 
CBW research. On 27 May 1966, a very early indicator of grass-roots opposition was 
seen when the Committee of 100, an anti-war protest group, demonstrated outside 
Porton Down.117 After the protest however, the Committee of 100 lost momentum and 
publicity on CW policy lulled until 1967, when in line with events in Vietnam, 
publicity in the United States and alleged use of chemical weapons by Egyptian forces 
in Yemen, CW again attracted mainstream attention in Britain.118 In January 1967, 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson informed the Commons that evidence ‘suggests pretty 
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strongly that poison gas may have been used’ in Yemen.119 Within two months of these 
public accusations that Egypt had used lethal chemical weapons in Yemen, public 
attention in the CW field gained further traction with a BBC radio programme called 
‘Make a Desolation and Call it Peace’, which covered CBW.120 In April, BBC Horizon 
then released a T.V. documentary titled ‘The Shape of War to Come’, which introduced 
different types of chemical and biological weapons, their effects, their availability and 
possible arguments for their use.121 These key events and revelations represented an 
increasing and crucial flow of information on CBW into the public domain.  
After hearing and watching some of this BBC coverage of CBW, one attentive listener 
was spurred into action.122 Elizabeth Sigmund, referred to as the ‘toxic avenger’, 
initiated her campaign to hold British CBW policy to account.123 For Sigmund, the 
emerging coverage and revelations tapped into a deeper personal aversion to CBW, as 
she later revealed, her views were shaped by her grandfather suffering badly from gas 
exposure during the First World War, by seeing photos of long-lines of gas victims, and 
by reading Wilfred Owen’s Dulce et Decorum Est.124 It was this collection of personal 
experiences and emotions which the BBC revived and brought to the fore through its 
reports. In her endeavour to hold Government policy to account, Sigmund wrote, in her 
own words, a ‘clumsy, but effective’ letter to the Observer in April 1968.125 In the 
published letter, she called for a united, grass-roots movement to scrutinise and raise 
awareness of Government CBW research. She received numerous responses, ranging 
from seasoned campaigners in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), to 
newcomers, shocked by BBC revelations and by the nature of CBW.126 With this 
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upsurge of support, and reflective of the wider groundswell of opposition against CBW 
at the time, Sigmund formed the Anti-Chemical and Biological Warfare Group.127 The 
group, she recalled, ‘was not a structured, carefully planned strategy for ending CBW 
in Britain’, but a ‘haphazard and pragmatic use of every piece of information that we 
could obtain.’128  
Following the establishment of the group, Sigmund went on to play an integral part in 
campaigning and raising awareness of British CBW research in the crucial period of 
May-June 1968. When, just months after Mason’s decision to push the nerve agent 
question into abeyance, a tide of publicity and scrutiny struck. During this pivotal 
period, Sigmund represented a wider trend in British public perceptions of CBW, when 
the public mood shifted decisively against Government policy and when it morphed 
into a ‘campaign of criticism’.129 Other grass-roots movements which played a 
significant role and which liaised with Sigmund included the CND, the Christian CND, 
and the hard-line Southampton Peace Action Committee.130 On 1 June 1968, these 
protest groups converged on Porton Down for a four-day protest.131 The presence of the 
CND was particularly troubling for the Labour Government, as the CND had embedded 
itself within the Labour Party.132 Of even greater alarm for Wilson’s Government, 
though, was a story published by the CND’s magazine Sanity on 8 June 1968, which 
contained aerial pictures of Britain’s top secret CW research facility at Nancekuke.133 
As Sanity proclaimed, they had ‘the pictures no-one dare print’.134 For the Government, 
the story represented a massive security breach, with pictures of Nancekuke published 
and shown in major news outlets across the country.135  
Coinciding with this growing awareness of CBW at the grass-roots level was a more 
general rise in student protests, which in mid-1968 had become widespread.136 As noted 
by Clarke, anoraks, placards and loud-hailers marked the end of Britain’s exemption 
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from the student-led protests which had been rampant in the rest of Europe and the 
United States.137 In Britain, student protestors, courtesy of the efforts of the BBC and 
other grass-roots movements, were now far more informed, and it was in response to 
revelations in the CBW field that they escalated their involvement and engagement. An 
early example of student activism had been seen on 7 May 1968, when nearly 200 
students at Essex University disrupted a talk by the visiting Dr T. Inch, a Porton Down 
official.138 In the ensuing confrontation, one student allegedly sidled up to Dr Inch and 
sprinkled some Coleman’s mustard on his sleeve, saying ‘here, have some mustard gas 
yourself’.139 In response, Essex University suspended three students, but this then gave 
way to an even larger student counter-reaction, with students deciding that they would 
establish a ‘free university’ and that they would hold a continuous meeting to discuss 
CBW.140  
Growing student activism in the field was not the only level at which Universities were 
engaged in the CBW debate, for prominent scientists also became involved. In May-
June 1968, 21 scientists wrote to Harold Wilson requesting greater transparency over 
British CBW research.141 This coincided with the efforts of other professionals and 
academics, with one key contribution came in the form of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a think-tank established by the Swedish government. 
Other crucial interventions, representing more grass-roots orientated attempts to draw 
attention and increase awareness of the CBW field, can be seen with the engagement of 
the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science and the Bernal Peace Library 
sponsoring a conference on CBW.142  
In May and June 1968, interlinking, fuelling and feeding off these grass-roots 
movements was also reinvigorated interest in British CBW policy by the press and the 
BBC. On 6 June 1968, the BBC released provocative coverage of CBW with a 
documentary titled ‘A Plague on Your Children’.143 Controversially, the programme 
showed the effects of the incapacitating agent BZ on animals, and it alluded to the 
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immense secrecy surrounding British activities in the CBW field.144 The programme, 
rather frustratingly for British officials, also included a quote from a United States 
General referring to how nerve agents were useful for achieving a ‘clean kill’.145 Adrian 
Malone, the programme’s producer, contended that the public reaction had been one of 
‘overwhelming horror and revulsion’, but the Government did not find the exposure 
overly negative.146 What some Government officials did mind, though, was the 
continued fixation of the BBC on British CBW policy, and in particular the perceived 
bias of some BBC presenters.  
Shortly after, the BBC again refocused attention on the Government’s CBW policy in 
‘Points of View’, where the host Robert Robinson discussed public responses to ‘A 
Plague on Your Children’.147 During the programme, Robinson revealed negative and 
emotional public responses to the information they had learnt on British activities. 
Some British officials, in particular the Chief of Public Relations at the MoD, John 
Peters, were outraged, as they condemned the coverage as overly negative and 
selective.148 Although angered by the perceived bias of BBC reporters against British 
CBW research, John Morris, the Minister of Defence for Equipment and thus 
responsible for Porton Down, wanted to avoid a public confrontation. He feared that if 
concerns were raised with the Chairman of the BBC, then the situation may escalate to 
the benefit of Robinson, by giving him more attention.149 Morris’ private office thus 
urged officials to stay away from direct confrontation, as they wanted to avoid ‘a 
reaction in favour of the wretched Mr Robinson – who is after all a not very important 
performer in a not very important programme.’150 Ultimately, it was the probing 
questions of BBC presenters, and the perceived outspoken nature of them, which irked 
Government officials who were accustomed to relative quiet in this top-secret area, 
with the ensuing publicity troublesome, but not disastrous.  
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British defence officials did imagine more constructive ways of dealing with this 
negative coverage, showing a degree of constructive spin in countering the negative 
narrative.151 Government practice, as supported by Wilson, Healey and Morris, was to 
operate in a slightly grey area, that of being as open as possible without breaching any 
security considerations.152 The primary aim of this was to mitigate ‘lively public 
interest’ and criticisms of British CBW policy, through minor concessions.153 In a 
remarkably similar vein to 1960, Government officials thus again selectively deployed 
limited disclosures in an attempt to gain some control over the flow of information. As 
Morris’ private office noted, their target audience for this was not the ‘irrational ones 
who follow the latest protest fashion’, or the ones attempting to damage British defence 
policy, it was ‘the reasonable and responsible ones’.154 It was thought that this latter 
group could be reached through scientific publications and further transparency outside 
of Parliament, alongside patient repetition inside of Parliament.155 
In order to combat the negative coverage outside of Parliament, officials agreed to 
release unclassified Porton publications in British scientific journals.156 This measure 
was an attempt to shift the debate to factual scientific considerations and draw attention 
to the defensive nature of British research. All releases were carefully vetted 
beforehand, and senior British officials like Solly Zuckerman were often consulted.157 
In terms of reaching the wider public, select reporters were also invited for tours of 
Porton Down, which produced favourable responses from The Times, the Telegraph 
and the Guardian.158 After the reporters had gone on the tour and been briefed, their 
stories were often ‘unsensational and objective’, which was precisely the line the 
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Government desired.159 In essence, defence officials and Morris attempted to boil 
controversial and sensationalist stories down to a bland, scientific discussion devoid of 
drama.  
Inside Parliament, establishing a united position on CBW research proved troublesome, 
as numerous backbench labour MPs had joined in with the damning chorus and sided 
with the grass-roots movements, student protests and negative media coverage. For 
many Labour MPs, CBW research had long been a divisive issue, with some of them 
already having expressed grave concerns in 1959-60. In 1968 however, their views 
coincided with the substantial public attention afforded to CBW, which gave them the 
groundswell of support they needed to confront and question the Government’s CBW 
policy directly. Unfortunately for Prime Minister Harold Wilson, his Government’s 
CBW research thus directly set him at odds with this surge of publicity, and with many 
of his own MPs.  
In response to public unease and in order to provide a political review of British 
research into science and technology, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and 
Technology had initially been formed, which held meetings and interviews in mid-
1968. Running concurrently with the appearance of student CBW protests and press 
coverage, the Select Committee consisted of 14 MPs, and part of its remit was to 
review and scrutinise aspects of British scientific defence research, including on CW.160 
The findings and statements from the review were to be kept confidential, and 
‘witnesses’ were allowed to clarify and proof their statements before final circulation. 
One individual to be interviewed on British scientific research was Solly Zuckerman. 
While Zuckerman was not afraid of confrontation and tended to speak his mind, he 
ensured the Select Committee had little to work with when he made over 130 changes 
to his original manuscript.161 As Zuckerman informed the Chair of the Select 
Committee, Arthur Palmer MP, the steno-typist must have ‘misheard’ him when he was 
being interviewed, and he did not want his views to be distorted.162 
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While Zuckerman managed to stifle any controversy, the Government’s fortunes did 
not hold. For when the Select Committee had turned to review CW policy in May 1968, 
one frustrated Labour MP intervened before any confidential manuscript could be 
proofed or edited. Tam Dalyell MP, an ardent critic of CBW and member of the Select 
Committee, wanted to bring greater transparency to British CBW research, and so was 
irritated when he realised that officials could ‘side-line’ material from their reports.163 
To pre-empt this editing process, and to reveal more information on CW policy, Dalyell 
leaked an un-proofed confidential manuscript on CBW to the Observer.164 The leak 
contained confidential evidence from the top tier of British CBW experts, including 
information supplied by the Director and Deputy-Director of CW research at Porton 
Down.165 These unedited witness statements included information on the strengths and 
costs of CW research, the names of scientists and the universities collaborating with 
Porton Down. Perhaps most damningly of all, it confirmed that Britain possessed no 
nerve agent stocks and no retaliatory CW capability.166 A few days after his leak, and 
already knowing the answer, Dalyell asked in the Commons for a list of universities 
involved in British CBW research, which was reluctantly supplied.167  
Though Dalyell focused on the role of universities, perhaps to capitalise on existing ill-
will and student activism in the area, Government officials remained divided on how 
best to deal with the leak, and particularly on how to handle the public revelation that 
Britain possessed no chemical weapons capability or deterrent. CW policy again 
became an area of contention and disagreement between officials in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO – formerly the Foreign Office) and the MoD.168 Even 
with the leak, the MoD wished to continue in secrecy and to only confirm that Britain 
possessed no chemical weapons as a last resort. A key reason why MoD officials stuck 
to maintaining secrecy, even though the story had already broken, was that they took 
comfort in the fact that ‘potential enemy countries will tend to believe that this is a 
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partial deception by the British Government’.169 Along this line, with Government 
officials refusing to be drawn in and with the selective release of secret information 
originating from a Labour MP, an attempt at deception could be seen as a likely 
possibility to an external observer. Defence officials were also aware that their biggest 
secret had remained hidden: the 1963 Cabinet Defence Committee decision, which the 
CoS still wanted to enact, to acquire a lethal nerve agent capability.170 As defence 
officials also surely realised, a positive public response to the news that Britain did not 
possess chemical weapons would have made their future acquisition that much harder.  
FCO officials, on the other hand, believed that there would be every advantage to 
Britain publicising its lack of chemical weapons, especially due to ongoing ‘public 
agitation’.171 One key supporter of this stance was Fred Mulley, the Minister for 
Disarmament, who was keen on publicising and capitalising on the revelation.172 The 
FCO and Mulley both believed that Daylell’s leak was, in essence, a PR coup, which 
needed building upon.173 Here Britain could distinguish itself from the superpowers and 
claim the moral high ground, and at the same time take the sting out of ongoing public 
criticism. Yet despite these potential advantages, a strange middle path was taken, 
which only partially revealed Britain’s lack of CW capabilities. With Morris 
confirming in Parliament that ‘the only stocks of nerve gases currently held are small 
quantities necessary for the development and testing of defensive measures’.174 This 
statement, though, seemingly had little impact, as the Government neither completely 
covered up CW capabilities nor trumpeted or benefitted from this revelation and the 
positive aspects of disposing of nerve agent weapons.175  
Government resistance was, though, slowly eroding under continued pressure, as one of 
the most frustrating political facets of the Dalyell saga was not the actual content of the 
leak, but that for Wilson and the Labour Party the story did not disappear, it lingered in 
national newspapers for almost two months. The sense of drama over the whole 
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situation was given greater weight by parliamentary procedure. When MPs, including 
Wilson, voted to subject Dalyell to a review by the Committee of Privileges.176 The 
Committee subsequently found Dalyell guilty of breaching parliamentary privilege 
through deliberately leaking confidential information, and Wilson again voted in favour 
of punishing the Labour backbencher.177 In addition to voting in favour of punishing 
Dalyell, the Prime Minister implemented a three-line whip on the vote, showing that he 
had very strong feelings on the matter.178 For Wilson, this tough line also had two 
substantial political benefits. Firstly, as he surely planned, a three-line whip would deter 
many other Labour MPs from siding with their colleague against the Government. 
Secondly, Wilson not only needed to prevent others from joining Dalyell, but he needed 
to send a strong message that there were serious repercussions to taking Dalyell’s hard-
line against Government policy.  
Notably, even with this tough line, there were still numerous backbench Labour MPs 
who voted against disciplinary action on 24 July 1968, with the vote passing 244-52.179 
The 52 noes, which on the surface seems low, can actually be seen as unusually high 
given that even Edward Heath, the Leader of the Conservative Opposition, voted with 
Wilson and against Daylell. In the preceding debate, numerous Labour backbenchers 
had also voiced their support for Dalyell, and in one instance Labour MP Emrys 
Hughes used the opportunity to directly attack Wilson’s CBW policies.180 Although 
Wilson won the vote and secured the parliamentary condemnation of Dalyell for the 
‘gross contempt of the House’, his party had not escaped unscathed, and CBW 
continued to divide the Labour Party.181 
In September 1968, after a brief respite in publicity and coverage of CBW, the CND’s 
Sanity magazine again came to the fore, when it reported on ‘Britain’s first nerve gas 
victim’.182 Following an earlier story by the Observer, the magazine reported the 
allegations that Flt. Lt. William Cockayne had been exposed to lethal nerve agents 
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when he worked at Porton Down in 1954.183 Cockayne had made the connection 
between his long-term physical and psychological health issues and his work at Porton 
Down after watching BBC coverage of British CBW research.184 In addition to the 
Observer and Sanity covering the story, Private Eye reported on it, and Elizabeth 
Sigmund attempted to secure compensation for Cockayne.185 Cockayne also had the 
support of his local Labour MP, James Dickens, who had voted in support of Dalyell in 
Parliament two-months before.186 Ultimately, though, the situation was dealt with 
comparatively quietly, and the MoD stonewalled any claims for compensation.187 As 
despite it representing a breach of security, with the articles over Cockayne potentially 
breaking the law, Morris again showed his publicity savvy mind when he concluded 
that ‘any action taken on security grounds would merely give the articles in question, 
and Cockayne, much more public interest than they at present enjoy.’188  
This caution and desire to avoid any negative publicity whatsoever also impacted 
British CW research, when, in October 1968, serious doubts were raised over the 
possibility of British officials conducting trials on even CW defensive measures. 
Heightened public interest had direct consequences for policy. With all the public 
attention on CW policy, Healey requested that Morris reconsider the timing of 
Operation Fearless, which was the testing of CW defences and included the use of an 
aerial spray.189 Although all the trials were to take place out at sea, out of sight of land 
and passing shipping, the sheer volume of public criticism and attention afforded to 
CW policy entailed a serious re-think. In reviewing the situation, Morris decided that 
the defensive trials were to be postponed, ‘in order to gauge the strength of press 
reaction and public opinion’.190 While coverage of British CW policy did ease slightly 
after the rush of mid-1968, it did not disappear altogether. There emerged a steady 
trickle of parliamentary questions on the links between Britain and the United States in 
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the CW field, chemical and biological weapons disarmament and wider questions on 
pollution and safety in CW policy.  
In June 1969, while public and parliamentary discussions continued at a slightly slower 
pace, the constant focus, pressure and attention afforded to CW policy by the public, 
newspapers and MPs did eventually draw more concessions from the Government.191 
On 18 June 1969, in response to questions reflecting public concerns over the 
transportation and storage of nerve agents, Morris confirmed in Parliament something 
which Dalyell had leaked a year before, and that defence officials wished kept quiet. 
Morris categorically informed Parliament that ‘there are no poisonous gases and 
substances in the United Kingdom for use in biological and chemical warfare.’192 
Surprisingly, this concession again did not appear to draw the shock-waves that might 
have been expected, instead, despite this categorical statement and major concession, 
public criticism continued.  
In July 1969, Dr Steven Rose, who regularly drew public attention to Government 
CBW policy, highlighted the pollution effects of CW and he alleged that in Britain VX 
was transported by road.193 Rose’s article in The Times also referenced ongoing 
incidents in the United States, with the Skull Valley incident – a trial resulting in the 
accidental poisoning of thousands of sheep, increasing CS gas use in Vietnam, and the 
decision to dispose of 27,000 tons of surplus CW agents.194 Weeks after Rose’s article, 
questions again arose in Parliament, with Peter Bessell MP querying whether nerve 
agents would be transported through his constituency. Bessell feared that this 
transportation of nerve agents might risk fatalities in his constituency.195 These 
concerns over safety and of the nerve agent threat lingered in the consciousness of the 
public and in the press, culminating in Morris again reiterating in August 1969 that 
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Britain held no stockpiles of chemical weapons.196 Further adding to Morris’ 
comments, the Government’s Army Minister, Ivor Richard MP, also responded to 
continued interest in December, when he reiterated that ‘elaborate safety measures were 
in place’ and that Britain did not possess stockpiles of chemical weapons.197 After 
Dalyell’s leak and multiple Ministerial interventions stating that Britain did not possess 
CW stocks, any pretence or attempts at deception were severely undermined. Defence 
officials had previously taken some comfort in there being ambiguity over Britain’s 
CW capabilities in 1968, but by late 1969, this position was threadbare.198 
Remarkably even with all the negative publicity and scrutiny which had led some 
defence officials to bemoan the requirement for ‘these politically difficult devices’, the 
CoS still desired a British nerve agent capability.199 In January 1968 the CoS had 
tactfully agreed on the need for a two-year deferral, whereas in early 1969, they had 
initially wished to be ready for Ministerial review in January 1970, when Mason’s 
period of two-year abeyance would end.200 After again reviewing policy, and despite 
the United States proving unforthcoming in providing ‘firm assurances’ that they would 
use their CW stocks on behalf of British forces, the CoS wisely decided against 
pursuing Ministerial approval.201 This was not a result of any military argument, for the 
need for chemical weapons for deterrence and retaliation remained, especially with the 
United States proving non-committal to British requests, rather, it was due to publicity 
and political pressures, leading to the CoS self-imposing an extension to the two-year 
abeyance period. As Sir Ian Hogg, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, astutely 
observed: 
The Government will be starting to occupy itself with electoral thoughts. 
Any Government would be most reluctant to grasp a disagreeable nettle 
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in any case at such a time…The time to tackle this problem is with a 
Government having a good majority and a long lease of life.202  
British defence officials thus again read the political situation, let it dictate the drift of 
CW policy and temporarily override their desire to possess nerve agent weapons. The 
unpopularity of chemical weapons now meant that defence officials needed to be even 
more careful when seeking Ministerial approval. As Hogg clarified, any political 
decision to acquire chemical weapons would ‘likely cause a row’ and cost votes, 
whereas a decision to rule out the acquisition of chemical weapons altogether would 
likely win votes.203 Due to the negative publicity surrounding chemical weapons and 
the politically costly toll of approving the acquisition of nerve agents, the CoS decided 
to again defer seeking acquisition until a more favourable political environment 
emerged.204 While the campaign of criticism in the late 1960s was a substantial dent to 
the CoS request for a nerve agent weapon, it was by no means the end of the road for 
defence officials, as nerve agent acquisition would again resurface in the early 1970s.205 
The decision to wait for the electoral results and to delay was therefore not a change in 
policy, but a tactical and deliberate decision to wait for a more sympathetic political 
climate in order to acquire chemical weapons, which displayed full recognition of the 
difficulties involved in reaching the desired policy outcome. As ensuing events were to 
prove, this CoS decision to quietly continue the period of abeyance was, for defence 
officials and the continuance of CW policy at least, the right call.  
Throughout the 1960s, after Healey’s deferrals and Mason’s intervention, it was 
increasingly evident that politically, publicity for the purpose of deterrence was a red-
line and an insurmountable obstacle. For the Labour Government, acquiring nerve 
agent weapons was predominantly a political, not a military decision, and a highly 
unwelcome one at that. Even with the best efforts of the CoS, and even after the 
positive outcome of the 1963 Cabinet Defence Committee decision, CW policy was 
effectively ‘pigeon-holed’ for almost five years. Wilson, after coming into power in 
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1964, had not been able to contemplate following through with the decision to acquire 
nerve agent weapons, yet instead of outwardly reversing policy, he settled for drift and 
abeyance as CW policy gradually slipped down the list of Ministerial priorities. British 
CW policy was ignored by Wilson, dis-owned by Healey, and delegated to Mason, who 
essentially left the problem for his successor. Despite not pro-actively changing CW 
policy, they did still have a substantial impact on it.  
From 1968, compounding political aversion to publicity, British CW policy was thrust 
into the limelight on an unprecedented scale. Unintended publicity, brought about by 
United States actions in Vietnam, took the form of grass-roots movements, student 
activism, media coverage and parliamentary scrutiny. This profusion of sources forced 
the Government to concede that Britain possessed no chemical weapons capability, and 
it revealed proactive public and parliamentary aversion towards chemical weapons. The 
negative experience of publicity in a formerly immensely secret area, also occurred 
during a crucial period of policy abeyance, and it revealed that political concerns and 
fears over publicising a nerve agent capability, for the purposes of deterrence, were 
well founded. Even after 1969, though, and despite substantial concessions, publicity 
would not fade, for another storm was about to strike. When, just six months before a 
general election, the Wilson Government decided publicly to clarify its interpretation of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol.  
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6. The ‘Ugly Sister’: the CS Debacle and the rise of disarmament, 1970-76.1 
 
It is now 50 years since the First World War, but men still shudder at the 
idea of gas warfare.2  
Frank Hooley MP, House of Commons Debate, 19 March 1970. 
Building upon the momentum established by superpower rapprochement in the late 
1960s, détente continued at pace in the early 1970s. Key markers of changing attitudes 
and of reduced tensions in the Cold War were seen with strategic arms limitations talks, 
which led to the SALT I agreement and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in May 1972, and 
the summit meetings between Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and President of the 
United States Richard Nixon.3 In Europe, the two sides were also showing signs of 
greater cooperation, epitomised by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt pursuing a 
policy of Neue Ostpolitik.4 This period of détente between the superpowers and their 
respective European blocs culminated in 1975, when the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe met and produced the Helsinki accords.5 The accords were to re-
shape the nature of the Cold War, with the inclusion and recognition of human rights as 
an aspect of international security.6 However, détente as a whole was not a smooth and 
steady affair. Conflicts and confrontations were still present, especially in the Third 
World, with continued fighting in Vietnam, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973 and the Angolan Civil War in 1975-76.7 In all cases, continued 
superpower rivalry in the Third World added an uncertain dimension to détente, 
drawing into question its long-term viability and sustainability.  
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For Britain, navigating the changing pace of détente, both in Europe and in the Third 
World, was particularly problematic as, alongside this shifting international climate, 
British domestic politics was also in a period of flux. In June 1970, Conservative 
victory in the general election led to Edward Heath replacing Harold Wilson as Prime 
Minister, and Lord Carrington taking over from Denis Healey as Secretary of State for 
Defence.8 After four-years of Conservative rule, Labour would return in February 1974, 
with Wilson again at the helm.9 Reflective of these significant changes in political 
leadership, British defence policy was also in transition from 1970.10 For British 
defence officials, the coming of détente and the emergence of disarmament talks in the 
area of biological weapons brought with it both new opportunities and new challenges. 
The Biological Weapons Convention in April 1972, which built on a British proposal 
first put forward in 1969, established precedent and practices which would eventually 
spread to, and dominate, British considerations of CW policy.11 Facilitated by détente, 
and building on achievements in the BW area, chemical weapons disarmament 
negotiations culminated in Britain producing, and submitting to the UN, a draft 
Chemical Weapons Convention in 1976. Before the ascendency of disarmament, 
though, this chapter will initially explore a politically extremely damaging encounter 
British politicians had with the CBW field in early 1970, when Wilson thought it 
necessary to publicly qualify Britain’s interpretation of the widely accepted 1925 
Geneva Protocol. It will then move on to analyse the rise of disarmament, and how this 
irrevocably fuelled and shaped British CW policy. A crucial zenith in this transition to 
disarmament can be seen in 1976, with the culmination of years of disagreements and 
debates over the acquisition and role of nerve agent weapons. This is the year when 
acquisition finally gave way to disarmament.  
 
The CS debacle 
In December 1969, adding to the previous waves of negative publicity which had swept 
across the CW field since 1967, a substantial and politically costly CBW issue arose for 
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Wilson’s Government.12 On this occasion, unlike with others, negative publicity and 
political fallout were entirely self-inflicted. The Government’s attempts at openness in 
the CW field drew widespread international criticism, when a debate over riot-control 
agents and the Geneva Protocol was shunted into the public spotlight.13 The debate, just 
six months before the June 1970 general election, centred on whether riot-control 
agents, such as CS, should be considered under the 1925 Geneva Protocol as illegal for 
use in war.14 It also coincided with United States use of CS in Vietnam, and followed 
shortly after controversial CS use in Northern Ireland in August 1969 and the resultant 
and ongoing Himsworth Committee, which had been established to investigate safety 
concerns surrounding the use of CS.15 In late 1969, the Geneva Protocol had thus again 
become a source of contention and controversy in British CBW policy, with Wilson’s 
Cabinet split over whether chemical riot-control agents could be considered under the 
Protocol as either ‘poisonous’ or as an ‘other gas’.16 
This ambiguity fuelled a stark divide in Wilson’s Cabinet, which reflected ongoing 
disagreements between FCO officials and defence officials.17 For defence officials, the 
central argument provided by Denis Healey and officials in the MoD was that CS was 
not a gas, but smoke, and thus not a part of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They also 
contended that ‘science has provided the Army and the Police with a humane and 
harmless alternative to older methods.’18 This argument reinforced the view that CS 
was an advanced and sophisticated scientific breakthrough, and that it was more 
humane than previous capabilities, that were available when the Geneva Protocol was 
formed.19 Healey, when presenting his case to Cabinet colleagues, also believed that the 
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Government’s decision over CS had far-reaching consequences for internal security.20 
He warned that if CS were included under the Geneva Protocol, then Britain would be 
using a chemical agent in peace-time that was barred from use in war. In contrast to 
nerve agent weapons, CS also had a slightly more acceptable role, as it was also used in 
dealing with localised riots and ‘dangerous criminals’.21 This encompassing of the 
internal security dimension, and points over the humane nature of CS, set it apart from 
other chemical weapons, and provided Healey with some strong arguments.  
On the opposing side to Healey and the MoD was, once again, the FCO, which strongly 
opposed the exemption of CS from the Geneva Protocol.22 While the FCO accepted that 
there would indeed be consequences from stating that CS was exempt from the Geneva 
Protocol, it believed that these would be overwhelmingly negative and international, 
rather than the domestic security concerns referred to by Healey.23 Officials in the FCO 
were troubled by the prospect that any public qualification of the widely accepted 
Geneva Protocol would ‘gravely prejudice our standing in the international 
disarmament negotiations’.24 It was feared that Healey’s recommendations would 
expose Britain to accusations that it was only changing policy to please the United 
States, which had not even requested that Britain do so.25 Supporting this strong FCO 
rebuttal was also the Attorney-General, Sir Elwyn Jones, who argued that 
incapacitating agents, including CS, were significantly harmful and deleterious to man, 
and, as such, they were included within the remit of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.26 Solly 
Zuckerman, never shy to make his opinion known, also wrote personally to Wilson on 
the subject, appealing for a more nuanced take on the CS debate which avoided 
publicity altogether.27 Zuckerman believed that the issue had nothing to do with the use 
of CS for protests and riot-control, and that any public qualification or exemption 
would only cast doubt on Britain’s good faith in ongoing biological weapons 
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disarmament negotiations and trigger ‘formidable political repercussions’.28 
Unfortunately for Wilson, he did not heed Zuckerman’s warnings, or the advice of the 
FCO and his the Attorney-General, and instead he put the decision before Cabinet on 
18 December 1969.29 
In the Cabinet meeting, members had before them an introductory text by Wilson, 
which put forward two options, both involving parliamentary statements.30 In his 
submission, the Prime Minister informed Cabinet that in light of domestic and 
international pressures, Britain had to qualify whether or not its military forces would 
be able to use riot control agents in war.31 In terms of the two options he provided, the 
first was to reaffirm the Geneva Protocol without qualification, which was supported by 
the FCO and the Attorney-General. The second, more controversial and drastic step 
supported by the MoD and Healey, was to reaffirm the Geneva Protocol but to explain 
that in the eyes of the British Government, CS was exempt from it.32 Oddly for post-
war debates over CW policy and the Geneva Protocol, this time it was defence officials 
who came out on top.33 The majority of the Cabinet supported releasing a public 
statement that Britain would take a more nuanced interpretation of the widely accepted 
Geneva Protocol, with the qualification that riot control agents, such as CS, were 
exempt from it.34 Arguments over military utility, specifically in relation to Northern 
Ireland, scientific sophistication, and the belief that incapacitating agents were suitably 
different to other forms of chemical and biological weapons, had persuaded the Cabinet 
to support Healey.35 To a degree adding salt to the already open wound, it was Michael 
Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who would 
have to make the announcement in Parliament.36 
On 2 February 1970, when responding to a parliamentary question on disarmament, 
Stewart informed the House that ‘we regard CS and other such gases…as being outside 
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the scope of the Geneva Protocol.’37 As anticipated by Zuckerman and the FCO, this 
decision to exempt CS from the Geneva Protocol triggered a tirade of criticism. 
Domestically, the announcement triggered dismay. As Stewart noted: 
The decision has led to a far greater volume of correspondence from 
members of the public, again virtually unanimous in disapproval, than 
any other single development in the disarmament negotiations in recent 
years.38 
Stewart further elaborated that many who opposed the Government’s qualification 
were, in fact, Labour supporters. With criticism of the Government’s position not only 
coming from ‘disreputable organisations’, but also from organisations such as the UN 
Association, the Quakers and the British Council of Churches.39 The strong domestic 
reaction was further seen through a barrage of parliamentary questions, personal letters, 
criticism in the press and conference resolutions.40 Labour MP Frank Hooley surmised 
the views of many when he stated that ‘it is now 50 years since the First World War, 
but men still shudder at the idea of gas warfare’.41  
On the international front, the policy clarification did not fare much better. At the UN 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Britain came under heavy criticism from India, 
Sweden and several other countries, and was accused of carrying out a ‘unilateral re-
interpretation’ of the internationally recognised Geneva Protocol.42 Nicholas Sims, then 
a consultant on disarmament, concluded that ‘the credibility of British policy in the 
field of chemical and biological warfare had been very severely damaged’.43 Yet 
despite this domestic and international reaction, and the appeals of Stewart, Wilson 
refused to alter course. As outlined by Spelling, the entire incident was handled with 
great awkwardness.44 Perhaps of greatest concern for defence officials, though, was that 
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this substantial blowback and negative publicity was not even over lethal nerve agents, 
but riot control agents.45  
In mid-February 1970, with the backlash against the Government’s decision to clarify 
its interpretation of the Geneva Protocol ongoing, British defence officials again turned 
to review nerve agent acquisition. However even with the two year period of abeyance 
ending, which had started in January 1968 and was imposed by Roy Mason, defence 
officials remained hesitant on reviving Ministerial discussions over a nerve agent 
capability. Reinforcing this judgement was the observation that throughout the two-year 
abeyance period publicity in the CW field had been rampant and unrepentant.46 In 
1970, this negative attention surrounding and enveloping CW policy had not ebbed, but 
increased with the Geneva Protocol clarification, leading the CoS to conclude that: 
In political terms, there have been numerous developments heightening 
UK and international interest in and concern about CW, and … [there can 
be] little doubt that Ministers would expect public and Parliamentary 
opinion to view the present as a remarkably strange and inopportune time 
for new UK re-armament measures in this field.47  
While accepting that for two-years British CW policy had been tumultuous, eventful, 
and come under significant domestic and international pressure, the CoS maintained 
that Britain still needed a nerve agent capability.48 This was despite the unfavourable 
political climate.49 The military requirement for nerve agent weapons and a CW 
deterrent thus remained unaltered, and the CoS again confirmed that ‘the military case 
for having a retaliatory capability still holds good’.50 This steadfast commitment to 
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acquiring a nerve agent capability had now been the aim of the CoS for almost eight 
years, since 1962; the tide of negative publicity could not in itself undo or change the 
perspectives of defence officials as to the military utility and deterrence value of nerve 
agent weapons.51 As in 1969, the CoS simply continued to allow CW policy to drift and 
remain under the Ministerial radar by unilaterally self-imposing an extension to the 
abeyance period.52 By avoiding Ministerial attention when the public and political 
situation was adverse, the CoS kept alive the future possibility of acquiring nerve agent 
weapons.  
 
The rise of disarmament  
Coinciding with the CoS maintaining the military necessity of a nerve agent capability 
and alongside the CS debacle, was the rise of disarmament talks addressing CBW, 
facilitated by superpower détente. Important decisions taken by Wilson’s Labour 
Government were to have a lasting impact on the CW field, with British discussions 
and considerations of chemical weapons disarmament having a long history, spanning 
decades before Britain signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.53 
Early Cold War attempts at chemical and biological weapons disarmament had 
stuttered, and it was only with the coming of détente that chemical weapons 
disarmament gained significant traction. These earlier, less successful attempts included 
UN discussions on the Geneva Protocol and chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament in 1952. Participants were however slightly distracted when contestants in 
that year's Miss Universe competition were granted access to view the debate.54 
Although the Soviet delegation made proposals for chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament, an international consensus and genuine superpower desire for chemical 
and biological weapons disarmament was lacking, until the mid-to-late 1960s.55  
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An indicator of Wilson’s commitment to chemical weapons disarmament was seen in 
1968, when the Government supported and promoted a report by a ‘UN Group of 
Consultant Experts on CBW’.56 The findings of the report were to be put before the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, and each nation was to have one 
representative expert. In January 1969, with the support of Wilson, Minister for 
Disarmament Fred Mulley, and Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, Solly Zuckerman was 
selected as Britain’s expert.57 As Mulley noted, Zuckerman had already been involved 
in the UN expert panel on nuclear weapons, where he had done a ‘magnificent job’.58 
Yet even with Zuckerman’s involvement, the UN CBW report was soon found to be 
more complex than expected, with the Soviet representative delaying and deferring 
decisions.59 As Zuckerman noted, the previous UN nuclear weapons panel had been 
‘child’s play’ in comparison to the one on chemical and biological weapons.60 In 
overcoming this Soviet obstructiveness, Zuckerman took an extremely active role in 
discussions and the formulation of a report.61 After much negotiating the broad 
substance of a report was accepted by all sides; British officials dubbed it 
‘comprehensive and not unduly bias[ed]’.62  
This final UN experts report on CBW was released in July 1969, and it urged member 
states to stop the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological 
weapons.63 With a foreword by U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, the report 
also outlined how chemical and biological weapons disarmament would slow down the 
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arms race and reduce Cold War tensions.64 Zuckerman was also keen to include in the 
document the quote ‘Armis bella non venenis geri’, roughly meaning war is waged with 
weapons, not poisons.65  
Reflective of the growing aversion towards chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
the strengthening of détente, disarmament proposals continued to gain significant 
international support. In Britain, this growing focus on chemical and biological 
weapons disarmament was even reflected in the Queen’s Speech of October 1969, 
which detailed that:  
My Government will strive for further progress on nuclear and 
nonnuclear arms control and disarmament. They will be particularly 
concerned with chemical and biological weapons, and will follow up with 
vigour the proposals they have put forward for a complete ban on 
biological methods of warfare.66 
Coinciding with this increasing focus on disarmament, was a crucial intervention by the 
US President, Richard Nixon. In November 1969, Nixon announced the ending of 
offensive biological weapons development in the United States and explicitly re-
instated the policy of the no-first-use of lethal chemical weapons, publicly bringing the 
United States in line with the 1925 Geneva Protocol.67  
In late 1969, Britain also pushed forward with strong proposals in the CBW field. And, 
it took a leading and controversial role in chemical and biological weapons 
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disarmament when it proposed separating the two fields, and tackling them in 
isolation.68 In this vein, British officials tabled a draft ‘Convention for the Prohibition 
of Biological Methods of Warfare’, which the UN General Assembly acknowledged in 
December 1969.69 This decision to separate a Biological Weapons Convention from a 
Chemical Weapons Convention was down to officials believing that in order to 
successfully and effectively secure the signing of any chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament treaty, the two fields had to be tackled individually.70 In addition to the 
complexities of effectively attempting to negotiate two treaties at the same time, there 
was also a military angle to this division.71 Chemical weapons were still widely 
developed and deployed by the superpowers and the CoS still wished to possess a nerve 
agent capability, whereas the CoS had no intention of acquiring biological weapons.72 
Tackling the BW treaty first thus also represented the preferable option in terms of any 
perceived military loss resulting from a disarmament treaty.  
This successful British attempt to split chemical and biological weapons disarmament, 
though, was a decision which caused a degree of political backlash, and it was one 
which would haunt future British considerations of chemical weapons disarmament. On 
the domestic front, despite proposing biological weapons disarmament negotiations in 
the UN, Mulley came under criticism from backbench Labour MPs, who believed that 
the Government was pursuing chemical and biological weapons disarmament too 
slowly.73 Shortly after the CS debacle had gone public in February 1970, Wilson was 
also succinctly informed that the decision to separate CW and BW had ‘won us few 
converts in public’.74 While dealing with the barrage of negative publicity resulting 
from the clarification of the Geneva Protocol, Wilson was thus also advised to 
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immediately begin consideration of chemical weapons disarmament, even if this was 
‘only on a defensive basis’, in order to fend off criticism for separating the two fields.75  
With Wilson’s approval, the FCO drafted a tentative list of options for chemical 
weapons disarmament which Britain could put forward at the Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva. These options included a total ban on chemical 
weapons, a non-proliferation treaty, and the establishment of a chemical weapons free-
zone in Europe. As cautioned by FCO officials, the chemical weapons free-zone would 
likely ‘provoke considerable parliamentary trouble’ for the Government.76 For if the 
zone were established, United States chemical weapons which were stored in West 
Germany would potentially need to be relocated to Britain. Such a move, coinciding 
with the spate of negative publicity over just incapacitating agents and the separation of 
chemical and biological weapons disarmament, would have re-vitalised public protests, 
grass-roots movements and Labour MPs in opposition to Government CW policy. A 
chemical weapons free-zone, no matter how appealing, would therefore have left the 
Labour Government in the unenviable position of being sandwiched between strong 
domestic opposition, and the pressures of maintaining close Anglo-American relations.  
Similarly to the CS debate, when it came to these chemical weapons disarmament 
discussions Healey and the MoD again took a hard-line towards, and a dim view of, 
these early FCO proposals.77 Healey in particular attempted to stifle and limit these 
disarmament considerations at an early stage, warning that the utmost care had to be 
taken with the United States, as while the United States did not possess any stockpiles 
of biological weapons, it did possess chemical weapons.78 A British proposal for 
chemical weapons disarmament could therefore run counter to the wishes of the United 
States, especially if the United States were reliant on its stockpiles for CW deterrence in 
Europe. Healey was particularly sceptical of the chemical weapons free-zone, 
especially as this involved the delicate and troublesome issue of verification.79 British 
intelligence also believed that Warsaw Pact countries possessed stockpiles of chemical 
weapons, meaning that any agreement had to ban not just Soviet chemical weapons 
from Europe, but also those of Eastern European countries as well. Healey thus 
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believed that dealing with just the Soviet Union would prove a ‘useless’ exercise.80 In 
the CW field there were numerous countries with smaller stockpiles involved, which 
included countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia.81  
In his resistance to the progression of chemical weapons disarmament discussions, 
Healey’s views coincided with those of United States officials from the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. United States officials expressed serious doubts over 
Britain’s proposed chemical weapons disarmament discussions, counselling that if 
Britain did proceed, then it might give the impression that it was having second 
thoughts over splitting chemical and biological weapons disarmament. They also 
warned that such a drive for chemical weapons disarmament would also undermine 
ongoing biological weapons disarmament negotiations, by slowing them down.82 
United States officials feared that countries in the Non-Aligned Movement would 
become bogged down and distracted by any newly proposed chemical weapons 
disarmament negotiations.83 With this external pressure from the United States and 
internal pressure from Healey and defence officials, exploratory chemical weapons 
disarmament discussions were temporarily shelved. The British decision to separately 
pursue biological weapons disarmament had therefore seemingly obligated the FCO to 
initially consider chemical weapons disarmament as well, but the separation ultimately 
led to a delay in chemical weapons disarmament negotiations, with concerns that they 
might undermine successful biological weapons disarmament.  
In late 1971, and in tandem with the desire to avoid any overlap with biological 
weapons disarmament, unwavering military support for a nerve agent capability 
continued the hiatus and malaise in CW policy. Throughout these biological weapons 
disarmament negotiations, the CoS still remained committed to the acquisition of nerve 
agent weapons, with a VX capability estimated to cost around £9 million.84 Four years 
after Mason had imposed a period of two-year abeyance, in 1968, the CoS still 
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continued to discuss the issue in secret. Seeking Ministerial approval would likely have 
thrown CW policy into doubt, as the political situation was still not conducive to nerve 
agent acquisition; self-imposed abeyance and isolation thus continued. This was to be 
the de facto state of affairs until the Biological Weapons Convention opened for 
signatories in April 1972, and with this momentous occasion a former obstacle to 
chemical weapons disarmament turned into a key founding and supporting pillar.85 
After April 1972, successes in biological weapons disarmament rapidly spurred on 
British considerations of chemical weapons disarmament. The ground-breaking 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was naturally focused on BW, with it binding 
signatories to ‘never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain…biological agents’, but it also contained an article on chemical 
weapons.86 In the BWC, of which Britain was a key driver, Article IX stated that: 
Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of 
effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to 
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early 
agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, 
production and stockpiling and for their destruction...87 
The BWC thus bound Britain to continue disarmament negotiations in the CW field. 
And, even though there was a substantial delay in the signing of the BWC in 1972 and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, the two are heavily interlinked. Officials in 
the FCO had already been pressing for chemical weapons disarmament after the 
separation of biological and chemical weapons disarmament talks, and with the success 
of the former, they moved with alacrity to the latter. The commitment of Article IX was 
taken particularly seriously by the FCO and by Members of Parliament, such as Lord 
Chalfont the former Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.88 
Chalfont called for the ‘urgent need to get rid of this dreadful weapon’, with chemical 
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weapons disarmament being in line with both ‘world opinion’ and with the BWC.89 He 
also further counselled parliamentary colleagues that ‘not even the soldiers want this 
weapon’.90 
By mid-1972, and despite the BWC and very much contrary to what Chalfont believed, 
the CoS still wanted a CW capability, as British defence officials still ‘saw no reason’ 
to change their request for acquiring lethal nerve agent weapons.91 Gradually though, 
from July 1972, signs started to emerge that this strict and rigid stance was beginning to 
thaw, with defence officials slowly recognising that in the age of détente and with 
adverse publicity towards chemical weapons, holding out for a nerve agent capability 
for deterrence was simply no longer feasible.92 This change in approach was also to a 
degree facilitated by a compromising FCO, which made it ‘absolutely clear’ that it ‘had 
no intention of ignoring our own defence requirements and [that] nothing would be 
proposed at Geneva without prior consultation with the MoD’.93 Adding to this FCO 
drive were two major, and from the perspective of the CoS alarming, superpower 
actions in the chemical weapons disarmament field.  
In July 1972, the CoS assessed the impact of these superpower disarmament actions, as 
well as domestic trends and hostile public opinion, and it analysed how these evolving 
pressures could shape or influence the possibility of acquiring a nerve agent capability. 
As the CoS noted, the first major superpower involvement came in the form of a Soviet 
proposal to the UN Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, which recommended a 
complete ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.94 
The second was a paper by the United States, which proposed a ‘freeze’ on existing 
stocks and a ban on the future production of chemical weapons.95 In both cases, the 
CoS warned that unless the proposals contained stringent methods for verification, 
Britain would be left at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc and the 
                                                 
89
 Hansard, House of Commons, ‘Chemical Weapons’, 7 June 1972, Vol.331, cc312-62. 
90
 Ibid.  
91
 TNA, DEFE 4/272, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 July 1972, Confidential 
Annex; DEFE 13/1000, ‘Chemical Warfare Policy’, B. G. Stanbridge, 27 July 1972, Annex A; DEFE 
13/1000, ‘Chemical Warfare Policy’, B. G. Stanbridge, 27 July 1972, Annex A, Appendix 3.  
92
 Ibid.  
93
 TNA, DEFE 4/272, DEFE 4/272, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 July 1972, 
Confidential Annex; TNA, DEFE 13/1000, ‘Chemical Warfare Policy’, CDS to Secretary of State, 27 
July 1972. 
94
 TNA, DEFE 4/272, DEFE 4/272, Minutes of Meeting, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 July 1972, 
Confidential Annex. 
95
 Ibid. 
210 
 
Soviet Union if it conformed to them.96 Without assurances that the Soviet Union had 
disposed of its CW stockpiles through stringent verification methods, then Britain 
would have effectively unilaterally given up the option of ever acquiring a CW 
capability. This was all the more important given that the JIC believed that the Soviet 
Union possessed the ‘largest offensive CW capability in the world’.97 Defence officials 
observed that if Britain were banned from production, then it would never be able to 
acquire a domestic nerve agent capability. In addition, any ‘freeze’ on existing stocks 
would have prohibited Britain from developing chemical weapons, leaving it at a fixed 
and substantial disadvantage until Soviet and Warsaw Pact CW stocks expired.98 The 
CoS thus recommended that Britain should not agree to any superpower initiative 
which left the country at a military disadvantage; in their current forms, both initiatives 
did. Defence officials and the CoS also advocated the hindering and obstruction of any 
superpower chemical weapons disarmament negotiations which did not remove the 
Soviet CW threat through stringent verification, or the need for a British CW deterrent.  
Coinciding with these superpower actions was also a growing and grudging acceptance 
by the CoS that public and political attitudes towards CW were likely to remain hostile, 
adverse and insurmountable. In terms of the negative publicity surrounding CW policy, 
the CoS accepted that: 
One cannot…ignore the highly emotional reaction which any reference to 
offensive CW provokes in some sections of public opinion in this country 
and elsewhere in the West. The CS gas issue, for example, illustrated 
how sensitive was the feeling in some quarters towards the use of even 
incapacitating agents in war.99  
While continuing to recognise, as they had throughout the 1960s, that the acquisition of 
nerve agents was politically an extremely troubling and emotional subject, in July 1972 
defence officials were forced to fully acknowledge and confront the immense political 
difficulties surrounding the acquisition of a nerve agent capability. The CoS recognised 
that even when it came to those chemical weapons which were portrayed as ‘humane’ 
and ‘non-lethal’, such as with CS gas, then there was still public uproar.100 Any public 
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announcement on the production or possession of highly lethal CW agents, such as VX, 
would therefore have likely triggered far more significant political difficulties and a far 
stronger public backlash.  
This issue over negative publicity was further compounded by how defence officials 
justified their request for nerve agents, which was still for CW deterrence and 
retaliation in Europe.101 In the eyes of the CoS, CW deterrence still relied upon other 
countries knowing that Britain possessed chemical weapons, and that it was willing to 
use them.102 This policy all but removed the possibility of keeping the production and 
possession of controversial nerve agent weapons a secret, which was still a red-line for 
politicians.103 The CoS, though, could not afford to separate deterrence from the nerve 
agent requirement, as this was their primary role and function. Defence officials were 
therefore stuck, as while the military requirement for nerve agent weapons remained, 
the hostile public environment and political aversion rendered their acquisition and 
publicity extremely unlikely. With publicity still viewed as a necessary part of 
deterrence and an integral part of policy, the CoS could not realistically seek 
Ministerial approval, and rather than risk negative reprisals, they again continued in 
silence and in limbo. Adverse publicity and political pressure thus continued to play a 
significant part in enforcing abeyance, through ensuring that the CoS remained hesitant 
to bring nerve agent requirements to the attention of Ministers for fear of a negative 
response.  
With the mounting and multifaceted shift against CW, and in favour of chemical 
weapons disarmament, the CoS did not explicitly drop its request for lethal nerve 
agents. But, it did acknowledge that in light of these seemingly insurmountable barriers 
they simply desired that ‘the option of providing an offensive CW capability for our 
forces…not be foreclosed’.104 This subtle shift represented a change from over a decade 
of policy, as from late 1962 the CoS had always sought the acquisition of lethal 
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chemical weapons, whereas in 1972, they just wanted the future option of acquiring 
them left open.  
Though the CoS had given some small ground on their desire for a nerve agent 
capability, with the coming of superpower détente and chemical weapons disarmament 
discussions this change in approach was not enough. Serious questions emerged over 
even keeping open the future possibility of acquiring nerve agent weapons. As Lord 
Carrington, Healey’s Conservative successor as Defence Secretary was warned, CoS 
resistance to Soviet and United States chemical weapons disarmament proposals was 
‘dogmatic’ and ‘negative’.105 Carrington was advised that it would be completely 
unrealistic for Britain to independently oppose superpower disarmament negotiations, 
regardless of the military requirements.106  
Before Carrington made a definitive decision on his own stance towards chemical 
weapons disarmament, and whether this involved strict verification measures as the 
CoS wished, or more flexibility as he was privately advised, he wanted to see the 
outcome of bilateral chemical weapons disarmament talks with the United States.107 On 
27-28 July 1972, British officials from the MoD and the FCO met United States 
officials from the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.108 One of 
the main reasons for this bilateral meeting was that United States officials were 
concerned by the rival ‘unacceptable’ Soviet chemical weapons disarmament proposal, 
and they wished to counter it with a united Western effort.109 The United States, for 
domestic political reasons, was also ‘committed to going it alone’ if necessary, even 
without British support.110 With this keen and proactive United States stance, 
Carrington decided to take a more flexible approach to disarmament negotiations, and 
while he accepted CoS concerns over the Soviet threat, he cautioned that:  
It would be unrealistic to completely rule out British acceptance of a CW 
agreement, which although not entirely suitable from our point of view, 
nevertheless commanded a wide measure of international support…If it is 
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not possible to modify the United States position on a convention 
freezing stocks, we should adopt a more flexible fall-back position.111 
From 1972-1974, with Carrington’s tentative support, or at least without his outright 
opposition, the drive for chemical weapons disarmament gained further traction. 
Without Healey obstructing disarmament negotiations, and with the formulation of the 
BWC no longer hampering efforts but fuelling them, British consideration of chemical 
weapons disarmament continued at pace. Disarmament officials in the FCO, responding 
to this change in environment, shifted much more of their attention towards CW policy, 
and they began asking serious questions over why CW deterrence and nerve agent 
weapons were needed. Critical FCO officials had decided that it was ‘time that the 
voice of the UK was heard’ in chemical weapons disarmament talks at Geneva, and that 
every effort should be made to ensure that Britain did not appear as ‘American 
stooges’.112 This increasing FCO attention and involvement in chemical weapons 
disarmament continued to grow throughout 1973, and it was FCO officials in the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department who took a tough line with the CoS request for a 
British retaliatory capability, and of CW deterrence through the threat of retaliation.113 
In December 1973, they argued that if British forces were defensively well-equipped 
against CW, then there would be little need for a British retaliatory capability.114 In this 
endeavour they used the military trials and war planning exercises conducted by 
defence officials in the 1960s, in support of their claims. FCO officials used these 
assessments to argue that a well-equipped force could heavily mitigate against the 
military benefits of CW use, meaning that if British forces were defensively well-
prepared then there would be no benefit to CW use by an enemy, thus deterring its 
initiation.115  
In theory, this defensive approach to CW deterrence could work, especially if used in 
tandem with disarmament measures, however in practice and in isolation such an 
approach would be laden with immense difficulties.116 Part of the problem of this form 
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of deterrence is that a key feature of nerve agent weapons is not only their military and 
psychological effects, which could indeed be mitigated against with advanced defensive 
measures and preparations, but also perceptions of their near-myth like status and 
effects.117 Any successful deterrent, from a purely defensive posture, would therefore 
have had the added difficulty of potentially altering, or at the very least undermining, 
an enemies’ perception of the military utility of their own chemical weapons and of 
combatting this myth-like image. This perception of nerve agent weapons and their 
utility had been long-ingrained in the minds of defence officials during the Cold War. 
Without such a measure, defence planners would have to hope that their rival 
counterparts had reached the same conclusions as them with regards to the 
effectiveness of defensive measures, and that they had not been drawn in by the hype. 
Appreciating that defensive measures would militarily counter Soviet use of chemical 
weapons was one thing, convincing an enemy that your defensive measures nullified 
their capabilities, and persuading them not to believe in the hype or in the perceived 
effectiveness of their own nerve agent weapons, was another.  
As British officials found, dispelling the superweapon nerve agent myth was no easy 
matter, for they had attempted such a feat with minimal success in 1968, through 
patient repetition of the scientific arguments. Domestically, while this attempt to 
counter the perception of the effectiveness of CW agents did have some success in 
calming public criticisms, achieving a similar outcome internationally and with a 
sceptical Soviet Union was an entirely different prospect. Unless Soviet officials had 
thus also dispelled the nerve agent myth or believed that advanced defensive measures 
would in fact completely mitigate all aspects of their nerve agent weapons, then 
deterrence through just advanced defensive measures would have likely failed. 
Although the success or viability of such an alternative approach to CW deterrence can 
be questioned, due to the military fixation with retaliatory deterrence, this potential 
avenue was not given meaningful consideration by defence officials.  
FCO officials also queried the very role and plausibility of CW deterrence, as 
envisaged by defence officials, observing that if Soviet forces invaded with 
overwhelming conventional forces and used chemical weapons, NATO’s response 
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would be to use nuclear weapons, making chemical weapons all but redundant.118 Even 
if Soviet forces used chemical weapons in a limited war, then FCO officials thought 
that as the Soviet Union would have chosen to initiate CW, then they would likely have 
already taken the necessary protective steps against NATO reprisals with chemical 
weapons.119 Any retaliatory CW use by British forces would therefore not have 
necessarily recovered the lost ground, offered any real tangible military benefit or even 
deterred subsequent Soviet CW attacks. Critical FCO officials also sagely warned that 
CW use and retaliation would create the most casualties and difficulties for civilians in 
NATO countries, not Soviet or NATO military forces.120 In their eyes, chemical 
weapons lacked a clear deterrent role and a clear military role, with its use only likely 
to cause widespread civilian casualties.121  
The divergence between defence officials and FCO officials was primarily based on 
their faith in disarmament negotiations and their interpretations of CW deterrence. 
While the CW threat existed, to prevent the outbreak of CW, the CoS favoured 
deterrence through the threat of retaliation. A Chemical Weapons Convention could 
mitigate against this requirement, by potentially removing the threat altogether, but it 
would need stringent verification methods.122 Without the removal of the threat, the 
CoS viewed CW deterrence as the only viable means of preventing the use of chemical 
weapons, which was thought best accomplished through the possession of a credible 
retaliatory capability in the form of nerve agent weapons. This retaliation-in-kind form 
of deterrence had long been an ingrained policy and belief in defence circles, dating 
back to the Second World War. For FCO officials, though, preventing the outbreak of 
CW could be accomplished through disarmament negotiations, and by deterrence 
through removing the military benefits of Soviet first-use with advanced defensive 
training and equipment. This form of CW deterrence was intended to discourage CW 
use, through removing the military utility factor and the military benefits of an 
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enemies’ nerve agent weapons, leaving them only the normative and political costs of 
use.  
Complicating the disarmament picture, and exacerbating this divide between FCO and 
defence officials, was the involvement of numerous other countries in international 
disarmament negotiations. On top of the tentative United States and Soviet proposals, 
in 1971 the Non-Aligned Movement had also presented a joint memorandum on 
chemical weapons disarmament to the UN. While the memorandum did not receive 
much attention, and as British officials observed it contained ‘no original thinking’, it 
did reflect broader feelings of international support for chemical weapons 
disarmament.123 This international support was given greater weight when Japan 
submitted a detailed draft Convention on chemical weapons disarmament at the Geneva 
Conference in April 1974.124 This Japanese draft, as outlined by Spiers, advocated a 
gradualist approach to disarmament, including the establishment of an international 
verification agency to observe the destruction of CW agents and, importantly, on-site 
inspections.125 Surprisingly these robust verification methods were very much in line 
with the wishes of the British CoS, as an independent verification agency and on-site 
inspections mitigated against fears that Britain would face chemical weapons without 
the possibility of acquisition or retaliation. With these thorough checks, the need for a 
CW deterrent would be reduced, as there would be greater assurances over a potential 
enemy not possessing stockpiles of chemical weapons.  
The Japanese draft, commended for its basic principles, reinvigorated international 
chemical weapons disarmament efforts. Despite the faltering of bilateral talks between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, growing international pressure pushed them to 
release a joint communiqué on the need for a fresh bilateral initiative on chemical 
weapons disarmament in July 1974.126 After Nixon resigned in August 1974, President 
Gerald Ford continued the bilateral drive for chemical weapons disarmament.127 Even 
after the entry of Ford, though, United States officials could not overcome Brezhnev’s 
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reservations over chemical weapons disarmament, and particularly his concerns over 
the issue of verification, with the Soviet Premier hesitant to commit to on-site 
inspections and thorough verification measures.128 But, in the wider international 
sphere, there continued to be more success. Coinciding with these tentative bilateral 
discussions and the Japanese draft were a plethora of interventions and statements by 
national representatives at the UN Disarmament talks in Geneva in favour of chemical 
weapons disarmament.129 Amongst those to raise the issue were representatives from 
France, Poland, and Canada.130 This growing attention afforded to chemical weapons 
disarmament, which spanned across all divides in the Cold War, culminated in the UN 
General Assembly approving Resolution 3256 in December 1974.131 The resolution 
noted that the process of détente was conducive to further disarmament measures in the 
CW field, and it urged states to successfully conclude negotiations on the complete 
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.132 
Alongside this growing international support and FCO drive for chemical weapons 
disarmament was a substantial change in gear in the British internal debate after the 
Labour Party, still under Harold Wilson, returned to office after winning the general 
election of October 1974.133 It was after the return of Wilson and Labour that the 
British push for chemical weapons disarmament was to gain substantial impetus.134 In 
opposition, Labour MPs, such as John Morris, had continued to pursue British progress 
in chemical weapons disarmament talks with parliamentary questions.135 
Complementing and reflecting this international shift towards chemical weapons 
disarmament, President Ford had also continued to build on bilateral chemical weapons 
disarmament talks and Nixon’s earlier work in the disarmament field. In January 1975, 
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in a major milestone, he ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, with its commitments to the 
no first-use of chemical and biological weapons.136 
 
The end of an era 
Throughout 1975-76, the growing international commitment to chemical weapons 
disarmament heavily impacted British discussions over CW policy, especially after 
Porton Down had again come under public criticism and ‘unfavourable attacks’, with 
British research there remaining a ‘politically sensitive’ area.137 With these 
international pressures and continued negative domestic publicity, FCO officials were 
also maintaining their strong push for a chemical weapons disarmament treaty. Under 
this unrelenting and increasing weight, the CoS yielded and drastically changed 
direction in 1976, going far beyond the minor concessions they had made in 1972. On 2 
March 1976, the CoS finally acquiesced, and defence officials relinquished their 
request for nerve agent weapons, stating that there was: 
No requirement for the United Kingdom to have a capability to produce 
offensive chemical weapons for deterrent and retaliatory purposes: 
neither [is] there a need to retain the potential for resurrecting such a 
capability.138  
This resounding dismissal of nerve agent acquisition represented the end of a policy 
almost fourteen years old. Since 1962, the CoS had supported the acquisition of nerve 
agent weapons for deterrence and retaliation, but with the advent and rise of CBW 
disarmament talks, negative publicity and political aversion, they were forced to change 
course. In certain areas, the CoS even went much further than simply removing their 
request for nerve agent weapons, with 1976 representing a major contraction in British 
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CW policy as a whole. In addition to scrapping the nerve agent requirement, the CoS 
also supported substantial cuts to British CW research, with the closure of the 
Nancekuke facility, the reduction of all staff involved in CBW research by around 700, 
and the curtailing of research and development work at Porton Down.139 These 
substantial concessions and reductions led to an irreversible decline in Cold War British 
CW policy, and the green light for more detailed consideration of chemical weapons 
disarmament was given.140  
To mitigate against these substantial cutbacks to CW research, as with much of the 
post-war period, Britain again turned to the United States. With Britain’s lack of CW 
preparedness and due to its ever-dwindling CW effort, the CoS explicitly accepted full 
reliance on the United States for CW deterrence, retaliation, research and 
development.141 On this occasion, the decision to forego offensive weapons and to 
become completely dependent on the United States was in fact communicated to senior 
United States officials; and after initially expressing doubts, United States officials 
proved receptive to the British decision.142 This level of reliance also stretched beyond 
research, weapons and deterrence, with the CoS even considering the purchase of 
defensive equipment from the United States.143 For much of the Cold War, this reliance 
for deterrence and a retaliatory capability had been more of an implicit policy for the 
CoS, yet in March 1976 this reliance and dependence was expanded, fully embraced, 
and explicitly acknowledged.  
Reliance and dependence however came at a price, with United States officials 
stipulating that Britain should not make its drastic cuts to CW public, as the United 
States CW programme was seeking extra Congressional funding.144 If Britain had 
publicly proclaimed its reductions in CW research, it would have undermined these 
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attempts by CW advocates in the United States, as serious questions would have been 
raised in Congress as to why the United States needed greater funding for chemical 
weapons when close allies were drastically curtailing their activities in the field. The 
condition of British dependence on the United States was therefore secrecy in the short-
term, meaning that eager FCO disarmament officials were unable fully to benefit from 
the significant concessions made by the CoS in early 1976. Such publicity, of 
substantial and unilateral British reductions in CW policy and the renunciation of 
offensive weapons research and development, would have undoubtedly aided in 
garnering support for a British chemical weapons disarmament proposal. This 
potentially rich vein of moral and political arguments, which could have significantly 
aided disarmament talks and British disarmament proposals, thus initially went 
untapped for the sake of Anglo-American relations.  
In line with the minimal publicity condition placed upon Britain by the United States, 
the British decision to greatly reduce CW expenditure initially attracted relatively scant 
attention.145 Tucked away in the March 1976 parliamentary defence estimates, it was 
revealed that ‘significant economies’ would be made in British CBW policy along with 
the closure of the Nancekuke facility.146 British Government officials downplayed this 
major moment in post-war policy. There was little fanfare or attention afforded to the 
decision to renounce offensive weapons research, development and possession. 
Predictably there was some backlash from the hundreds of scientists now unemployed 
from the policy shift, as they expressed frustration and warned that such a reduction 
was ‘unwise’ given the scale of the Soviet threat.147 This was quietened, however, with 
Government assurances that while the threat of the Soviet Union was fully appreciated, 
the country still needed to make economic cutbacks. Government officials also stated 
that Britain would not be adversely affected by these reductions due to its close 
cooperation with the United States.148 Any disquiet was thus swiftly stifled, with British 
CBW researchers struggling to find politicians sympathetic to their plight and 
Government officials keen to abide by United States requests. Conversely some MPs, 
such as Michael Hamilton, even used the cutbacks to draw further attention to the need 
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for chemical weapons disarmament, with Hamilton cautioning colleagues that the 
‘equally Ugly Sister’ of BW, that of CW, still needed a disarmament treaty.149 
While the United States encouraged conditions of secrecy, which limited disclosures on 
this significant policy shift and hampered the ability of FCO officials to fully capitalise 
on the situation, British defence officials also had one final say over the direction of 
chemical weapons disarmament in mid-1976. The CoS and defence officials had a 
condition of their own for FCO disarmament negotiators: if Britain were to forego the 
option of acquiring a future CW capability, then any disarmament treaty had to contain 
strict verification measures.150 British defence officials were understandably keen to 
minimise any enemy’s CW capabilities and the chance that British forces would be 
exposed to lethal chemical weapons.151 This condition was only made possible, and 
deemed necessary by the CoS, after it had ruled out any British aspirations of attaining 
a nerve agent capability.  
From the diplomatic standpoint, stringent verification measures would make a treaty 
slightly harder to negotiate considering Soviet objections to on-site inspections. 
Nevertheless, similarly to the BWC, Britain now had a chance to show its genuine 
commitment to thorough and verified disarmament by pursuing a tough line. From the 
perspective of defence officials, however, these rigorous checks in any draft 
Convention were intended to ensure that even if Britain did not possess chemical 
weapons, then it would be less unlikely to face a Soviet Union which did. With the 
removal of the Soviet CW threat, there would have been no need for a CW deterrent. 
On 3 August 1976, defence officials thus concluded that: 
As a state with no offensive or retaliatory CW capability of our own and 
with no intention of acquiring such a capability, a genuine CW 
disarmament measure would be to our advantage.152 
By taking one piece out of the game, the CoS recognised that they could level the 
playing field through a disarmament treaty. With no intention of acquiring nerve agent 
weapons, and with the Soviet Union long thought to have a significant advantage over 
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Britain in chemical weapons, the CoS swung fully behind chemical weapons 
disarmament.153 Defence officials also appreciated that a British attempt would have 
the added benefits of countering criticism from Non-Aligned Countries, as it would 
show Britain to be proactive in chemical weapons disarmament, and it would form a 
part of the broader Western effort to make the world ‘more secure’.154 The CoS 
acquiescing to further chemical weapons disarmament talks, but insisting on stringent 
verification measures in any Convention, also coincided with the mood in much of the 
wider international community which had in sight the same goals, including the 
complete, thorough, and verifiable dismantling and destruction of CW stockpiles and 
the banning of development and production. 
The only drawback from tough verification measures in an international disarmament 
treaty, from the military perspective, was that they would also ‘result in the loss of the 
United States CW stockpile, which at present provides the only credible CW deterrent 
available for use in the NATO area’.155 This created the slightly strange situation of 
Britain actively seeking reliance on the United States and its CW deterrent, while 
supporting disarmament talks which were attempting to scrap that very same 
deterrent.156 Yet even this fear of losing the CW deterrent of the United States was not 
enough to override the rise of chemical weapons disarmament in British policy, with 
the CoS simply re-iterating that strict verification measures were of the ‘greatest 
importance’ in any disarmament treaty.157 In 1976, defence officials ultimately thought 
it near-impossible to reverse or resist the growing surge of support for chemical 
weapons disarmament, and they could only hope to guide its course and achieve the 
best possible outcome through stringent verification measures. The finale of this 
ongoing negotiation between the FCO and defence officials over strict verification 
would be seen on 6 August 1976, when Britain tabled a draft Chemical Weapons 
Convention at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva.158 This draft Chemical 
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Weapons Convention, after years of effort and debate, had the full backing of the CoS, 
and it contained strict verification measures.159  
In the draft Convention, Britain recommended the prohibition of the ‘development, 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons’.160 The draft also included stringent 
measures for verification, with it calling for ‘strict and effective international control’, 
on-site verification and the listing of all CW stockpiles.161 This aspect of the draft 
Convention entailed state assent to onsite inspections and the verification of the 
destruction of stockpiles.162 These strict verification methods were stronger than in the 
Japanese draft, and entailed potentially intrusive inspections from external officials. As 
such, the British effort deviated greatly from the earlier Soviet draft, which had 
opposed on-site inspections by external officials, and from the original United States 
line of freezing stocks and halting production. Although described by Mark Allen, the 
British Ambassador to the UN Disarmament Conference, as a ‘synthesises’ of previous 
drafts put forward by the Soviet Union, Non-Aligned Countries, Japan and Canada, the 
draft Convention represented and signalled a major shift in British attitudes towards 
CW policy and nerve agent weapons.163 Even though in parts the draft Convention read 
like a ‘rough draft’ that was rushed out in inexplicable haste, perhaps by FCO officials 
keen to make the most of the CoS drastically changing course, it represented a critical 
turning point.164 After years of internal debates and discussions, during 1976 defence 
officials had fully transitioned to supporting chemical weapons disarmament and had 
abandoned any aspirations of nerve agent acquisition. 
Despite the draft Chemical Weapons Convention representing a considerable shift in 
British CW policy, with disarmament overriding deterrence, internationally Britain’s 
draft Convention was overtaken by other developments in the disarmament field. 
Although the British draft Convention was well-received and debated, with it remaining 
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‘on the table’, it was overshadowed by reinvigorated bilateral talks on chemical 
weapons disarmament by the two superpowers.165 These bilateral disarmament 
discussions had been revitalised after the United States had indicated that it was willing 
to pursue a ‘two-track’ approach, whereby alongside UN negotiations the United States 
would negotiate bilaterally with the Soviet Union.166 Reflective of wider trends in 
détente and with evolving international and domestic attitudes towards chemical 
weapons disarmament, United States officials had changed tack from their earlier line, 
and in 1976 they were far keener on verification and inspections from international 
representatives. This placed the United States much more in-line with the thinking of 
British, Japanese, and other non-Eastern bloc countries in relation to strong verification 
measures. It was in view of these ongoing and seemingly promising bilateral 
negotiations that Britain held off pressing its own draft Chemical Weapons Convention 
at Geneva, as it wished to avoid impeding or detracting from bilateral superpower 
talks.167 
After abiding by United States requests to delay the publicity aspect of the March 1976 
CoS decision and with ongoing superpower bilateral talks, Britain’s dramatic shift in 
CW policy was publicly confirmed in October 1976, months after it had submitted the 
draft Chemical Weapons Convention.168 Parliament was thus finally and explicitly 
informed that Britain would only focus on defensive research, that Nancekuke would be 
closed and that this contraction would be mitigated by the capabilities of the United 
States.169 This was even after some last-gasp protestations from supporters of a CW 
capability and those fearful of the Soviet threat, with a potential ‘chemical warfare 
onslaught by the Warsaw Pact’ reported and with some Conservative MPs criticising 
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the decision to significantly reduce CW expenditure and research.170 This criticism, 
however, only originated from a select few MPs, such as Peter Blaker, with the vast 
majority of MPs raising no complaints. This last gasp paled in comparison to the prior 
campaigns against Government CW activities during 1959-60 and 1967-70, with 
outspoken supporters of such a controversial area of research few and far between in 
1976. The minor backlash against the massive reductions in British CW policy failed to 
prevent or reverse the direction of British CW policy, which had fully orientated behind 
chemical weapons disarmament.  
The legacy of this 1976 CoS compromise over disarmament, with the abandoning of 
the request for a nerve agent capability and demands for strict verification measures, 
would stretch far beyond the 1970s and throughout the remaining Cold War. This 
compromise between the FCO and defence officials represented a lasting and 
irrevocable shift in British attitudes towards CW policy. Even though bilateral 
superpower talks did eventually break down over the controversial issue of verification, 
the British draft Chemical Weapons Convention highlights a dramatic turning point in 
Britain’s military outlook in the CW field.171 This substantial military shift, in the face 
of the rising tide of disarmament, would remain a constant, with British officials, 
committed to chemical weapons disarmament and strict verification, continuing to work 
towards a Chemical Weapons Convention long after 1976.172  
The foundation established and represented by the 1976 draft Chemical Weapons 
Convention would be built upon and updated with repeated FCO attempts for chemical 
weapons disarmament in the late 1970s and 1980s.173 In 1984 Britain tabled a further 
three chemical weapons disarmament papers, and in 1986 Britain again attempted to 
push for disarmament negotiations.174 This ongoing British disarmament push 
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culminated with the CWC, which contained strong verification measures, opening for 
signatories in 1993.175 Across all chemical weapons disarmament attempts, up to and 
including the signing of the CWC in 1993, British officials had remained committed to 
strict verification measures. The origins of this stance can be traced to 1976, when the 
FCO and the CoS compromised over disarmament talks, when Britain’s explicit 
commitment to strict verification measures clearly emerged, and when defence officials 
finally dropped their request for nerve agent weapons. 
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Conclusion: From Discovery to Disarmament 
 
From acquiring German nerve agents to fully supporting and pursuing chemical 
weapons disarmament, British CW policy was tumultuous and controversial 
throughout. In the immediate post-war period, the nerve agent discovery sent 
shockwaves through British defence policy, as the Services jostled for control of new 
nerve agent weapons, and the search began for a new nerve agent deterrent. With the 
War Office emerging as their chief proponent, a more clearly defined role for chemical 
weapons developed: that of a CW deterrent and a tactical weapon that was 
complementary to atomic weapons. In 1950, reflecting this growing military support, 
and spurred on by the views of Prime Minister Clement Attlee and the Korean War, the 
Labour Government approved the domestic production of sarin. Yet while approval for 
nerve agent acquisition was granted, policy implementation coincided with the 1952 
Global Strategy Paper, which was to prove a crucial turning point for CW policy in the 
Cold War. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper revealed arguments and divides between 
military utility and normative factors, with defence officials attempting, and failing, to 
change British first-use policy. This setback, in a period of economic constraints, 
represented a bitter blow to defence officials who were advocates of a British nerve 
agent capability.  
The resulting backlash over first-use and the 1952 Global Strategy did not however 
permanently solve the matter, for in 1955 defence officials again attempted to push for 
a change in first-use policy. On this occasion, as with the last, it was again the Foreign 
Office which shut down the ambitions of defence officials. The ramifications of this 
second rebuttal would prove hugely significant, when, despite the military need for a 
CW deterrent and even after the best efforts of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, without a 
clear role and with no guarantee of use, CW policy was significantly curtailed and 
reduced. In 1957, Britain disposed of existing CW stockpiles, plans for domestic mass-
production were cancelled, and offensive weapons development was halted. The 
ensuing drift and decline lasted until the early 1960s, when, alongside rising fears of 
CW proliferation in the Third World, a substantial and holistic reappraisal of nerve 
agent weapons was conducted. This crucial review coincided with the arrival of Solly 
Zuckerman, who played a significant part in pushing for a considerable reverse-course 
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in the CW field. In 1962, the CoS again swung fully behind a British CW deterrent and 
a nerve agent capability, a policy stance which was to last until 1976. In 1963, though, 
and acting on the advice of the CoS, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan approved 
British nerve agent acquisition.  
Substantial changes in British politics were to impact the acquisition of nerve agent 
weapons, with the arrival in office of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in October 
1964. Wilson was far more sensitive to public opinion and to the actions of his 
backbench MPs, and as such, CW policy went through a period of drift and 
marginalisation in the mid-1960s, with defence officials seeking to acquire a nerve 
agent capability, but with Labour politicians deferring and shutting down any request. 
The crux of this politico-military divide and policy malaise centred on interpretations of 
successful and effective deterrence, with military officials demanding publicity, but 
with politicians seeking to avoid publicity at all costs. This debate and ongoing divide 
over interpretations of deterrence resulted in a period of abeyance on the nerve agent 
question from 1968, which was intended to last two years, but which ended up lasting 
eight. Coinciding with this early abeyance in 1968 was a rise in publicity, growing 
public interest in CBW, political opposition to British CBW research and the convening 
of international disarmament talks. From the political perspective, these developments 
compounded the impossible nature of publicising a British CW deterrent, yet the CoS 
and defence officials remained wedded to publicity for deterrence. Only in 1976 did the 
CoS finally give substantial ground, for that is the year in which defence officials 
abandoned their nerve agent request, when they agreed to significant reductions in CW 
policy, and when they acquiesced to the submission of a British draft Chemical 
Weapons Convention. The marker of 1976 therefore represents a key milestone in 
British CW policy, when British consideration of nerve agent acquisition and 
deterrence clearly gave way to the pre-eminence of disarmament talks.  
While covering a long time period, this thesis has at its core focused upon the higher 
levels of nerve agent policy formulation, and it has predominantly taken a top-down 
approach focusing on the history, actions and motives of senior Government officials 
and defence officials when it came to the nerve agent question and British defence 
policy. This has facilitated an analysis of the driving factors of nerve agent policy and 
British considerations of the nerve agent weapons for both deterrence and use. It is also 
important to recognise that this thesis in itself is not a complete history of the British 
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CW experience, but an essential and complementary contribution to a much larger 
field. In the future, further avenues could be explored which would provide additional 
and valuable insights for both the CW field, and for the study of British history. In a 
purely chronological sense, increasingly available archival sources will soon allow for a 
thorough understanding of the evolution of chemical weapons disarmament talks in the 
1980s, and of British involvement in the formation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. These sources would also allow for a detailed analysis of British CW 
policy at the end of the Cold War.1 Public opinion regarding CW policy, which 
although addressed in the thesis and by other excellent accounts, could also be 
broadened out yet further, especially through the prism of emotion in history. 
Additional areas that could also build upon this thesis include the engagement and 
activities in NATO and the Warsaw Pact regarding CW, and more directly the role of 
international organisations such as the UN and Third World actors through the Non-
Aligned Movement. While these other avenues would provide further insights, this 
thesis has provided many of its own.  
Firstly, the thesis has revealed the remarkable seriousness with which nerve agent 
weapons were taken by British defence officials and by politicians. These were not 
weapons left on the periphery, nor an unconventional extra. The role and value of nerve 
agent weapons was repeatedly discussed at the highest echelons of the defence 
establishment, as well as in senior and influential committees such as the CoS, the 
DRPC and the all-important Cabinet Defence Committee. This level of attention was 
reflective of the active military interest in nerve agent weapons, with defence officials 
keen on CW deterrence and arguing for the acquisition of nerve agent weapons which 
could be used against Soviet forces. For defence officials, the perceived necessity of 
chemical weapons, whether through their tactical employment or deterrence value, 
overrode legal and moral considerations of this abhorrent form of warfare; costs which 
were thought a worthwhile price to pay in order to gain access to nerve agent weapons. 
It is important to note that CoS requests and support for the acquisition of nerve agent 
weapons after 1945 lasted for a total of almost 25 years. Nerve agent weapons were 
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discussed, debated and their acquisition approved on multiple occasions at the very 
highest levels of British defence policy.  
Nerve agent policy was also not just an important matter for defence officials. 
Throughout the Cold War senior politicians seriously considered and waded into these 
controversial waters, with political engagement regularly spanning party lines and 
drawing the attention of Prime Ministers. In the immediate post-war period, it was 
Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee who supported CW deterrence through an 
effective retaliatory capability, and it was under his watch that Britain took the bold 
steps of acquiring German nerve agent weapons in 1945-46 and of approving the 
domestic mass-production of sarin in 1950. The complete reverse of this was later seen 
with another Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. In 1968 Wilson oversaw CW 
policy going into abeyance, and in 1976 he was again at the helm when defence policy 
dramatically shifted in favour of full chemical weapons disarmament.  
Similarly in the Conservative Party, from 1952 Conservative Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill did little to aid nerve agent acquisition. Although in 1954 he approved nerve 
agent production, his conditions that items of defence be proved essential to defence 
hampered CW policy, as it pushed defence officials to repeatedly seek a change in first-
use policy, which Churchill then did not support. Churchill’s involvement in British 
nerve agent policy should thus not be pre-judged, as while he was interested in the field 
and the possibilities it represented, he was by no means the active or vocal supporter of 
chemical weapons that can sometimes be found in previous parts of his career. Of all 
the Conservative Prime Ministers, it was surprisingly Anthony Eden who was the most 
outspoken and confrontational in his support for a nerve agent capability, and in doing 
so he even went against his own Cabinet and Defence Secretary. By contrast, even 
though Harold Macmillan approved nerve agent acquisition in 1963, he was not an 
ardent believer or advocate of CW deterrence in the same manner as Eden.2  
Often the nerve agent issue was dubbed important enough for Prime Ministers to 
attempt to take personal control of policy, and at times they even sought to consult 
directly with Presidents of the United States. Churchill and Eden were particularly keen 
on using the Anglo-American relationship to secure either United States’ supplied 
nerve agents, or assurances of United States retaliation and deterrence on behalf of 
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Britain. Even in 1963, when Macmillan approved the expansion of CW policy and the 
acquisition of nerve agents, he did so in part to maintain close Anglo-American ties and 
to secure British access to advanced United States CW research. This seeking of 
support from the United States, and of Prime Ministers willing to take up the nerve 
agent question at the highest levels of Anglo-American relations, is further reflective of 
the seriousness with which the nerve agent question was taken by Prime Ministers and 
defence officials alike.  
Though Prime Ministers and defence officials followed a variety of paths and 
approaches when it came to the nerve agent question, what they all had in common was 
an attempt to adhere to some degree of secrecy. The second finding of the thesis shows 
that secrecy, publicity and parliamentary opinion were severe constraints on CW 
policy, and that at times they led to surprising revelations and to extraordinarily 
confusing and contradictory policies. This publicity aspect also reveals a broader 
theme, that of critical public and parliamentary reaction to almost any form of 
Government policy or statement on CW, as well as tactical and calculating Government 
responses to limit any adverse publicity. Adverse publicity also increased over time 
throughout this Cold War period and mirrored increasing public and parliamentary 
awareness of the nerve agents and what they represented. During the immediate post-
war period, political statements were mostly moderate or supportive of the success of 
CW deterrence, yet as information perforated into the public domain from the mid-
1950s, there was a clear shift in public attitudes and awareness. A core part of this 
thesis has therefore been the Government’s handling of, and adaptation to, this 
increasing public awareness and comprehension of the nerve agent discovery.  
While keen on secrecy, steering or limiting the public debate often came at a price, 
which seemed to increase alongside public awareness and the level of scrutiny. In 1960 
for example, mounting public interest pushed the Government into revealing surprising 
weaknesses in Britain’s defensive posture, such as the country possessing no CW 
capabilities, in order to try and stifle and limit the level of public attention. Likewise, in 
the late 1960s, public and political pressures again pushed Government officials into 
selectively revealing that Britain possessed no stockpiles of chemical weapons. In both 
cases, limited disclosures, in an attempt to quieten adverse publicity, seemingly 
trumped strict secrecy. The flip-side of this was that this strict adherence to some form 
of secrecy, as well as military pressure, also prevented Government officials from fully 
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capitalising on Britain’s decision not to produce or acquire chemical weapons at an 
earlier date. Even though they had made these concessions, British officials did not 
fully mine a potentially hugely beneficial moral and political vein or proclaim what was 
in effect unilateral disarmament. A key reason for this was the pressure of defence 
officials keen to maintain some semblance of security in the Cold War, which 
coincided with a legacy of secrecy that had been ingrained over time as the norm, with 
continued desire for nerve agent weapons. Publicity thus repeatedly pushed British CW 
policy down a strange middle path. Limited disclosures revealed British weakness, but 
adherence to some form of secrecy prevented access to the substantial political benefits 
which could have been accrued from unilateral disarmament. 
A core reason for maintaining some form of secrecy, in addition to secrecy ingrained 
over time and security concerns, was that Britain was often tied in and obligated to 
follow strict secrecy measures for the sake of maintaining close Anglo-American 
relations. This constraining factor of alliance networks and publicity was clearly 
emphasised in 1976, when even after military approval for disarmament talks, détente 
and with serious cutbacks to CW policy, Britain was initially not able to fully promote 
its abandonment of offensive weapons. British publicity, for the purposes of 
capitalising on its lack of chemical weapons, would have drawn significant 
dissatisfaction from United States colleagues, who themselves had a substantial CW 
programme and who were often seeking greater funding for it. As Britain was reliant on 
the retaliatory and deterrent CW capability of the United States, while the need for 
United States assurances remained, promulgating its opposition to such weapons would 
have proved untenable. Publicity thus represented a constraint and a complex web, with 
international alliances as well as internal security pressures preventing Britain from 
fully utilising the political and moral benefits of its lack of chemical weapons, but with 
public awareness and parliamentary pressures demanding disclosures. 
Conversely, during critical stages in CW policy, British officials themselves were not 
averse to withholding crucial information from the United States. In 1956-57 and in 
1963, the United States was not initially informed of substantial shifts in British CW 
policy. In 1957, this was fuelled by concerned British officials who feared the 
ramifications of senior United States officials becoming aware of British reliance, and 
in 1963 it was a result of fears of negative publicity and the leaking of secret 
information. These extraordinary measures, of withholding information on substantial 
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policy changes from an extremely close ally, were largely taken on the grounds of 
secrecy. This withholding of information and adherence to secrecy was contradictory, 
as much of British CW research and policy was predicated and dependent upon a close 
and open working relationship with the United States. The United States and Britain 
also took vastly different approaches to CW publicity, which did not aid cohesion. With 
United States officials in the Chemical Warfare Service viewing publicity more as a 
tool to secure greater funding, and with British officials keen to avoid almost any form 
of it, there was a clear degree of friction between the two approaches throughout this 
Cold War period.  
Differing approaches to publicity also represented a particularly troublesome and 
divisive issue for British defence officials and politicians, which came to dominate 
considerations of CW deterrence. This divide came to the fore in the mid-1960s, and 
was a result of defence officials deeming a CW deterrent and a nerve agent requirement 
as vital, and insisting that for deterrence to work Britain needed to publicise its CW 
capabilities and intent. From a political perspective, any public disclosure over CW 
research, preparedness or intent, even for deterrence, was anathema. It was not so much 
1976 which represented the crucial turning point for many politicians as to a nerve 
agent capability and deterrent, but 1967-70. During this period, Government officials 
faced mounting pressure from grass-roots movements, the media, backbench MPs and 
increasing disarmament talks, and as a result, political aversion to nerve agent publicity 
and acquisition solidified. The political acceptability or viability of nerve agent 
publicity was thus shattered in this period, and from 1970 this thesis is not so much a 
political account, but one of defence officials attempting to deal with the aftermath, 
aversion and drift resulting from politicians abandoning the nerve agent question in the 
late 1960s.  
Even though secrecy and publicity did lead to clashes and contradictory policies, 
especially in terms of deterrence, it does point towards the third significant finding of 
this thesis: despite there being no unanimous interpretation as to what CW deterrence 
entailed or how it could be accomplished, it was an active, conflicting and important 
part of British defence policy in the Cold War.  
For defence officials, successful CW deterrence entailed the threat of, and ability to 
respond with, a like-for-like retaliatory capability. This was very much in line with 
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other areas, such as nuclear deterrence, which often followed a similar mould. A core 
part of the origins of this approach to CW deterrence stemmed from CW experiences in 
the Second World War. For defence officials and politicians alike, it was the example 
of wartime CW deterrence which was seen as a success and a template for CW 
deterrence in the Cold War, with preparedness and the threat of retaliation thought 
central to deterring German first-use. Wartime deterrence of German first-use of 
chemical weapons was also seen as a reassuring experience, showing that even at the 
height of a world war deterrence could prevent the outbreak of a repugnant form of 
warfare. This past success of CW deterrence thus provided defence officials with a 
persuasive, re-enforcing and acceptable interpretation of what effective deterrence with 
WMDs entailed in the Cold War.  
In many ways though, CW policy was also severely confined and straight-jacketed by 
this legacy of the Second World War and by ingrained conceptions of CW deterrence. 
Military officials were uncompromising over the idea of deterrence as only achievable 
through possession of a capability for retaliation-in-kind. This pervasive and lasting 
belief in the success of wartime CW deterrence, present throughout the Cold War, 
played a significant part in defence officials remaining so committed to their 
interpretation of CW deterrence. For Eden, the perceived prior success of CW 
deterrence during the Second World War left such a mark, and was felt so persuasive 
an approach, that he willingly and unilaterally attempted to halt drastic changes to 
British CW policy. For defence officials, it meant that they were always committed to 
deterrence through the acquisition of a retaliatory capability and to publicity, just like in 
the Second World War. This wartime legacy and commitment to retaliatory deterrence 
thus led to a substantial degree of rigidity in policy, and it played a significant part in 
why it took until 1976 for defence officials to relinquish their demands for a nerve 
agent capability. In 1976 defence officials believed that they had a vaguely credible 
alternative to retaliation-in-kind deterrence, as based on their experiences and outlook 
the only real alternative was verifiable and thorough disarmament, rather than other 
forms of deterrence proposed by FCO officials and by Denis Healey. 
This focus on retaliation-in-kind deterrence thus led to the overlooking of alternative 
forms of deterrence, which could have removed CoS demands for a nerve agent 
capability at an earlier date. These other interpretations of CW deterrence vary greatly 
from nuclear deterrence, and at times the meaning and understanding of CW deterrence 
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were far more nuanced and varied than other aspects of defence policy. For example, 
few defence experts would advise either allowing an enemy to use a capability first, 
then deterring it after as Healey had suggested, or deterring the use of a weapon of mass 
destruction through purely defensive measures/equipment, which was seriously 
considered and advocated by FCO officials. Successful CW deterrence through purely 
defensive measures and equipment is a particularly interesting prospect, which was 
perhaps not given enough credence at the time due to the dominance of retaliatory 
deterrence.  
The entrenched interpretation of the role and value of CW deterrence and of nerve 
agent weapons also conversely provided the CW field with a distinct advantage over 
the closely related field of BW. While the two fields were to a degree overlapping, they 
followed very different paths in the Cold War, especially in terms of their perceived 
roles. Unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons were consistently seen as 
genuinely complementary to nuclear weapons, with tactical chemical weapons viewed 
as a useful ancillary option. With biological weapons, though, officials believed there to 
be some overlap with nuclear weapons, with biological weapons also seen as a strategic 
weapon to inflict causalities on a massive scale. This was not unique to the BW field, as 
even when CW policy was perceived to overlap with the strategic dominance of nuclear 
weapons, it was also curtailed. Advocates of the strategic potentials of CW, particularly 
in the Air Ministry, were unable to secure serious considerations of a strategic CW 
capability. A core difference in the varying and alternative experiences of CW and BW 
policy is that CW advocates could fall back on the tactical and complementary role of 
nerve agents and on the need for a nerve agent deterrent, while BW advocates struggled 
to separate and isolate the role of biological weapons from nuclear weapons. 
The fourth finding of this thesis relates to often turbulent but extremely close Anglo-
American cooperation. The dominance and scale of the United States CW programme 
in part facilitated a decline in British CW policy, by providing the option of complete 
dependence and continued access to advanced research. In stark contrast to the almost 
complete dependence seen in 1976, in the immediate post-war period British CW 
policy was in a comparatively strong position, with an independent CW capability, a 
large stockpile of captured nerve agents and an advanced research effort. At this early 
stage of the Cold War, British CW policy benefitted from tripartite cooperation, but it 
was not wholly reliant on this network. As the Cold War progressed, however, and 
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alongside economic pressures and political aversion, Britain gradually shifted from 
independence to interdependence, and by 1976 it was almost entirely dependent on the 
United States for all areas of CW policy. Certainly for nerve agent retaliatory 
capabilities and deterrence, Britain was dependent on the United States from 1957, as 
even though Ministerial approval was given for nerve agent weapons in 1963, it was 
never acted upon. The nerve agent debate is thus also, underneath the internal debates 
and discussions, an account of British CW policy in decline and of growing British 
dependence and reliance on the United States.  
Tripartite and Anglo-American collaboration in the CW field, though, occurred with 
noteworthy intensity and closeness, with CW cooperation perhaps only rivalled by BW 
cooperation in its depth and scope in British defence policy. This close cooperation, 
while having strong roots in the wartime experiences of the countries involved, was 
deepened and shaped during the Cold War. Regular conferences, the division of 
research, coordinating committees and representatives in each other’s CW programmes 
all further developed collaboration and led to a striking level of cooperation. This 
closeness allowed Britain to reduce expenditure in the CW field and avoid the 
duplication of resources. Close Anglo-American ties also held open the option of 
Britain acquiring nerve agent weapons from the United States. The Anglo-American 
relationship was not always smooth or completely open, but it did still facilitate the 
pooling of resources which was of vital importance to Britain, especially in light of the 
Soviet CW threat and given the massive research burden that came with the nerve agent 
age. And, even though there was turbulence in cooperation and the scale of the United 
States effort provided the opportunity for British reliance, Anglo-American and 
tripartite relations were central to keeping Britain at the forefront of CW research in the 
Cold War.  
The fifth finding of this thesis is that despite the significant importance attached to a 
nerve agent capability, military necessity, perceptions of the threat and substantial 
technological developments were seldom enough to override Government fears of 
adverse publicity, economic pressures, moral aversions, or the pre-eminence of 
internationally recognised arms control treaties. In the Cold War, arguments over 
military utility continually failed to overcome the constraints to their acquisition and 
possession. In 1946, with the emerging Cold War, retention of German stocks had been 
approved, in 1950, with the Korean War raging, nerve agent development was given 
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the green light, in 1954, after the nerve agent deal with the United States had fallen 
through, nerve agent production was approved, and 1963, with fears of Third World 
proliferation, nerve agent acquisition was again granted political support. Yet despite 
these policies, Britain never domestically mass-produced nerve agent weapons. In the 
early 1950s acquisition stumbled when it came to the issue of first-use, in the mid-
1960s nerve agent weapons failed to overcome political aversion and negative 
publicity, and in the 1970s acquisition was subsumed by the unrelenting shift towards 
disarmament. A key underlying feature of this British Cold War nerve agent debate is 
thus that fears of the Soviet threat, as well as the perceived military necessity and 
demands for a British nerve agent deterrent, were repeatedly overridden by concerns 
over negative publicity, political considerations, international arms control treaties, 
economic pressures and aversion to nerve agent weapons. 
For the acquisition of nerve agents, unlike with riot-control agents, commitments to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol remained sacrosanct and unyielding. From 1952, defence 
officials keen on nerve agent weapons witnessed the strong resistance to any re-
interpretation of first-use and any deviation from the internationally recognised 1925 
Geneva Protocol. This resistance came from within the Government, with the Foreign 
Office and the Cabinet Defence Committee actively opposing any reinterpretations of 
the widely accepted Geneva Protocol. Even though the nerve agent weapons 
represented a significant advance in the CW field, and despite the Soviet threat and 
need for a CW deterrent, military requirements never justified a unilateral re-
interpretation of first-use. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper in part represents a crucial 
success for the primacy of normative values over military utility and deterrence. Further 
exemplars of the influence of international treaties and political aversion to nerve agent 
weapons were also seen in 1955, when military attempts to re-interpret the Geneva 
Protocol were again rebuffed.  
In the 1960s, advocates of nerve agent weapons could also do little to overcome 
political considerations and adverse publicity, with Wilson’s ‘masterly silence’ 
isolating and marginalising CW policy.3 In light of this aversion to nerve agent 
weapons, and to the publicity thought necessary for deterrence, defence officials keen 
on acquisition could do little but bide their time, hopeful of a change in fortunes. The 
                                                 
3
 TNA, DEFE 13/557, ‘Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare – The Future of MRE and CDEE, 
Porton’, Sir Joseph Percival William Mallalieu, 22 August 1967. 
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1960s thus represents both the strengths and weaknesses of political oversight. For 
while politicians side-lined and quashed requests for nerve agent weapons, they did not 
proactively and definitively remove it, with the CoS simply waiting for a more 
opportune time. Rather than enact any meaningful change from the mid-1960s, CW 
policy was in essence frozen in place.  
The finale to this ongoing political-military struggle only came with the rise of 
chemical weapons disarmament. After 1972, opposition to nerve agent weapons gained 
significant momentum, and British commitments to chemical weapons disarmament 
took hold of policy considerations. This upsurge of support for chemical weapons 
disarmament effectively shifted the game, with the FCO directly questioning military 
requirements and striving for comprehensive disarmament measures and concessions 
from defence officials. In 1976, one of the most critical shifts in this ongoing clash 
came with commitments to chemical weapons disarmament ultimately overriding 
military requirements for nerve agent weapons. In 1976 détente and disarmament talks 
ended the aspirations of defence officials for a nerve agent capability, and after decades 
of military support, the door closed on this chapter of British defence policy. 
The British nerve agent debate over acquisition, deterrence and disarmament was a 
fluctuating and often contradictory one, policy was regularly muddled and a 
compromise: secrecy clashed with cooperation, deterrence clashed with secrecy and 
publicity, military utility clashed with political aversion and arms control treaties, and 
disarmament clashed with deterrence. While it was conflicting and often changing 
course, even with the high importance attached to CW deterrence and the acquisition of 
nerve agents, Britain never domestically mass-produced large stockpiles of nerve agent 
weapons, nor changed its first-use policy. In the Cold War British nerve agent 
experience and debate, the advocates for acquisition failed to overcome the obstacles in 
their path. 
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